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ABSTRACT 
This thesis uses the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development 
System (JCIDS) Capabilities Based Assessment (CBA) in an attempt to provide 
both monetary and nonmonetary solutions to the problem of low retention rates 
among Naval Information Warfare Officers (IWOs) in pay grades O-4 and O-5.  
An initial Functional Area Analysis (FAA) looks at Critical Skills Retention 
Bonuses (CSRBs), military retention factors, and IW community manning data.  A 
Functional Needs Analysis (FNA) looks into historical IW retention issues, and 
compares the pay of an IW officer to that of a civilian in an equivalent job.  
Retention issues are found by analyzing IW community-specific data from 
Defense Management Data Center (DMDC) from 1997 through 2007.  Analysis 
shows that, overall, historical retention is low at both O-4 and O-5, and that prior 
enlisted status, rank, and source of commission all play a role in this poor 
retention rate.  A Functional Solutions Analysis (FSA) recommends a monetary 
CSRB and nonmonetary solutions.  To evaluate the effectiveness of these 
solutions, an IW retention survey was administered to Naval Postgraduate 
School (NPS) IWOs.  This survey shows that, in addition to the monetary and 
nonmonetary solutions found in the FSA, the IW community might be able to 
improve retention further by focusing on improving IW leadership and  
community direction. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This thesis uses the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development 
System (JCIDS) Capabilities based Assessment (CBA) in an attempt to provide 
both monetary and nonmonetary solutions to the problem of low retention rates 
among Naval Information Warfare Officers (IWOs) in pay grades O-4 and O-5.  
The IW community needs to find a way to encourage officers in these pay grades 
to remain in service longer. 
An initial Functional Area Analysis (FAA) looks at Critical Skills Retention 
Bonuses (CSRBs), military retention factors, and IW community manning data.  
This analysis shows that 44% of the IW community is prior enlisted, and finds 
possible reasons why these officers might not stay past 20 years of service 
(YOS).  A Functional Needs Analysis (FNA) looks into historical IW retention 
issues, and compares the pay of an IW officer to that of a civilian in an  
equivalent job. 
Historical retention issues are found by analyzing IW community-specific 
data from DMDC for 1997 through 2007.  The FNA shows that, overall, historical 
retention is low at both O-4 and O-5, and that prior enlisted status, rank, and 
source of commission all play a role in this poor retention rate.  Additionally, the 
FNA finds that an IW O-4 with 18 YOS or more earns on average $12,700 less 
annually than his or her civilian counterpart’s 75th-percentile wage.  An IW O-5 
with 20 YOS or more earns slightly more than his or her counterpart’s 75th-
percentile wage. 
A Functional Solutions Analysis (FSA) suggests both monetary and 
nonmonetary solutions, including a recommended CSRB, geographical stability, 
flexible work arrangements, and leadership or educational opportunities.  To 
evaluate the effectiveness of these solutions, an IW retention survey was 




that IW personnel believe that, on average, they can earn $25,100 more annually 
in an equivalent civilian job, and 88% of those surveyed think a CSRB would be 
helpful. 
When asked what were the biggest negative IW community retention 
factors, participants answered (in order of importance): civilian career 
opportunities, pay, IW leadership, family quality of life, and community direction.  
When asked what their own biggest negative retention factors were, participants 
answered (in order of importance): IW leadership, job advancement, education 
and training opportunities, pay, and career opportunities. 
This survey shows that, in addition to the monetary and nonmonetary 
solutions found in the FSA, the IW community might be able to improve retention 
further by focusing on improving IW leadership and community direction.  This 
thesis concludes that shortages at O-5 are a direct result of too many prior 
enlisted officers who are not willing to stay in past retirement eligibility at the O-4 
pay grade.  While a CSRB may provide a short-term solution, nonmonetary 
solutions should be considered to provide an increase in long-term retention. 
The next recommended step for the IW community is to use the IW 
retention survey provided in this thesis, adjust it to reflect community solutions, 
and give it to all IWOs.  Analysis of this survey will allow the IW community to 
make effective decisions, based upon the intended behavior of the community.  
IW Community leaders should use this thesis and the survey provided to create a 
capable and cost-effective retention plan for the IW community. 
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Human Systems Integration (HSI) emphasizes human considerations in 
systems design and acquisition to reduce life-cycle costs and optimize system 
performance (Naval Postgraduate School, 2008).  With an emphasis on human 
considerations, HSI is involved in a multitude of domains, such as manpower, 
personnel, training, human factors engineering, human survivability, system 
safety, and health hazards.  The field of HSI uses many tools to develop effective 
solutions to problems within these domains, as well as trade-offs among them.  
The Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) is a defense 
acquisition process available to guide the HSI practitioner.  This thesis applies 
the JCIDS process in an attempt to solve the shortage of Naval Information 
Warfare Officers (IWOs), particularly at the pay grades of O-4 and O-5. 
A. EXPLANATION OF THE THESIS 
1. The Problem 
The Information Warfare (IW) community is a restricted line community 
within the United States Navy, with over 900 active duty officers.  Currently, the 
Navy’s IWOs work in the fields of Information Gathering and Information 
Security.  Since the IW community places a high value on the skills that  
Cryptologic Technicians (CTs) learn as enlisted Sailors, it recruits a high 
number of prior enlisted Sailors into its wardrooms.  This method of recruitment 
results in an operationally proficient wardroom until these IWOs are eligible for 
retirement.  Almost half of all IWOs are prior enlisted. 
Due to their prior enlisted service, many IWOs become eligible for 
retirement earlier than non-prior enlisted officers do.  As senior Lieutenants (LTs) 
and junior Lieutenant Commanders (LCDRs), they retire in  
larger-than-normal numbers and leave a significant gap in manning levels, 
especially at the next highest pay grade.  In 2008, manning at the  
2 
IW O-5/Commander (CDR) rank fluctuated between 72% and 79%.  Manning in 
other IW ranks has remained at or above 85%. 
In order to persuade prior enlisted IWOs to stay in the Navy beyond their 
20-year milestones, the IW community needs to find a way to encourage this 
commitment.  It feels that a monetary incentive to increase retention after 20 
years of service (YOS) may be a good solution.  Before drawing any conclusions, 
however, the IW community decided that more research was needed in this area.  
This thesis is part of that research. 
Rewarding prior enlisted, midgrade (O-4) and control-grade (O-5) IWOs 
may help the community’s immediate manning issues, but it may not be the best 
solution in the long run.  There may be other, more effective alternatives, which 
have fewer long-term effects and lower costs.  This problem needs a holistic 
approach, which identifies possible alternatives and recommends solutions, while 
ensuring the effectiveness of those solutions.  The JCIDS process can provide 
the right approach to finding effective solutions for manning shortages. 
2. The Human Systems Integration (HSI) Approach 
There are two well-used definitions of HSI.  According to the  
Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), HSI emphasizes human considerations in 
systems design and acquisition to reduce life-cycle costs and optimize system 
performance (Naval Postgraduate School, 2008).  According to the defense field 
of acquisitions, HSI is the integrated analysis, design, and assessment over the 
lifecycle of a system and associated support infrastructure in the domains of 
manpower, personnel, training, human factors engineering, personnel 
survivability, habitability, and environment, safety, and occupational health 
(ESOH) (Secretary of the Navy, 2008). 
As defined by NPS, HSI actually works in eight domains.  These domains 
are similar to the domains used in the field of acquisitions; however, ESOH is 
split into both System Safety and Health Hazards.  The NPS domains listed 






 Human Factors Engineering 
 Human Survivability 
 Habitability 
 System Safety 
 Health Hazards 
While HSI is clearly defined as a field used by acquisition management, 
HSI is also a process that can address issues in the design or redesign of any 
acquisition system that involves humans.  This process takes into account the 
issue(s), the HSI domains, and the trade-offs among those domains.  For 
example, when we lower manning levels without sufficient automation, we 
increase workload, increase safety hazards due to that workload, and  
decrease habitability. 
Of the eight specific HSI domains, Manpower, Personnel, Habitability, and 
Training are related to this IWO retention issue.  Manpower, Personnel, and 
Habitability are discussed extensively, while Training is covered briefly.  Initially, 
retention of IW control-grade officers is a manpower issue, since the IW 
community is undermanned in this area.  This thesis recommends solutions that 
involve both manpower and personnel policies and the effect of those policies on 
personnel habitability, as they relate to the IW community. 
Retention problems can contain a complex variety of subordinate issues.  
To assist in the organization and problem approach, part of the defense acquisition 
requirements process, called the JCIDS Capability Based Assessment (CBA), is 
used. 
3. The Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System 
(JCIDS) Process 
The primary objective of the JCIDS process is to ensure that joint 
warfighters receive the capabilities required to successfully execute the missions 
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assigned to them (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2007).  The JCIDS 
process helps the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) in assessing 
military capabilities and acquisitions.  This involves looking at current capability 
gaps, prioritizing needs, and finding solutions that fill those capability gaps.  The 
JROC can then recommend which solutions are best to begin or continue the 
acquisition design/redesign process. 
The HSI practitioner can use this process to help military decision makers 
prioritize capability needs, solutions, and alternatives.  The JCIDS process 
begins with a Capabilities Based Assessment (CBA).  The CBA is a holistic 
process that allows the HSI practitioner to systematically address capability gaps, 
identify needs, and find solutions.  This thesis uses the JCIDS CBA process to 
perform a functional area, needs, and solution analysis for the IWO  
retention problem.  It is important to note that this thesis was written prior to the 
new DOD instruction 5000.02, which modified the CBA process.   
The Functional Area Analysis (FAA) includes an overview of current 
military compensation strategies, retention issues, and an in-depth view of the IW 
community.  The Functional Needs Analysis (FNA) takes an analytical approach, 
looking at historical retention levels and retention trends to find capability gaps 
and areas for concern.  The Functional Solutions Analysis (FSA) provides both 
monetary and nonmonetary solutions for the IW retention problem.  This CBA 
process is shown in Figure 1, and can be found in DOD instruction 5000.2, and 
the related JCIDS J-8 CBA user guide. 
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Figure 1.   The CBA Process (After Joint Chiefs of Staff, J-8, 2006) 
Start at the top right of this modified JCIDS model, where the IW 
community has suggested a possible Critical Skills Retention Bonus (CSRB).  
This is the strategic guidance input, or future concept idea, shown in the upper 
right of the model.  This input is a conceptual request for research into the 
redesign of IWO policy to increase retention at control-grade levels.  From this, 
the model flows left into the FAA, where the IW manpower issues and suggested 
solutions are identified.  Then, the FNA includes four of the HSI domains 
identified on the left as Manpower, Personnel, Habitability, and Training.  After 
the FNA, this process goes to the FSA.  During the FSA, the model shows the 
materiel and non-materiel approaches.  The IW community is provided with 
multiple solutions, as shown at the bottom right. 
4. Measuring Solution Effectiveness 
The Navy cannot afford to implement manning strategies that are 
ineffective or have costly side effects.  Decision makers can decide who will pay 
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for a new strategy and how much they can afford, but they must have a reliable 
list of effective solutions.  Part of the HSI approach is to ensure that solutions are 
effective for the end user.  Rather than provide only recommendations to the IW 
community that may or may not work, a basic measure of solution effectiveness 
is provided.  While it is impossible to know all of the side effects, all of the time, it 
is critical to think about these effects early in the decision-making process.  The 
initial measure of effectiveness is the results and feedback from an IWO survey. 
To measure the effectiveness of the recommended solutions, data from a 
survey of NPS IWOs is provided.  Thirty-four NPS IWOs provided input and 
feedback on IW retention and an IW CSRB.  The focus of this survey is to find 
out whether the affected IWOs will accept and support the solutions that may be 
implemented.  This should give the IW community an in-depth understanding of 
the issues, the possible solutions, and the IWOs response to those solutions. 
B. OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
1. Scope 
This thesis analyzes the IW community, midgrade and control-grade 
retention, and provides solutions with feedback.  The focus is on the JCIDS 
process, monetary incentives, retention, nonmonetary incentives, and prior 
enlisted officers.  While this research will concentrate on the IW community, other 
communities may also find it of interest.  Department of the Navy (DON) Fiscal 
Year (FY) 96-09 Budgets show that over the last decade, total annual officer 
gains have decreased, while the number of prior enlisted officers gained each 
year has remained approximately the same (Department of the Navy, 2009).  
The percentage of all Navy prior enlisted officers gained each year between 1998 
and 2005 averaged 23.5%, while the percentages have increased between the 
years 2006 and 2008, averaging 34.8%. 
While increasing the number of prior enlisted officers may be a good idea 
for many reasons, officer-manning problems at the O-4 and O-5 pay grades 
could be a costly side effect.  Since the IW community has such a large 
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percentage of prior enlisted officers, this issue could be a precursor of future 
manning issues across other communities.  While this particular methodology 
may be helpful to other communities, all communities are not the same, and 
should be treated independently.  These results should not be used beyond the 
IW community without careful consideration. 
In addition to providing solutions for the IW community, this thesis shows 
that using the JCIDS CBA process can be an effective tool for HSI manpower, 
personnel, and training practitioners.  However, using a holistic approach, and 
providing initial solution effectiveness, still has limitations. 
2. Limitations 
This is an analysis of a complex manpower, personnel, and habitability 
(morale) issue.  As such, there is no physical experiment.  With no quantitative 
experiment, it is difficult to account for confounding variables and establish true 
cause and effect.  This will limit the absolute efficacy of this research.  However, 
establishing correlations and accounting for possible confounding variables, may 
still produce valid recommendations. 
Additionally, the effective representation of the NPS IW survey is an issue.  
These particular survey participants did not accurately represent the IW 
community.  Results may be biased toward men, and those with more 
experience in the Navy.  These results are less useful than if we were to survey a 
sample from the entire Navy population of IWOs.  Other limitations are described 
where appropriate in future chapters. 
C. IW COMMUNITY BACKGROUND 
As previously stated, the IW community is a restricted line community 
within the United States Navy.  This community began with a mission of 
gathering signals intelligence.  The IWO was formally known as the  




due to the expanding scope and responsibility of the community.  While the 
community name changed, the officer designators and billets remained  
the same. 
Today, the Navy’s IWOs work in the fields of Information Gathering and 
Information Security.  IWOs usually work in one of five areas, commonly 
described as Electronic Warfare, Computer Network Operations, Psychological 
Operations, Military Deception, and Operational Security (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
2006).  Forty-four percent of IWOs come from the enlisted ranks through various 
commissioning sources.  Many of these prior enlisted officers come from enlisted 
cryptology ratings. 
According to the Navy, all newly commissioned IWOs attend 11 weeks of 
IW training before going to their first assignment (United States Navy, 2008).  
Usually, these new officers are sent to one of four locations: San Antonio, Texas; 
Kunai, Hawaii; Augusta, Georgia; or Fort Meade, Maryland.  After this initial tour, 
many of these officers serve in a deployable status, while others are sent to 
continue their education.  After their second tour, regardless of commissioning 
source or age, most IWOs are mid-level Lieutenants.  Future duty stations focus 
on four main components: leadership, operational experience, technical 
competence, and continuing education.  It is also important that an IWO be 
competent in all four areas, and not be limited to one or two kinds of competency. 
The IW community currently has over 900 personnel and holds over 1,000 
billets, 69% of which are considered shore duty. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. OVERVIEW 
This chapter describes the main literature reviewed and information 
needed to perform an FAA.  The need for retaining control-grade IWOs stems 
from an immediate operational need for these officers.  However, the Navy 
cannot quickly produce control-grade officers for the IW community.  Considering 
how long it takes to “grow” a control-grade officer, and the complexities involved 
in retention, the implementation of a CSRB for these officers must first be viewed 
as a perceived need.  When beginning an assessment of a perceived need, the 
JCIDS process recommends a complete initial area analysis (Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, J-8, 2006). 
Section B discusses current Navy manning policies.  Section C discusses 
Navy CSRBs.  This includes current Department of Defense (DOD) and Navy 
retention policies, as well as three examples of Navy CSRBs.  Typical CSRB 
implementation procedures and issues, and how to calculate an initial amount for 
a CSRB, are also included in section C. 
Section D covers military and Navy retention.  This begins with retention 
definitions and factors, moves on to major military retention issues, followed by 
the reasons that people leave the Navy.  Next, it describes specific Navy 
retention factors and retention characteristics, including lateral transfers and prior 
enlisted personnel.  The last part of Section D includes retention trade-offs and 
nonmonetary ways to improve retention. 
Section E gives a brief description of the advantages and disadvantages 
of online surveys, and describes two different types of good retention surveys.  
Section F provides a demographic description of the current Navy, to be used for 
comparisons in the FNA section.  Section G provides available data on the IW 
community including billets, advancement opportunities, and typical end strength. 
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B. UNITED STATES NAVY MANNING POLICY 
To understand Navy manning policy, it is helpful to start with an overview.  
Changes in one area may affect another area’s mission, environment, resources, 
and process (Thie, Christian, Stafford, Yardley, & Schirmer, 2008).  It is important 
to identify the pertinent policies, vision, and mission of the involved leadership.  
This will allow us to identify gaps between leadership desires and suggested 
solutions.  This section provides a general review of policies that affect manning 
and retention decisions. 
In previous years, the DOD has provided guidance to manpower  
decision makers to make fiscally informed manpower decisions with three things in 
mind.  First, manpower levels should remain at the minimum levels needed to 
meet workload requirements.  Second, the combination of personnel (civilian or 
military) assigned to missions should be determined using the least costly method.  
Third, the DOD planning and programming guide should be used when 
determining acceptable fiscal limits and risks (Thie et al., 2008).  Additionally, 
when civilian personnel are available and can do the job, whether deployed or 
otherwise, they should be considered for that job (Thie et al., 2008).  This may be 
a policy of interest to any community, when looking at severe manning shortages. 
Within the DON, the Office of Manpower, Personnel, Education, and 
Training (N1) provides input to the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and other 
Navy executives.  One type of input includes the Manpower and Personnel 
(M&P) Total Force Baseline Assessment Memorandum (BAM).  This five-year 
plan proposes key strategies, including minimizing long-term manpower costs, 
providing positive experiences to Sailors, and aligning the M&P policies with 
Total Force human resource policies (Department of the Navy, N1, 2002). 
Much as it sounds, the Navy’s Total Force policy is a single, all-inclusive 
manning policy for both reservists and active duty (AD) personnel.  One of the 
Total Force issues identified in the BAM is the gap that exists between the 
Navy’s operational requirements and the number of Sailors that it has to fill those 
requirements.  The Navy also has a problem with longevity imbalances in both 
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the enlisted and officer workforces.  In other words, there can be grouping issues 
where there are too many or not enough Sailors with a particular longevity 
measured by YOS.  This BAM identifies the need for both short-term and long-
term actions to mitigate these issues.  One suggestion is the targeting of special 
duty or special skill pay toward projected midgrade shortages in the officer 
community (Department of the Navy, N1, 2002).  This is similar to what the IW 
community has proposed for control-grade officers. 
Currently, there are many kinds of targeted compensation packages within 
the Navy.  Section C discusses one of the major types of compensation— 
the CSRB. 
C. THE MILITARY CSRB 
Within the last ten years, the number of bonuses paid to officers has 
increased.  With policies and strategies that support these bonuses, it is not 
surprising that the IW community identified the CSRB as a solution to its manning 
problem.  Before implementing a CSRB, it is important to look at and identify 
possible CSRB trends and issues.  There are many CSRB examples to look at 
within the military. 
In the Navy, the primary CSRB examples are within the Unrestricted Line 
(URL) communities including Aviators, Surface Warfare Officers (SWOs), and 
Submariners.  The IW community is not a part of the URL; rather, it belongs to 
the Restricted Line (RL) community.  However, because of the large amount of 
research that has been done on the URL community’s CSRBs, it is useful to look 
at the URL community that most resembles the IW community.  Therefore, the 
SWO community’s CSRB is one of the bonuses reviewed in this section. 
Within the RL community, the Navy currently only offers one CSRB, which 
is for the Intelligence community.  Within the Staff Corps, the Department of 
Health and Human Services (HHS) offers CSRBs to Navy healthcare 
professionals.  Both the Intelligence and Healthcare CSRBs are also reviewed in 
this section.  Relative to the URL CSRBs, less research has been conducted on 
the smaller RL community and Staff Corps CSRBs. 
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1. Department of Defense CSRB Policy 
The current DoD policy encourages the military services to use retention 
bonuses as incentives to meet DoD personnel requirements.  Specifically, 
monetary bonuses should be used when other alternatives have proven 
inadequate, impractical, or less cost-effective.  Monetary compensation should 
be awarded to personnel whose skills are “essential to the accomplishment of 
defense missions” (Department of Defense, 2005, p. 2).  The current directive 
states that financial incentives are just one element with which to control 
personnel inventory, and should not be a substitute for good planning and 
management. 
While the CSRB targets personnel with essential skills, there are 
limitations.  To receive a CSRB, an officer must remain on active duty for a 
period of at least one year.  In addition, an officer must not have completed over 
25 years of active duty before the end of the period for which the bonus is 
offered, except in the case of a Healthcare Officer.  Lastly, officers receiving the 
CSRB cannot receive more than $200,000 in bonuses over the course of their 
career, nor more than $30,000 per year (Department of Defense, 2005). 
2. Department of the Navy CSRB Policy 
In addition to the DoD policy on CSRBs, the DON provides Navy-specific 
guidance for compensation.  This guidance is very similar to the DoD guidance, 
and states that the rational use of compensation policies can support strategic 
objectives.  The DON supports using CSRBs as a means of effective and cost-
efficient recruitment, retention, reward, and motivation, and to facilitate career 
transitions to sustain the Navy’s Total Force (Force Management Oversight 
Council, 2005). 
In 2004, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Manpower and Reserve 
Affairs gave four guiding principles to support the DON’s guiding compensation 
strategies (Hansen & Koopman, 2005).  One of the strategies listed is Strategic 
Best Value or Best Value.  It states that the DON’s policies should align with 
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other elements of the larger human capital strategy to produce the highest value.  
To facilitate this alignment, targeted compensation can provide cost-effective 
solutions to address service-specific needs (Hansen & Koopman, 2005). 
3. N1 CSRB Recommendations 
As previously stated, the BAM evaluates all current Navy personnel 
programs to ensure that they each support M&P strategies.  A few of the 
suggestions focus on Selective Reenlistments Bonuses (SRBs) for enlisted 
Sailors, as well as Special Duty Assignment Pay (SDAP) and Surface Warfare 
Officer Continuation Pay (SWOCP) for officers.  Money remains one of the most 
effective ways to increase retention (Department of the Navy, N1, 2002).  A 
recent example of the use of CSRBs is the one currently offered to midgrade 
Intelligence Officers.  N1, however, also recognizes that monetary compensation 
does not solve all problems.  In some cases, nonmonetary incentives are  
more effective. 
4. Intelligence Officer CSRB 
After 2001, both the importance of the Intelligence Community and the need 
to retain Intelligence Officers increased dramatically.  Like officers in other 
communities, Intelligence Officers often get out of the Navy after their initial 
obligation has ended, which sometimes results in manning shortages.  These 
manning shortages prevented the Intelligence community from meeting operational 
requirements at the O-4/LCDR level.  Offering a CSRB to O-3/LTs between 4 and 
10 YOS was one way in which the Intelligence community retained these officers 
(Department of the Navy, N1, 2002). 
To analyze the effects of an Intelligence Officer CSRB, the Navy hired the 
SAG Corporation to conduct a comprehensive review.  The SAG Corporation 
evaluated econometric relationships and used them to create a baseline behavior 
for Intelligence Officers.  Then they projected end strengths based on this 
behavior.  The retention behavior after CSRB implementation was modeled using 
pay elasticities (Mackin & Dye, 2001).  Additionally, the SAG Corporation gave 
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an estimated CSRB program cost using the Navy’s Cost of Manpower Estimating 
Tool (COMET), with training cost data from the community manager.  Table 1 
shows an example of data provided by the SAG Corporation, as reported by N1.  
This data shows that providing a CSRB costs less annually than not providing a 
CSRB for the Intelligence community. 
Annual Steady State Costs and Savings ($M) 
Cost Element Baseline With CSRB 
Billet Costs* 102.4 89.5 
Training Costs 1.6 1.4 
CSRB Cost 0 2.8 
Total Annual Cost 104.0 93.7 
Net Annual Savings -------- 10.3 
     *Includes $10.3K per student for initial training. 
Table 1.   Annual Steady State Costs and Savings ($M) 
Since there was no data showing the Intelligence Officer CSRB take-rate 
(the rate at which officers accept or decline the CSRB), this was estimated using 
the take-rate among participants in the Nuclear Program SWOs.  Retention 
studies for the RL communities often use examples and data from the URL 
communities.  This is because there is no available econometric study of RL 
community officer retention behavior.  Other communities could have been used 
in the model, but the Nuclear SWO results provided the most conservative 
estimates of retention effects (Mackin & Dye, 2001). 
N1’s risk assessment at that time was a moderate-high (on a scale of low, 
moderate, high), based on the cost of operational billet gaps.  As with the current 
IW community, the Intelligence community was in danger of losing over 20% of 
its Officer Programmed Authorization (OPA; the number of officers authorized) at 
O-4/LCDR.  This report showed that “a modest investment in CSRB is viewed as 
the best alternative to reduce risk” (Department of the Navy, N1, 2002, p. 88). 
5. HHS CSRB 
The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Commissioned 
Corps Personnel Manual (2003) gives insight into the detailed requirements, 
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eligibility, and implementation of the Healthcare CSRB program.  This instruction 
identifies all the specific rules by which the military medical officers of the Public 
Health Service (PHS) can be given the Healthcare CSRB including eligibility, 
obligation, payment, contract, repayment, and termination. 
Currently, the HHS offers CSRBs to 19 Healthcare specialties such as 
nurses, anesthesiologists, radiologists, and surgeons.  In order to be eligible for 
the HHS CSRBs, medical officers must work for three or more years in their 
qualifying specialty, in addition to currently using 75% or more of their workday 
performing the duties of the qualifying specialty.  They must also have attained 
the appropriate training, certification, or degree for their field (Department of 
Health and Human Services Public Health Service, 2003). 
These requirements are a good example of just how selective a 
community can be before authorizing the eligibility of a service member for a 
CSRB.  Instead of changing the number of personnel eligible for the CSRB 
program, HHS has put in place specific training and requirements to ensure that 
only those personnel with desired qualifications get a CSRB.  In other words, 
they improve the quality of the CSRB taker, without decreasing the pool of 
takers.  This could prove to be an effective tool during times when fewer CSRB 
takers are desired. 
6. SWO CSRB 
Retention of SWOs has been an issue for decades, going back to the 
1960s.  In 1999, the Secretary of the Navy authorized Surface Warfare Officer 
Continuation Pay (SWOCP) (Wahl & Singh, 2006).  Today, there are four bonus 
programs for a non-nuclear SWO:  two for junior officers and two for more senior 
officers.  Of the two programs for more senior officers, one, called the Expanded 
SWOCP, is for department heads (O-3 and O-4) who are still fit for sea duty.  
Another bonus is the Senior SWOCSRB or the Senior SWO Bonus.  The Senior 
SWO Bonus is aimed at O-5s and O-6s who serve in critical positions identified 
by the CNO (Department of the Navy, 2005; Department of the Navy, N1, 2002). 
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Of the four bonuses, the expanded SWOCP and Senior CSRB can be 
identified as more critical, since it takes 10–15 years to “grow” a midgrade (O-4) 
SWO or 15–20 years for a control-grade (O-5) SWO (Department of the Navy, 
N1, 2002).  As with the Intelligence Officer CSRB, the BAM report identifies the 
costs of the SWO programs.  These include the installments, commitments, and 
budgeting required for a CSRB.  Like officers from the Intelligence and IW 
communities, SWOs are getting out at a certain YOS and in large enough 
numbers to cause concern. 
The SWO community has not met its OPA since 1993.  Figure 2, from the 
N1 BAM, shows a SWO Length of Service (LOS) Distribution.  This LOS 
distribution shows shortages at mid-grades and control-grades (Department of 
the Navy, N1, 2002).  The yellow background shows the OPA levels that were 
authorized.  The blue bars show the actual end-strength levels (number of 
personnel) reported at the end of the FY.  The dashed lines show the differences 
in pay grade.  The x-axis represents LOS, and the y-axis represents the number 
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Figure 2.   SWO Length of Service (LOS) (From Department of the Navy, N1, 
2002) 
Figure 2 shows that for SWOs with LOS 9–15, the SWO community is 
approximately 100 personnel short for each YOS.  The SWO community’s OPA 
was approximately 2,100 (7 years x 300 authorized) personnel for those seven 
undermanned LOS years.  Manning was at approximately 1,400 (7 years x 200 
available) personnel.  That is an OPA gap of approximately 33% for YOS 9-15 
during FY01.  Additionally, we can see how many more SWOs are being 
recruited above OPA on the left, just to meet the desired end strength at more 
senior YOS.   
Today, the SWO community is still trying to find a better way to retain its 
officers.  Strict monetary incentives have not been as effective as originally 
thought.  Stoker and Mehay (2005) found that the SWOCP appears to be less 
effective at retaining women than men.  Their data came from the 2004 SWO 
Quick Poll Survey.  While 67% of men felt that their Department Head (DH) tour 
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decisions would be impacted by the current SWOCP ($50,000), only 52% of 
women felt likewise.  This gender gap grows with the proposed size of the bonus.  
While 72% of men felt that a $100,000 bonus would increase their desire the 
stay, only 27% of females felt the same (Stoker & Mehay, 2005).  Since 2004, 
13%–19% of women still report money does not influence their retention decision 
as much as their male counterparts (Stoker & Crawford, 2008). 
Filip (2006) suggested that the implementation of a bonus auction might 
be more effective than a strict bonus.  The current system gives the same bonus 
to all officers, when only some may require that much of a monetary incentive.  A 
bonus auction allows those officers who will stay for less money, to stay for that 
amount, allowing them to “outbid” their peers.  The difficulty is ensuring that the 
most skilled and motivated personnel are as likely to win the auction bonus as 
those who are less motivated or skilled (Filip, 2006).  While this new solution may 
make the bonus more efficient, it does not account for the retention of personnel 
who are less motivated by monetary incentives. 
Rather than fix this imbalance by giving all SWOs more money, Stoker 
and Mehay (2005) suggest that the SWO community offer a one-year sabbatical 
leave program.  They assert that more money will not permanently fix cultural 
issues and is, at best, a temporary solution.  Targeting this program to high-risk 
officers is the biggest challenge.  The Navy will preserve the pay and allowances 
of officers who choose the sabbatical rather than a normal shore tour.  However, 
even the addition of nonmonetary solutions does not tell us the possible take-rate 
behavior of SWOs toward these programs. 
Because of the unknown take rate, Stoker and Mehay (2005) suggest 
conducting interviews of SWOs to collect information and develop questionnaires.  
These questionnaires should be developed into a survey to find out what SWOs value 
the most before making retention solution recommendations.  They suggest 
interviewing three groups—AD, recently separated, and lateral transfers—with males 
and females interviewed separately within these groups (Stoker & Mehay, 2005). 
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After the interviews, the Navy should develop a conjoint-based survey to 
determine the relative value that each officer places on a variety of monetary and 
nonmonetary factors that influence his or her SWO retention decision.  Flexible 
work arrangements, 360-degree feedback, mentoring programs, and additional 
family support programs are also recommended, but to a lesser extent (Stoker & 
Mehay, 2005).  This same methodology may be useful to the IW community. 
In the original study of the implementation of the SWO Career Incentive 
Pay (CIP), the positive factors associated with the monetary incentive were 
increased retention, alleviation of short-term manning problems, and the 
retention of high-quality personnel (Mackin & Darling, 1996).  This study quoted 
cost savings, since the higher bonus payments were cheaper than the overall 
decrease in work-years or billet costs.  The report suggests implementing the 
SWOCIP; however, it also states that the magnitude of cost savings is sensitive 
to the assumptions made regarding responsiveness (take-rate behavior).  This is 
still true today, and the SWO community is still having trouble meeting its OPA.  
The SWO community failed to account for the poor take-rate behavior of SWOs 
toward the SWOCIP, which might have been foreseen earlier with a valid 
SWOCIP take-rate survey.  Such a take-rate survey was suggested twice in the 
original SWOCIP paper (Mackin & Darling, 1996). 
After the fact, the Navy has sent out several surveys about implementing 
the SWOCIP.  The issue with these surveys is that they tend to focus on the 
overall minority of personnel who are interested in staying in the Navy for the 
money.  The Navy should be looking at the retention of the majority of 
respondents, including those who are not as persuaded by the SWOCP (Wahl & 
Singh, 2006).  The IW community should carefully examine both the mistakes 
and successes of the SWO community’s efforts to retain their officers. 
While these studies provide invaluable insight into officer CSRB 
methodology, Kleinman and Hanson (2005) provide some additional key points  
of note: 
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 Nonpay-related attributes of the military can increase or reduce 
compensation values. 
 A holistic approach is needed when planning compensation 
packages. 
 The Navy should give people choices when those choices do not 
negatively affect the military mission.  Often, this is more  
cost-effective than generalized bonuses. 
7. Efficient Compensation 
Researchers have used several techniques to find the most efficient amount 
of money to offer in a CSRB.  These methods include complicated statistical 
formulas like those used by the SAG Corporation, retention surveys, and figures 
based on civilian equivalency pay.  There is no perfect number when it comes to 
retention CSRBs, especially when there are nonmonetary issues involved.  While 
looking at retention relative to military enlisted compensation and civilian equivalent 
pay, Hansen (2000) found that those highly technical enlisted ratings, with the higher 
civilian equivalent salaries, had the most severe manning problems.  However, 
these ratings also had the highest military compensation levels. 
Hansen (2000) linked enlisted Navy ratings to their civilian equivalents and 
evaluated many factors, including the wages military personnel could make if 
working in their civilian equivalent job.  He found that the Defense Manpower 
Data Center (DMDC) had created a “crosswalk” that links Navy officer and 
enlisted ratings to a 5-digit Occupational Employment Statistics (OES) code 
(Defense Manpower Data Center, 2001).  This OES code is used by the Bureau 
of Labor Statistics to evaluate a plethora of employment statistics on each 
occupation code.  Hansen suggests using the Occupational Conversion Index 
(OCI) to convert military occupations by job and specialty before looking up the 
data for that occupation (Department of Defense, 2001).  In 2004, however, the 
National Crosswalk Service Center adopted DMDC’s creation into an easily 
accessible Web site with Military Occupation Code to Standard Occupational  
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Classifications (MOC-SOC) conversions.  This is a convenient way to find out a 
how much an IWO can earn in the civilian workplace, and could be used as a 
starting place for a CSRB amount. 
D. UNITED STATES NAVY RETENTION 
Looking at manning policies and current monetary incentives is important.  
However, these sections give only limited insight into the complex personnel 
retention issues the Navy currently faces.  This section identifies the Navy’s 
retention issues, the reason our personnel leave, and possible solutions. 
1. Introduction, Definitions, and Retention Factors 
Retention is defined as a person, or a number of personnel, voluntarily 
deciding to stay in the Navy after being eligible to leave.  Related retention and 
turnover definitions can be found in Table 2. 
Term Definition 
Turnover The number of people who leave the organization 
Retention The opposite of turnover; the number of people who stay
Turnover Rate Number of employees that left during time x  ÷   Average total number of employees during time x 
Involuntary Turnover Personnel who are involuntary discharged or terminated 
Voluntary Turnover Personnel who leave by their own choice 
 
 
Table 2.   Retention Definitions (From Korkmaz, 2005) 
Retention is an issue in all organizations.  If an employee leaves the 
organization, there is usually a negative impact.  This impact is due to decreased 
productivity, costs to hire a new employee, etc. (Korkmaz, 2005).  There can also 
be negative impacts on employee morale and organizational culture.  In the 
Navy, low retention (high turnover) increases overall personnel cost, decreases 
officer quality, increases recruiting efforts, and reduces overall productivity 
(Korkmaz, 2005). 
There are many reasons why Navy personnel voluntarily leave.  The most 
significant of these factors are pay, age, tenure, number of dependents, 
organizational commitment, and satisfaction with work, coworkers, and 
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supervisors (Korkmaz, 2005).  Other studies have looked at specific community 
retention.  Messmer and Pizanti (2007) looked at DMDC data from 1990 to 2005, 
and analyzed demographics, professional characteristics, and military experience 
as retention factors in the Navy Nurse Corps.  He found that retention in the 
Nurse Corps was positively correlated with being a male, a minority, having 
dependents, being prior enlisted, having a subspecialty beyond general nursing, 
and having a postgraduate degree (Messmer & Pizanti, 2007). 
Stoker and Crawford (2008) looked at the SWO community and found that 
mentoring was an indirect retention factor.  They also found a positive correlation 
between experienced officers and junior officer retention (Stoker & Crawford, 
2008).  Regardless of the community, retention issues are complex and span 
many factors; thus, there are different retention views and theories. 
2. Retention Issues 
There are several ways to view retention issues.  From an economic point 
of view, the military pay table is not sensitive enough to provide optimal pay 
across various pay grades and jobs (Rosen, 1992).  This is just one explanation 
of why the Navy must give bonuses to meet the demand for the retention of 
specific personnel.  Additionally, times are changing.  Staying in the military for 
20 years to get a pension does not influence as many people as it used to.  
Economic incentives built into the system depend on how a person perceives the 
costs and benefits of that system and the incentives offered (Rosen, 1992).  
While this statement is from a slightly older review of retention, it still holds  
true today. 
Another economic theory likens military service to an “experience good,” 
stating that only after individuals enter the military do they find out whether or not 
they like it (Asch & Warner, 2001).  At this point, most of those who do not like 
military service leave at the end of their obligation.  The real question is why do 
other personnel stay?  The military has several factors that are uncommon in the 
civilian workplace, like the loss of personal freedom, increased danger, and  
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frequent family separations.  It is because of these unusual job-related factors 
that the reasons personnel remain in the military vary widely (Asch &  
Warner, 2001). 
Asch and Warner (2001) found that it is this heterogeneity of reasons that 
help the military retain senior enlisted personnel.  These same personnel are 
highly skilled and motivated.  If their preferences are not met, the military could 
see these personnel leave (Asch & Warner, 2001).  Accordingly, the more types 
of retention programs available, the more preferences that can be met and the 
more personnel the Navy will retain. 
Retention is not always about constantly improving, either.  The downside 
of improving Navy retention is to improve it too much.  Then, senior personnel 
would not retire or leave and the promotion opportunities for more junior 
personnel would decrease.  This would result in a decrease in the productivity of 
these personnel and create manning issues in the more junior ranks (Asch & 
Warner, 2001).  It is easier to “grow” junior personnel than senior personnel, so  
over-retention of senior personnel may be preferred.  However, this method may 
decrease the morale of junior personnel.  It is often difficult to change the 
negative cultural impact of poor morale within a large organization like  
the military. 
The military has had duty rotations for much of its existence; however, 
rotations have specific identified effects, such as high turnover and lower 
performance (Kleinman & Hansen, 2005).  Leadership can be affected by 
rotation, also.  Frequent rotations can separate decisions from outcomes, 
contributing to both conservative and risky decisions, depending on the leader.  
Other rotation issues that can have a negative effect on retention include 
children’s education, schools, dependent special health needs, and recreational 
interests (Kleinman & Hansen, 2005). 
This should lead one to ask if rotational duty is necessary.  It is (Kleinman 
& Hansen, 2005).  The military needs to have a system that rotates personnel to 
and from dangerous or less-desirable duty, as well as to relieve worn-out Sailors.  
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Without rotational duty, personnel may identify more with their job than with the 
Navy, or units may begin to form their own culture, contrary to the Navy’s mission 
(Kleinman & Hansen, 2005). 
While these retention issues are clear, there is specific military and Navy 
community research that has tried to find out exactly why undesired personnel 
turnover continues. 
3. Why People Leave 
The United States military has a unique work force.  In 2004, the average 
LOS was less than ten years (Department of Defense, 2006).  As previously 
discussed, the military usually wants to keep a younger force and prevent a top-
heavy rank structure.  The military also moves personnel regularly.  Civilian jobs 
with similar lifestyles include police officers, miners, corporate executives, and 
physicians (Department of Defense, 2006).  While many companies may ask 
their managers and executives to move, the rest of the organization usually 
remains stable.  Between 2000 and 2001, 37% of military personnel moved to a 
new residence, compared with 15% of civilians (Department of Defense, 2006). 
The military lifestyle can have a negative effect on family life.  Shift work, 
unpredictable hours, and overnight duty make the scheduling of family life 
difficult.  Enlisted service members self-report working about 54 hours per week, 
while officers work almost 60 hours per week (Department of Defense, 2006).  
Family responsibilities among military personnel have grown, as have marriage 
rates and the numbers of women, single parents, and dual-service couples 
(Department of Defense, 2006).  Frequent relocation can cause a number of 
family problems.  Children must adjust to a new area, friends, school, and school 
curricula.  In addition, military spouses are disadvantaged in the job market 
because of their temporary status (Department of Defense, 2006; United States 
General Accounting Office, 2002). 
Over the last 40 years, military spouses have become a larger part of the 
workforce, much as civilian spouses have.  This, combined with the military’s 
quick job rotation, is likely one of the reasons for today’s retention issues 
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(Kleinman & Hansen, 2005).  Kleinman and Hansen (2005) found that military 
spouses are often not employed full time, nor do they make as much as their 
civilian counterparts.  This is true for both male and female spouses.  This means 
it is less likely that a military spouse’s career will progress successfully like the 
career of a civilian spouse.  Because of this, Navy families may find it difficult to 
choose between the two careers (Kleinman & Hansen, 2005).  Eventually, if the 
service member’s family is not happy, the member is likely to seek employment 
elsewhere. 
The most evident Navy-specific retention issue of late has been the high 
turnover within the SWO community.  Stoker and Crawford (2008) looked into the 
factors that influence SWOs to leave the Navy.  Some of the factors included 
monetary incentives, leadership, mentoring, and gender.  This report found that 
the SWOCP might not have as positive an effect as was originally thought.  While 
CSRBs may provide retention for those who are attracted to the monetary value, 
they do not solve nonmonetary-related issues. 
Stoker and Crawford (2008) looked at people that have already left the 
military, who represent officer year groups from 1983 to 2005.  Their findings are 
shown in Table 3.  This report compared men to women, and the older versus 
younger year groups (1983–1993 and 1993–2005, respectively).  Table 3 shows 
which officers (by sex and age) agreed with the statement in the first column.  
Most of these factors held strong influence on their decision to get out of the 
Navy.  Blank boxes under the Age column mean there was no indication that 









Findings Sex (M/F) Age (Older/Younger)
Family-related factors are the highest rated 
influence on retention. Both agree Both agree 
Leadership and culture have more influence than 
monetary incentives. Both agree Both agree 
Mentoring is a positive retention tool. Both agree  
A significant number of personnel would consider 
returning to the community if improvements to 





Leadership is the primary topic listed that the 
SWO community could fix to improve retention. Both agree
All agree, except 
F from younger 
year group 
 
Table 3.   SWO Turnover Factors (From Stoker & Crawford, 2008) 
In addition to improving leadership and culture, other studies have 
reported that government-funded education and geographic stability are more 
likely to improve SWO retention than SWOCP (Stoloff, Monroe, MacIlvaine, & 
Wills, 2006).  In 2004, the Navy Personnel Research, Studies, and Technology 
SWO Quick-Poll reported that the top five incentives to retain SWOs through 
their Department Head (DH) tour are: 
 Guaranteed funded education after DH tour 
 Geographic stability after DH tour 
 SWOCP 
 Guaranteed lateral transfer after DH tour 
 One year unpaid sabbatical 
Regardless of community or gender, there are many other positive and 
negative career motivators, as shown in Table 4.  Many times, pay is listed as a 
reason to stay versus a reason to leave.  This may be an indication that 
personnel do not always leave because of money.  While personnel may be 
retained through monetary increases or bonuses, this does not improve or 
resolve the nonmonetary reasons they leave. 
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Reasons to Leave Reasons to Stay 
Possible Death Rewarding Work 
End of Obligation Pay 
Family Benefits 
Homosexuality Patriotism 
Medical Lack of Other Opportunity 
Retirement 
Time Deployed 
Failed to Select 
 
 
Table 4.   Career Motivators (From Stoloff et al., 2006) 
When pay is reported as a reason to leave, it is often reported with many 
other reasons.  In 1999, a DOD survey of AD members found the top five 
reasons for leaving or considering leaving the military were basic pay (with 28% 
of respondents choosing this as the #1 reason), amount of personal and family 
time (9%), quality of leadership (8%), job enjoyment (7%), and disruptive 
deployments (6%) (Hansen & Koopman, 2005).  Whether it is 1999 or 2008, the 
continuing pattern of retention factors is clear.  These factors seem to be the 
primary reasons personnel leave the Navy. 
4. Accessions, Lateral Transfers, and Retention Rates 
When looking at different communities’ manning and retention issues, it is 
important to understand the process of accessions and lateral transfers.  
Community accessions are how a community gains officers.  These personnel 
come from a variety of sources.  Most often, junior personnel come from the 
United States Naval Academy (USNA), Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC), 
or Officer Candidate School (OCS). 
Sometimes, these accessions are described as having or not having prior 
enlisted service.  Some of these accessions fail out of their initial 
pipeline/community and transfer over to another community.  These “attrites” are 
usually not warfare qualified.  Other transfers are already warfare qualified and 
are called lateral transfers.  These officers transfer from their original community 
to another community, usually as an O-3 or O-4. 
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Accession types add another layer of retention complexity.  Within the 
RL/Staff communities, over 90% of warfare-qualified laterals survive to 9 YOS 
(108 months), compared with less than 50% of nonwarfare-qualified laterals 
(Monroe & Cymrot, 2004).  Figure 3 shows survival rates to different milestones 
for warfare-qualified and non-warfare-qualified control-grade officers, based on 
data from 1986 to 2002. 
 
Figure 3.   Survival Rate of Warfare/Non-Warfare-Qualified RL/Staff Officers  
(From Monroe & Cymrot, 2004) 
When looking at retention issues, it is important to identify where 
personnel are coming from and going to, and in what numbers.  While the IW 
community has begun to keep track of these data, it will take years of consistent 
data collection before historical information like this is fully available.  However, 
data from other communities is available for comparison. 
Figure 4 shows the URL retention rates to O-4 by year group and URL 
communities (SWO, Submariners (SUB), and Aviation (AIR).  During this time, 
pilots (a portion of the AIR community) and submariners received a career bonus 
like the CSRB.  As shown, between 20% and 35% of officers (Year Groups [YGs] 
1983–1990) in the SWO and SUB communities stay until the rank of O-4, 
whereas the numbers are higher for the AIR community (Bernard, 2002).  It is 
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also noteworthy that 39% of the SWOs who stayed to the O-4 promotion board 
transferred to SWO from another community (Bernard, 2002). 
 
Figure 4.   URL Retention to LCDR by Community (From Bernard, 2002) 
5. The Prior Enlisted Factor 
An important part of the retention equation for the IW community is the 
possible correlation between prior enlistment and retention.  Several studies 
have looked directly and indirectly at this relationship.  Bernard (2002) looked at 
O-4 retention across commissioning sources from 1983 to 1990.  The data show 
that prior enlisted URL officers are 22% more likely to stay in the Navy to the 
rank of O-4, than were non-prior enlisted officers commissioned by the USNA, 
ROTC, or OCS.  However, in the RL community, this same percentage 




Table 5 compares the retention rates of RL officers from different 
accession sources and communities (Bernard, 2002).  It is important to note that 
these results for the RL communities are very different from results found for 
officer retention in the URL communities, and that the numbers in Table 5 include 
both officers with prior enlisted experience and those without. 
 
Table 5.   Restricted Line Retention by Source and Community  
(Years 1983-90) (From Bernard, 2002) 
In Table 5, ECP refers to prior enlisted officers commissioned through the 
Enlisted Commissioning Program.  When looking at retention to the O-4 
promotion board, officers commissioned through ECP, OCS, and ROTC-Contract 
(ROTC-C) remain on active duty 15% more than accessions from the USNA and 
ROTC-Scholarship (ROTC-S).  While ECP accounted for a very small fraction of 
the total RL sample (less than 1%), it had the highest retention rate of any of the 
accession sources.  In terms of size, OCS made up the largest proportion of 
officers.  57% of the RL officers from OCS were retained, and had the second 
highest retention rate (55.2%) to the grade of O-4. 
While 100% of ECP graduates are prior enlisted officers, the other 
accession sources also contain some prior enlisted officers.  Of these programs, 
OCS has the largest percentage of prior enlisted officers, at approximately 30% 
of all OCS graduates (Watson, 2001). 
CATEGORY Total Accessed Total Stay Retention Rate 
Accession Source 
USNA 958 401 41.9%
ROTC-S 1,020 399 39.1%
ROTC-C 177 97 54.8%
OCS 2,924 1,615 55.2%
ECP 50 28 56.0%
Community 
Fleet Support 1,365 627 45.9%
Supply Corps 1,980 900 45.5%
RL and Staff 1,784 1,013 56.8%
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Today, we should expect to see OCS graduates make up a smaller 
proportion of total accessions.  Before 1989, when the majority of the data used 
in Table 5 were gathered, OCS graduates made up between 30% and 50% of 
total FY officer gains.  OCS graduates have made up fewer than 12% of total 
officer gains each year since 1996 (Department of the Navy, 2008). 
As previously stated, the percentage of newly-acquired prior enlisted 
officers between 1998 and 2005 averaged 23.5% annually, while the average 
percentage from 2006 to 2008 was 34.8%.  If prior enlisted officers still stay in 
the Navy to O-4 at a higher rate than non-prior enlisted officers do, as described 
by Bernard (2002), and approximately half of the IW community is prior enlisted 
officers, then we should expect IW retention to O-4 to be high.  IW retention at all 
pay grades is shown in Chapter IV. 
Officers with prior enlisted experience have longer service lengths than 
their non-prior enlisted peers (Korkmaz, 2005).  Since these officers are able to 
adapt easily, and transfer their enlisted experience to their officer careers, they 
are expected to have improved job performance, better promotion opportunities, 
and serve longer in the Navy.  Additionally, officers with high undergraduate 
grade point averages (GPAs) and technical majors are also expected to serve 
longer (Korkmaz, 2005). 
Figure 5 gives a good picture of when officers normally separate from the 
Navy by YOS.  As shown, there are two major spikes in officer turnover, at 4–5 
and 10–12 YOS, respectively.  Turnover at 4-5 YOS is mainly due to officers 
voluntarily leaving at the end of their initial term of obligated duty.  Some officers 
stay and remain for duty at the department head level.  This can incur another 
term of obligated service due to a tour obligation, or a community bonus 
obligation.  When this obligation is over, some officers voluntarily leave, often 
between 10 and 12 YOS. 
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Figure 5.   Officer Separation by YOS (From Korkmaz, 2005) 
Turnover at 10-12 YOS is also around the time of promotion to LCDR/O-4.  
Some officers involuntarily leave because they Failed to Select (FOS).  FOS 
happens when an officer is involuntarily separated because he or she is not 
promoted to the next rank, which is, in this case, LCDR/O-4.  After the second 
turnover spike in Figure 5, the number of turnovers gradually lessens  
(Korkmaz, 2005). 
In his 2005 research, Korkmaz found that among the Navy’s officers, 
those commissioned by the USNA are more likely to be retained than those who 
are not USNA graduates.  Korkmaz also suggests that communities that acquire 
more prior enlisted officers have fewer retention problems.  This is similar to 
other research suggesting that the Naval Nurse Corps increase its Medical 
Enlisted Commissioning Program (MECP) accessions (Messmer & Pizanti, 
2007).  One of the problems with these recommendations, however, is that prior 
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enlisted officers can retire at a lower rank than non-prior enlisted officers can.  
This may create manning gaps at grades higher than O-4. 
Figure 5 shows typical officer separation patterns.  In a common scenario, 
prior enlisted officers average approximately 8 or 9 years of enlisted service 
before being commissioned.  While the second spike in turnover is normally at 
10–12 YOS, this scenario adds 8–9 YOS for prior enlisted officers.  This moves 
the prior enlisted turnover spike significantly to the right to 18–21 YOS.  In this 
scenario, prior enlisted officers would be faced with the end of their department 
head tour obligation as an officer, FOS, or retirement around 20 years of service.  
All of this is as a senior O-3 or O-4.  Additionally, there is only one retention 
program in place for officers at this point in their career (the Senior SWO Bonus).  
In this same timeframe, the Navy’s biannual pay raises cease, producing what is 
often referred to as a pay scale cap. 
Bise (2008) looked at the effect of pay scale caps on prior enlisted Marine 
officers.  The pay scale for a prior enlisted Marine officer is the same as for a 
prior enlisted Navy officer.  Both Navy and Marine Corps prior enlisted officers in 
pay grades O-3E to O-7 stop receiving biannual longevity pay at 18 YOS.  The 
only pay raise received after this point is an annual Cost of Living Allowance 
(COLA), intended to ensure government salaries keep up with inflation  
(Bise, 2008). 
Based solely on experience and performance, the Navy and Marine Corps 
would probably retain highly trained officers for a full 30 YOS (Bise, 2008).  
However, for reasons discussed in this chapter, Section D, subsection 2, the 
military tries to maintain a younger work force.  Not everyone can stay in the 
military for 30 years.  Besides the need for young Soldiers, Marines, and Sailors, 
there cannot be more leaders than followers.  There must be incentives for 
personnel to retire or there will be too many senior-ranking personnel to fill a 
small number of senior-ranking billets (Bise, 2008). 
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If, however, the Navy or Marine Corps experiences a drop in manning at 
these higher-ranking levels, it may desire a policy that includes the increase of 
longevity pay past 18 years.  This, however, is not cost-efficient.  It is doubtful 
that the military will change the base pay scale for a possible short-term manning 
shortage.  Bise (2008) describes other barriers to retaining control-grade prior 
enlisted officers, including fewer wage increases and older children in high 
school or college.  Many midgrade and control-grade officers are also young 
enough to start another career. 
As shown in Figure 6, Bise found that after the 20-YOS mark, prior 
enlisted Marine Corps officers retire at higher rates than non-prior enlisted 
officers do; however, this is not due to the cessation of longevity pay (2008).  
Even though they retire at higher rates, they are also more likely to stay up to 26 
YOS than a non-prior enlisted Marine Corps officer (Bise, 2008).  One reason 
officers may elect to stay past 20 years is the 2.5% increase in retirement pay 
they receive for each additional year after year 20. 
 
Figure 6.   Prior vs. Nonprior Unconditional Continuation Rate for Marine 
Officers (From Bise, 2008) 
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6. Retention Trade-offs 
There is relatively little military-based research available on retention 
trade-offs; however, CSRB auctions and retention trade-off survey research has 
increased over the last few years.  One such study looked at how enlisted Sailors 
make trade-offs between the monetary and nonmonetary quality of service 
factors listed below: 
 Basic pay 
 Sea pay 
 SRBs 
 Different methods of SRB payment 
 Thrift Savings Plan (TSP) matching contributions 
 Obligation lengths 
 Assignment guarantees 
 Working in rate 
 Promotion schedules 
 Detailer contacts 
 Guaranteed time for voluntary education 
 Shipboard habitability 
 In-port housing while on sea duty 
Researchers found that nonmonetary factors have a significant impact on 
enlisted reenlistment intentions (Kraus, Lien, & Orme, 2003).  The two factors 
with the largest positive effect on reenlistment were location and duty-type 
assignment guarantees.  These two were valued the same as a 4%–6% pay 
increase (approximately $125.00 per month for an E-5 with 6 years service).  
Matching TSP also had a large positive impact.  The factors with the largest 
negative impact on reenlistment intentions are requiring Sailors to live on-board 
ships while in port and granting later-than-expected promotions.  These could be 
offset by a 13% and 8% pay raise, respectively ($325.00 and $200.00 for an E-5 
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with 6 years’ service) (Kraus et al., 2003).  While this survey was tailored for 
enlisted Sailors, officers may feel the same way. 
7. Nonmonetary Ways to Improve Retention 
While the CSRB and similar bonuses remain one of the most widely used 
retention tools in the Navy, there are many nonmonetary ways to improve 
retention.  This subsection briefly covers the most common of these.  The newest 
of these retention improvement programs available in the Navy is often referred 
to as a sabbatical or sabbatical leave.  A 2005 survey done by the Society of 
Human Resource Management found that 17% of employers offered sabbaticals 
(Stoker & Mehay, 2005). 
Stoker and Mehay (2005) found that marriage has a positive retention 
effect for men, but a negative retention effect for women.  This is one reason why 
a sabbatical program may be beneficial to increase retention, especially for 
married females.  Additionally, some companies use the sabbatical program as a 
way by which to avoid layoffs during a recession.  While the military is not the 
same as the civilian sector, it may be cost-efficient to offer such programs, 
specifically tailored to officers who would otherwise not be retained.  This 
program could prove useful to the Navy to absorb over-manning problems by 
offering sabbaticals to well-trained officers, rather than forcing them out of the 
Navy through involuntary separations (Stoker & Mehay, 2005). 
Some firms use a sabbatical program to offer 4, 6, or 8 weeks of paid time 
off every 5 years.  This gives their employees time to “recharge their batteries.”  
The military, however, offers significantly more leave time per year than most 
civilian companies do.  Rather than offering 1–2 month-long paid sabbaticals, it 
may be more cost-efficient to take advantage of the leave program in place and 
ensure that those who transfer can take a minimum of 4–6 weeks of vacation, 
providing they have enough leave time saved.  Sometimes, military personnel 
are not offered much time off between duty stations.  Others find it difficult to take 
more than one week of leave at a time during their tour of duty.  In its currently-
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used state, the Navy’s leave program is hardly considered a sabbatical, yet it 
offers the opportunity to be used in conjunction with one. 
The United States Coast Guard offers a temporary separation program 
(TEMPSEP) that began to be used as a retention tool in 2000 (Stoker & Mehay, 
2005).  This program provides a way for officers and enlisted to be temporarily 
discharged for up to two years.  This gives personnel opportunities to provide for 
newborn children or pursue personal interests, like education.  While this idea 
should be evaluated and tailored to the Navy, it may be another way in which the 
Navy could successfully retain those who would otherwise separate from service. 
The cost considerations for a sabbatical program should be evaluated 
carefully.  The Navy’s current pilot program includes benefits, but not base pay or 
housing allowances (Stoker & Mehay, 2005).  Bonuses are paid, assuming that 
members return to AD as agreed and scheduled.  Manning should also be 
planned carefully, since a sabbatical program may leave a manning shortage 
during the first year or two.  After that, officers should begin to return from their 
sabbaticals.  While manning levels would need to be carefully calculated yearly 
or quarterly, the overall manning levels (and cost savings) should stay higher 
than they would if those personnel were separated permanently (Stoker & 
Mehay, 2005). 
One of the ways in which the military solves small-scale retention issues is 
to provide selected personnel with educational or specialized training 
opportunities, or to promise duty locations and types (Kleinman & Hansen, 2005).  
These are often described as detailer initiatives, where the detailer tries to 
improve retention by contacting the officer before he or she leaves the Navy 
(Department of the Navy, N1, 2002).  Then the detailer can promise a certain 
duty or duty type and the member will accept the orders and agree to remain on 
active duty for a certain number of years or tour length.  All communities can use 
this flexible retention solution. 
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Flexible work arrangement is another option for improving retention.  In a 
2000 survey, Mercer found that 66% of companies offer flexible work 
arrangements—an increase of 40% over the last decade (Stoker & Mehay, 
2005).  In addition to flexible work arrangements, compressed schedules are 
currently offered by 20%–40% of large companies (United States General 
Accounting Office, 2002).  While the Navy is interested in these programs, there 
are few, if any, presently in effect. 
Prior studies have also found that work policies can affect the quality of life 
of employees, by making it easier to meet family needs.  Meeting more family 
needs improves the employee’s work performance (Stoker & Mehay, 2005).  
Improved performance leads to reduced turnover, increased productivity, and 
reduced absenteeism.  Some studies have also found that these policies can 
indirectly benefit other employees as well (Stoker & Mehay, 2005).  These 
studies show that by improving the quality of life for some employees, other 
employees can be positively affected by the increased work performance of their 
coworkers. 
Another example of nonmonetary options is providing alternative officer 
career paths to improve the retention of experienced officers (Department of the 
Navy, N1, 2002).  As previously discussed, switching career paths is often 
referred to as a lateral transfer.  Ideally, communities like to retain their officers.  
While using lateral transfers as a retention tool would not retain the officer in the 
community, it may provide a better option than not retaining that officer in the 
Navy at all.  With this program, the community losing that officer may be able to 
gain another officer of similar rank.  While far from perfect, the overall benefit to 
the community and the Navy may be greater than the loss of experienced officers 
due to lack of satisfaction within their own community.  Current lateral transfers 
work in this manner, except that the lateral transfer program is often not viewed, 
or classified, as a retention tool. 
In 2002, the General Accounting Office (GAO) reported that private sector 
benefits over the last decade indicate three main trends:  more benefits, with 
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more flexibility, that focus on the improvement of employee work/life balance 
(United States General Accounting Office, 2002).  These civilian market trends 
match the latest retention suggestions covered earlier in this chapter.  The more 
effective retention programs that are in place, the more needs the Navy will meet 
(flexibility), and the more personnel it will retain. 
E. RETENTION SURVEYS 
1. Web-based Surveys 
There are many types of survey data collection methods; however, non-
Internet collection methods are beyond the scope of this thesis.  There are both 
positive and negative aspects to collecting data via a Web-based survey.  Many 
of these aspects are shown in Table 6. 
Positives Negatives 
Quick delivery and return Limited population access 
Ease of reaching participants Technology issues 
Easily manipulated question formats Security threats 
Customized delivery as applicable Lack of control 
Captures data directly into database Potential for bias 
 
Table 6.   Web-Based Survey Positives and Negatives (After Denmond, 
Johnson, Lewis, & Zegley, 2007) 
The positive aspects of Web-based surveys are fairly well known.  It is 
equally important to minimize the negative aspects as much as possible.  
Security threats and lack of control issues should be identified and accounted for.  
A data-safeguarding plan is a good way to minimize some of these  
negative issues. 
2. Choice-based Conjoint Surveys 
While a relatively new concept, choice-based conjoint surveys are a good 
way to look at the trade-offs personnel make when looking at more than one 
option (Kraus et al., 2003).  This survey methodology requires the respondent to 
choose among two or more options that vary along several dimensions, just as 
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they might when making a choice.  The downside of this method is that the 
probabilities must be based on a baseline that is set by the researcher.  Not 
having historical data to assist in creating a valid baseline can be challenging.  
There is little historical retention data available for the IW community. 
3. Combinatorial Auction Theory 
In a recent study of SWO retention, a group of NPS students used an 
online survey Web site, called SurveyMonkey (Denmond et al., 2007).  The 
purpose of the study was to view how officers would choose among a variety of 
incentives, including SWOCP, choice of homeport, billet, or platform.  The results 
show that both a geographical stability option and a monetary option were 
preferred for the SWO community (Denmond et al., 2007).  Additionally, the 
authors found that the best combination of incentives depends on the 
preferences of the individual officers.  The IW community may want to develop 
an initial retention factor survey that identifies officer preferences before 
implementing retention incentives. 
This survey represents a successful attempt to gather multifactor retention 
data from military officers.  The use of multiple factors that the participants must 
choose from, or specifically weigh, may be an effective way in which to gather 
initial retention preferences from IWOs. 
F. THE CURRENT MILITARY POPULATION 
In order to analyze IW community demographics, it is necessary to have 
accurate Navy demographics.  The most commonly reviewed demographics are 
age, race/ethnicity, and marital status.  As previously discussed, the military stays 
younger than the civilian workforce.  In FY04, 87% of new AD recruits were 18–24 
years of age, compared to 37% of their civilian equivalents.  Officers were older than 
the enlisted personnel (mean ages 34 and 27, respectively), but were also younger 
than their civilian equivalents (Department of Defense, 2006).  The representation of 
women within the officer corps was 16% (Department of Defense, 2006). 
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As shown in Table 7, African-American officers make up 8% of all Naval 
officers.  This is similar to the 9% proportion of African-Americans among college 
graduates in the workforce (Department of Defense, 2006).  Asian officers, 
however, are under-represented, making up 3% of the Navy’s officer corps, 
compared to 9% of college graduates in the workforce.  Hispanics are also 
under-represented at 5% in the officer corps, compared to 7% of college 
graduates in the workforce (Department of Defense, 2006). 
 
Table 7.   FY 04 AD Officers and Accessions by Race and Ethnicity (From 
Department of Defense, 2006) 
While it has already been established that the number of married military 
members is increasing, Table 8 shows the current number and percentages.  
The 2004 population also shows that newcomers to the military continue to be 
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less likely to be married than their civilian equivalents (Department of Defense, 
2006).  Similarly, all military members continue to be less likely to be married 
than those in the civilian sector, but the margin is shrinking.  Male Naval officers 
(70%) are more likely to be married than female officers are (47%). 
 
Table 8.   FY 04 AD Married Officers by Gender and Service (From 
Department of Defense, 2006) 
G. IW COMMUNITY DATA 
The IW community is a relatively small RL community within the Navy.  
Within the Navy’s officer corps, there are specific designators that are used to 
identify what kind of qualifications an officer has, as well as what community they 
belong to.  The IW community has four such designators, identified by the Navy 
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as 1600 or 160X, 1640 or 164X, 6440 or 644X, and 7440 or 744X (Naval 
Personnel Command, 2006).  The Designator 7440 (which accounts for 10% of 
all IWOs) is used for Chief Warrant Officers (CWOs), and is not considered due 
to their unique characteristics.  The remaining designators are: 
161X:  RL IWO (82% of total with 7440 excluded) 
164X:  RL IWO in training (8%) 
644X: IW Limited Duty Officer (LDO) commissioned directly from the 
enlisted ranks (10%) 
Some of the data in this section uses only 1610 and/or 6440 data, and is 
identified as such. 
Some officer communities have certain qualifications that should be met 
before personnel can join that community.  Waiver requests are accepted, but 
not always approved.  The IW community looks for warfare-qualified officers in 
the pay grade of LT/O-3 or lower, with a technical background and a college GPA 
of 2.2 or higher (Korkmaz, 2005).  Additionally, these candidates must be eligible 
for a Top Secret clearance. 
The RL is made up of nine main communities.  Figure 7 shows a 2003 
breakdown of how IWOs (listed as CRYPTO in yellow) fit into the RL community, 
and how the RL fits into the officer corps as a whole.  Aerospace Maintenance 
Duty Officer (AMDO), Aviation Maintenance Officer (AMO), and Aerospace 
Engineering Duty Officer (AEDO) are grouped under the orange AEDO.  As 
previously discussed, many of the RL accessions come from the URL.  The IW 
community end strength has grown by more than 200 since 2003.  Even with this 
growth, the IW community makes up 1.6% of the entire Navy officer corps, and 
approximately 20% of the RL community. 
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Figure 7.   2003 Officer Corps Makeup (From Mooney & Cook, 2004) 
IW end strength (labeled End Strgth), or the number of IWOs reported by the 
community each FY, is available in Table 9.  This table shows end strength broken 
down by pay grade.  Also included are the OPA and the gains and losses for each 
FY.  OPAs are listed to the left, followed by end strength numbers if available to the 
right (i.e., 105/62).  This table only includes OPAs and end strength for designators 
1610 and 1640, not LDOs.  End strength data from FY92-FY03 came from N131 
and can be viewed in Appendix A (Mooney & Cook, 2004).  FY08 end strength, 
OPAs, losses, and gains are as reported by the IW community in October 2008 and 
March 2009.  Since there was no total end strength data from FY04-FY08 (shown in 
blue) available, these data are reported by subtracting designator 1610/1640 losses 
and adding 1610/1640 gains from the previous FY end strength.  As shown, much of 






















FY92 68/ 112/ 230/ 174/ 97/ 39/ 720 N/A N/A N/A
FY93 63/ 102/ 230/ 177/ 99/ 43/ 714 N/A N/A N/A
FY94 74/ 74/ 254/ 160/ 98/ 45/ 705 N/A N/A N/A
FY95 73/ 73/ 250/ 175/ 99/ 40/ 710 N/A N/A N/A
FY96 54/ 91/ 241/ 180/ 99/ 40/ 705 N/A N/A N/A
FY97 73/ 103/ 254/ 174/ 93/ 39/ 736 N/A 62 N/A
FY98 71/ 96/ 259/ 178/ 92/ 41/ 737 N/A 60 N/A
FY99 84/ 85/ 260/ 172/ 93/ 34/ 728 N/A 67 N/A
FY00 93/84 87/85 252/260 169/172 95/93 38/34 734 730 66 N/A
FY01 96/48 105/62 214/309 185/176 106/101 38/44 744 743 63 N/A
FY02 105/46 108/74 232/316 183/202 110/109 39/46 777 796 64 N/A
FY03 92/43 125/94 240/322 190/212 111/110 38/46 793 830 63 79 
FY04 /51 /88 /325 /217 /109 /47 809 841 63 82 
FY05 /71 /110 /393 /238 /118 /49 828 859 59 53 
FY06 /110 /108 /358 /242 /123 /49 822 866 62 76 
FY07 /115 /113 /360 /258 /129 /49 828 901 63 69 
FY08 106/113 140/113 309/365 224/261 103/135 43/49 854 911 61 87 
FY09 /113 /116 /362 /261 /135 /49 N/A 912 N/A N/A
FY10 /113 /117 /362 /262 /135 /49 N/A 914 N/A N/A
N/A = Not Available 
 
Table 9.   FY92-FY10 IW Community (1610 and 1640 Only) Reported End 
Strength/OPAs 
Using this method gives us a total end strength number of 854 for FY08, 
27 personnel more than the IW end strength reported in October 2008.  Using 
manning numbers from two separate sources is the most likely reason for this 
error.  Regardless, this table gives a good overview of what historical and normal 
end strength, OPA, losses, and gains look like in the IW community. 
Table 9 shows that the IW community has not met OPA since FY01.  
Between FY02 and FY05, this shortage was limited to an average of 30 
personnel, or 3%–4% of the total.  However, in recent years (FYs06–08), this 
shortage of personnel has increased to an average of 58 personnel, or 6%–7% 
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of the total.  This increase in the overall shortage of personnel in designator 
1610/1640 may be of concern to the IW community. 
Within the IW community, females make up 15% of the total IWO 
population.  The IW community currently makes up about 1.8% of the total 
population of female Naval officers and 1.7% of the total population of males.  
This is similar to the 2004 population of males and females Navy-wide shown in 
Table 8.  This means the IW community’s gender makeup is very representative 
of the entire Navy. 
As shown on Table 9, the IW community has lost an average of 62 
personnel every FY (6440 designator excluded) over the last decade.  Table 10 
shows the behavior of these losses for the last five FYs, as reported by the IW 
community.  Unfortunately, the data gathered do not include all losses, and must 
be considered a convenience sample of the IW community.  The losses reported 
however, still represent over half of IW losses for each FY. 
 Retirement 
Resignation Conduct, FOS, 
Medical 
Total
 <O-3 O-4 O-5 O-6< <O-3 O-4 O-5< <O-3 O-4 O-5<  
FY03* 3 9 5 6 3 1 0 1,1,1 0 0 30 
FY04 3 10 9 3 1 1 0 1,0,0 0 0 28 
FY05 2 11 11 7 1 2 0 1,2,0 1,0,1 0 39 
FY06 5 12 7 6 0 1 0 0,1,1 0 0 33 
FY07 6 12 8 3 6 1 0 0,2,0 0 0 38 
FY08 4 15 6 6 8 2 0 2,1,1 1,0,0 0 45 
Total 23 69 46 31 19 8 0 5,7,3 2,0,1 0 214 
 Total Retirement:  169 Total Resigned:  27   
 
Table 10.   Loss Behavior of IWOs FY03–FY08 
As you can see in Table 10, this sample shows that most personnel seem 
to leave the IW community due to retirement.  While the retirement numbers are 
steadily increasing, the population of IWOs shown in Table 9 has also steadily 
increased.  Of note is the current resignation trend of more officers in pay grades 
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O-3 and below in FY07-08.  This should be verified by a complete sample of IW 
loss behavior, and addressed if this trend continues. 
As previously stated, the IW community has been steadily increasing its 
total end strength over the last decade.  Table 11 shows the type of personnel 
that have been gained over the last six years.  These data were also reported by 
the IW community for designators 1610 (the first six columns) and 6440  
(labeled LDO). 
 USNA ROTC OCS STA-21 Attrites Laterals LDO Total 
FY03 4 4 43 0 15 13 0 79 
FY04 4 4 35 0 11 28 7 89 
FY05 4 4 16 2 5 22 22 75 
FY06 5 4 25 7 19 16 17 93 
FY07 1 3 25 4 26 10 10 79 
FY08 5 1 27 11 23 20 11 98 
Total 23 20 171 24 99 109 67 513 
Percent 5% 4% 33% 5% 19% 21% 13% 100% 
 
Table 11.   IW Gains from Fys03-08 for Designators 1610 and 6440 
As shown in the bottom row of Table 11, 33% of FY gains over the last six 
years have been from OCS, 21% from lateral transfers, 19% from attrites, 13% 
from LDO, and 5% or less each from the USNA, ROTC, or Seaman to Admiral 
Twenty-First Century (STA-21).  This makes sense, since other sources of 
accession like the USNA, ROTC, and STA-21 normally produce officers at the 
rank of ENS/O-1, while the IW community billets (see Table 14) are 
predominately for LT/O-3s and above. 
Historically, many IW accessions were brought on board from the lateral 
transfer and redesignation process.  In data from 1986-2002, approximately 45% of 
IWOs were accessed through lateral transfers (Monroe & Cymrot, 2004).  Of those 
45%, approximately half were non-warfare qualified.  Not being warfare qualified has 
been negatively correlated with retention (Monroe & Cymrot, 2004).  Today, lateral 
transfers are less of a factor, but still likely to make up 20%-25% of the IW community. 
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Sixty-seven percent of current IW community accessions are from 
traditionally non-warfare qualified sources such as the USNA, ROTC, OCS,  
STA-21, and Attrites.  Approximately 30% of OCS graduates are prior enlisted 
and may have enlisted warfare qualifications (Watson, 2001).  Conservatively, 
this still leaves at least half of IW accessions non-warfare qualified. 
Table 12 shows how many personnel the IW community selected through 
the lateral transfer process, between FY96 and FY08 (Mooney & Cook, 2004). 
 Quotas Selectees IW Reported Lateral Accessions March 2009 
FY97 N/A 17 N/A 
FY98 N/A 15 N/A 
FY99 N/A 9 N/A 
FY00 23 11 N/A 
FY01 29 15 N/A 
FY02 29 22 N/A 
FY03* 90       *49                 *13 
FY04 38 22 28 
FY05 N/A 18 22 
FY06 N/A 11 16 
FY07 N/A 12 10 
FY08 N/A 20 20 
FY09 N/A 19 N/A 
*Note that FY03 had three redesignation boards versus 
the usual two. 
N/A = Not Available 
 
Table 12.   IW Lateral Transfer Selectees from FY97 to FY08  
As noted, FY03 had three redesignation boards versus the usual two.  
This could be a reason for the huge disparity between reported lateral gains and 
selectees for that FY.  Quotas are listed if available, from Mooney and Cook 
(2004).  FY09 numbers only include the first selection board of that FY.  As 
previously discussed, advancements may also play a role in retention.  In 
addition to negative retention effects, a lack of advancement planning can lead to 
manning gaps.  Table 13 gives the number of personnel advanced to O-4 and  
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O-5 from FY03 to FY09 (in zone) according to annual Naval administrative 
messages (NAVADMINs).  The advancements of personnel below zone and 
above zone never exceed 3% and 16% (respectively) of those eligible during this 








% of Those 
Eligible 
FY03 
161X 27 75% 14 58% 
164X 4 100% N/A N/A 
644X 1 50% 1 100% 
FY04 
161X 38 75% 16 64% 
164X 0 N/A N/A N/A 
644X 5 83% 0 0% (1 eligible) 
FY05 
161X 28 82% 8 57% 
164X 0 N/A N/A N/A 
644X 7 63% 0 0% (1 eligible) 
FY06 
161X 35 81% 15 71% 
164X 3 100% N/A N/A 
644X 11 68% 0 0% (1 eligible) 
FY07 
161X 43 80% 16 62% 
164X 1 100% N/A N/A 
644X 7 88% 1 100% 
FY08 
161X 40 80% 22 67% 
164X 0 N/A N/A N/A 
644X 5 83% 0 N/A 
FY09 
161X 37 74% 23 70% 
164X 0 0% (1 eligible) N/A N/A 
644X 0 N/A 0 N/A 
N/A = Not Applicable (no personnel were eligible for that designator, 
during that FY, for that rank) 
 
Table 13.   IWs Selected for Advancement in Zone for FY03–08 
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Advancements from O-1 through O-3 are processed automatically, without 
selection boards.  Table 13 shows that approximately 80% of those O-3s in zone 
for LCDR/O-4 are advanced, while 64% of those O-4s in zone for CDR/O-5 are 
advanced.  Since advancements can vary between 70%–90% and 60%–80% for 
O-4 and O-5, respectively, these are considered normal advancement rates for 
these pay grades. 
The amount of time spent on sea duty (and deployed), as well as the 
locations that IWOs can serve, may also affect retention.  IW billet information as 
of October 2008 is available in Table 14.  The IW community holds 1,077 billets, 
with 257 of those (or 24%) counted as deployable sea duty.  Seventy-seven (or 
7%) are counted as overseas shore duty.  The remaining 69% of billets are 
counted as shore duty.  As shown, billets in the D.C. area make up 35% of total 
billets, with Norfolk at 17%.  The islands of Hawaii are at 9%, San Diego at 8%, 
and Fort Gordon, Georgia at 6%.  The remaining 25% of billets are in various 
locations, all over the world.  This means that 75% of billets are located in five 
areas, while only 20%-25% of billets are available on the West Coast.  Possible 
location-related retention factors are discussed further in Chapter VI. 
Duty Type O-1 O-2 O-3 O-4 O-5 O-6 & Above Total Percent
Shore 62 58 264 191 115 53 743 69%
Sea 40 54 108 41 14 0 257 24%
Overseas 2 8 32 20 13 2 77 7%
Total 104 120 404 252 142 55 1,077 100%
Percent 10% 11% 38% 23% 13% 5% 100% 
Major Locations 
D.C. area  378 35%
Fort Gordon (GA)  64 6%
Hawaii  100 9%
Norfolk Area  182 17%
San Diego Area  89 8%
Other  264 25%
Total  1,077 100%
 
Table 14.   October 2008 IW Billets 
51 
Figure 8 shows the IW LOS by pay grade graph (1610 designator only).  
The yellow background represents the OPA for various pay grades, while the 
vertical dotted black line splits the pay grades (labeled at the bottom).  In  
Figure 3, the SWO LOS graph showed large manning gaps between YOS 8-16.  
This is not the case for the IW community.  There are, however, manning gaps 
between years 4–7 and 11–14.  The gaps between IW OPA and end strength in 
Figure 8 correspond with the spikes in Navy officer separation shown again in 
Figure 9. 
 
Figure 8.   2008 IW LOS by Pay Grade (From BUPERS 315, 2008) 
 
Figure 9.   Officer Separation by YOS (URL and RL,  
1983-1990) (From Korkmaz, 2005) 
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As previously discussed in this chapter, Section D, subsection 5, normal 
officer separation happens initially between years 4 and 6, when an officer’s 
initial obligation is complete.  The second spike in officer separation is between 
years 10 and 12, when officers have a combination of the end of their department 
head tour obligated service and normal FOS.  As reported in October 2008, the 
IW community is comprised of 44% prior enlisted officers.  Because of their prior 
enlisted service, this should pull normal IW separation gaps to the right of 
normal.  Figure 8 shows IW manning gaps slightly to the right of overall Navy 
manning gaps in Figure 9.  Keep in mind that the scales of the two figures are not 
proportional to each other.  However, the LOS in Figure 8 does not include the 
LOS for designator 6440.  If LDOs were included, the gaps in the IW LOS graph 
would likely shift even more to the right. 
In August 2008, the IW community sent out a general survey to IW 
officers.  Four hundred thirty-two officers (44% of the community) presented valid 
responses.  Seventy percent of those who responded had 1610 or 6440 
designators and 82% were in pay grades O-3 to O-5.  Of those that responded, 
33% came from another officer community (i.e., through lateral transfer or 
attrition).  Of those that reported, 60% were prior enlisted and 40% of those (25% 
overall) came from cryptology or electronic warfare enlisted ratings.  Fifty-eight 
percent of the respondents felt the IW community should have a warfare pin 
versus 42% who did not.  As reported by the IW community, 25% of the survey 
respondents had been deployed as an individual augmentee (IA) and 75% had 
been given the opportunity to establish a mentor/mentee relationship. 
When asked what future opportunity(ies) would give them the most reason 
to continue Naval service, 44% said command opportunities, followed by 36% for 
joint assignments, 30% for computer network operations, and 27% for 
operational leadership.  As reported by the IW community, this is shown in  
Figure 10, with the bars on the right in dark blue.  On the left, in light blue, are 
what experiences the respondents thought that the IW community values the  
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most.  There are clear disagreements between the perceived IW community 
values and what the IW respondents desire, especially when it comes to sea duty 
and the opportunity to command. 
 
Figure 10.   Perceived IW Community Values vs. Future Opportunities Desired 
(From BUPERS 315, 2008) 
Overall, more than 90% of respondents said they would encourage a 
shipmate/CT to transfer or become a member of the IW community.  
Interestingly, 28% of respondents were not aware of the IW community’s overall 
vision/strategy, nor of their responsibilities as an IWO.  However, overall 
satisfaction with the IW wardroom is reported at 66%.  One of the most intriguing 
questions in this survey asks how many of the respondents are considering 
leaving the community via resignation, retirement, or redesignation in the next 
two years.  Forty-two percent of respondents, 181 total, or about 18% of the IW 
community, responded that they were.  Considering that, on average, 62 
personnel leave the 1610 designator per year, 181 personnel over two years 
could have a devastating effect.  On the other hand, this is only those personnel 
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who are considering leaving.  If approximately one-third of these personnel defer 
their retirement, etc., then the numbers would be as expected. 
Independent of these survey numbers, the IW community reports that 99 
personnel are eligible to retire at O-4 in FY09 (38% of O-4s and 10% of total 
IWOs)  This is also a large percentage, as compared to 17 O-5s eligible to retire 
in FY09 (2% of total IWOs). 
The last survey question asked involved the contributing reasons why IW 
officers would leave.  Of the options available, 33% said family, 30% job 
satisfaction, 26% career opportunities, 16% personal reasons, 14% promotion 
opportunities, 11% deployment or IA or Global War on Terrorism Support 
Assignment (GSA), 7% educational opportunities, and 11% other.  With the 
exception of career opportunities, these reasons are very consistent with prior 




A thorough assessment is needed before the IW community implements a 
CSRB.  As mentioned in the Chapter I introduction and shown again in Figure 11, 
this thesis will follow the acquisitions-based JCIDS CBA process.  Part of this 
approach is the FAA and FNA shown in Figure 11. Again, this process has been 
changed with the new version of DOD Instruction 5000.02. 
 
Figure 11.   The CBA Process (From Joint Chiefs of Staff, J-8, 2006) 
In this chapter, Section B concludes the FAA, and Sections C and D 
provide the FNA approach.  Section C provides the approach to find retention 
gaps within the IW community, while Section D provides the approach to finding 
a CSRB recommendation.   
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B. FUNCTIONAL AREA ANALYSIS (FAA) 
Much of the FAA is completed in the Chapter II Literature Review.  This 
section summarizes the most important points of the FAA on CSRB, retention, 
and the IW community 1610, 1640, and 6440/LDO designators. 
1. Summary of Area Analysis 
a. CSRB 
 The Navy supports paying CSRBs when it is cost-effective. 
 The CSRB may not be the most effective or efficient tool (since it 
does not take into account nonmonetary factors). 
b. Retention 
 More flexibility in retention choices will retain more personnel. 
 In random order, the major nonmilitary retention factors are:  pay, 
age, tenure, number of dependents, organizational commitment, 
satisfaction with work, coworkers, and supervisors/leadership. 
 In random order, the major military and IW retention factors are:  
pay, bonuses, work hours, being prior enlisted, frequency of 
deployments, education/training, frequent relocations, spouse 
employment, leadership, culture, mentoring, lateral transfers, 
sabbaticals, time with family, and career opportunities. 
 Warfare-qualified personnel are promoted more and retained longer 
than non-warfare qualified personnel. 
 Prior enlisted officer retention to the rank of O-4 should be high. 
 There are many reasons for prior enlisted officers to separate at  
18-21 YOS. 
c. The IW Community (1610/6440) (2008) 
 Made up of 925 personnel, 44% prior enlisted, many from enlisted 
cryptology ratings. 
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 Sixty-nine percent of IW billets are considered shore duty and, of 
those, about 52% are in the D.C. and Norfolk, Virginia areas. 
 Has not met OPA since 2001. 
 Top three accession groups since FY02 are made up of 33% OCS, 
21% Lateral Transfers, and 19% Attrites.  For the RL communities, 
these groups usually have higher retention. 
 IW advancements and ratio of men to women are a reflection of 
Navy norms. 
 Approximately 75% of losses each FY are due to retirement and 
25% due to resignation, conduct, FOS, and medical. 
 LOS/OPA for 1610 designator shows normal gaps at O-3 from  
5 to 7 YOS, and O-4 from 11 to 14 YOS, when taking into 
consideration the number of prior enlisted officers. 
 There is a gap between what IWOs want in order to remain in 
service and what they perceive is important to the IW community, 
specifically with respect to sea duty (not desired by personnel) and 
the opportunity to command (highly desired by personnel). 
2. Possible IW Capability Gaps 
The IW community holds 1,077 1610/6440 billets, all of which have a 
specific job and a related number of work hours attached to them.  Since the IW 
community has only 927 officers to fill those billets, this means that other military 
personnel or government employees must work harder to do the job of these  
unmanned billets. 
This may result in decreased operational support or decreased operational 
readiness.  Unfortunately, this definable capability gap is abundant throughout 
Navy manning.  At some point, a very real and recognizable loss in manpower 
must be important enough to be addressed.  Where is this point?  At a constant 
rate of +20 accessions per FY, when holding gains, losses, and OPA constant, 
the IW community will not meet OPA for another 4-5 years.  Assuming that the 
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IW community continues to add 20 personnel to its end strength per year, there 
are two main scenarios that could occur.  Scenario 1 is a worst-case scenario, 
while Scenario 2 is more plausible.  These scenarios will help identify how many 
personnel in pay grades O-4 and O-5, the community should try to retain. 
3. Scenario One 
The IW community has 116 personnel eligible to retire in FY09, 99 from 
the O-4 pay grade.  According to the IW survey, this trend may continue at least 
into FY10.  In Scenario One (a worst-case scenario), due to a variety of reasons, 
all of these personnel retire.  Looking at historical advancement data in  
Table 13, there are only a maximum of approximately 45 O-3s eligible for 
promotion each year.  Even if the maximum 90% of them advance, it would only 
amount to, at most, 50-55 new O-4s.  In this scenario, it is doubtful that many  
O-3 officers would FOS.  Since most are likely to be promoted, this may increase 
the desire to stay—especially in the current economy.  However, with such a high 
number of retirements, there would probably be a small loss of organizational 
knowledge and slightly higher workload or job demand.  With this in mind, 
assume that the number of O-3 resignations is likely to remain the same or 
decline slightly.  This would leave approximately 50–60 new O-4s. 
In this scenario, the IW community gap at the grade of O-4 would 
increase.  At this point, manning at O-4 would dip below 200 total and sit 
between 65% and 75%.  This scenario gives some room for O-4 laterals and 
other fluctuating numbers.  Manning at the O-5 level would not recover from its 
current 72%–79%, since the O-4 pool would have significantly shrunk and O-5 
historical advancement numbers would remain the same or be slightly higher by 
zero to five personnel than the number retiring (17).  Even if advancements 
increase to their maximum percentage, the number advanced will only increase 
by, at most, 3 or 4.  Recovering from manning shortages at O-5 is not a one-year 
fix.  It takes several years of high advancement and normal, or reduced, turnover. 
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The results of this scenario are manning problems at both O-4 and O-5.  
This scenario would be worse if similar numbers of personnel retire in FY10. 
4. Scenario Two 
In Scenario Two (a more realistic scenario), not all of the 116 personnel 
eligible to retire do so.  In this scenario, the numbers stay much the same as 
previous years, increasing slightly due to the increase in past end strength.  
Under this scenario, approximately 60 of the 99 O-4s would retire (60% of those 
eligible).  Assuming the number of resignations remains the same as in previous 
years, and O-3 resignations reduce slightly, there would be just enough O-3s to 
promote to O-4.  In this scenario, the O-5 community may promote enough 
eligible O-4s to slightly increase the O-5 manning levels, but not enough to solve 
O-5 manning problems altogether. 
The result of Scenario Two shows that O-4 manning is likely to stay the 
same.  In Scenario Two, O-5 manning may improve slightly, but like Scenario 
One, it will likely take longer than one year to increase O-5 manning levels 
significantly. 
5. FAA Conclusions 
The IW community is facing a retention issue both at midgrade (O-4) and 
control-grade (O-5).  While current O-5 manning is low, O-4 manning looks 
healthy.  However, when taking into account the number of prior enlisted officers 
within the community and current trends, the community is one bad year of 
turnover (high number of retirements or resignations) away from also facing 
manning issues at O-4.  It is safe to say that, for the next few years, the IW 
community should try to retain at least 50% of those eligible to retire or resign in 
pay grades O-4 and O-5. 
While monitoring the number of prior enlisted officers may be wise in the 
future, it will not fix the current problem.  The FNA shows both who is leaving the 
IW community, and how much of a CSRB they might need to remain in service. 
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C. IDENTIFYING RETENTION NEEDS 
To show who is leaving the IW community, data gathered from DMDC 
representing FYs97-07 were compared to an October 2008 list of IW officers.  
These data sets were matched to provide the last 10 years of retention 
information on over 1,100 IW officers.  This retention information is used as a 
dependent variable to identify possible retention issues and areas of low 
retention within the IW community.  The results of this FNA are in Chapter IV. 
1. Data Description 
The data used in this FNA comes from a longitudinal data file of Navy 
active duty service members maintained by the DMDC.  The original data file 
contained over 800,000 personnel who served on active duty, in any of the years 
from FYs9707.  The information analyzed from this data file is unclassified and 
does not contain individual social security numbers (SSNs).  To create a file of 
IWOs, the original DMDC data file was filtered to include only officers who served 
in designators 161X, 164X, or 644X.  There were 1,272 IWOs identified who had 
served in this capacity. 
To find out which of these officers remained in service, the DMDC data set 
was compared with a more current data set provided by the IW community.  This 
second data set included 990 IWOs who were currently serving in designators 
161X, 164X, or 644X as of October 2008.  This data file is also unclassified and 
does not contain individual social security numbers.  To match the DMDC data to 
the current IW community data for retention determination, each person in both 
data files was assigned a specific code.  This code consisted of their pay entry 
base date (PEBD) year and month, and their date of birth (DOB) year and month.  
For example, someone born in January 1975, who entered service in May 1997, 
would contain a specific code of 199705.197501.   Due to data constraints, this 
code was limited to year and month only.  Given the lack of SSNs to match the 
data sets, this was the best method of determining retention. 
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The limitation of this method is the duplicate matching of those personnel 
who have the same DOB year and month, along with the same PEBD year and 
month.  Those personnel with duplicate PEBDs and DOBs were excluded from 
the data analysis.  This left the DMDC data set with 1,145 officers, and the 
current IW data set with 897 officers.  Although the duplicate data were excluded 
in an unbiased manner, this excluded data set over-represented Caucasians with 
a bachelor’s degree from the Naval Academy.  The reason for this bias is 
unknown; however, it is possible that there are lots of common PEBD’s among 
Naval Academy graduates in our data set.  All other excluded data is 
representative of the data used for this study. 
Figure 12 shows the process of identifying IW officers who left service and 
those who remained in.  After the exclusion of PEBD/DOB duplicates, 542 
personnel of the original DMDC data set remained in service.  Six hundred and 
three personnel from the original DMDC data are no longer a part of the IW 
community as of October 2008.  When looking at NAVADMINs, only eight 
personnel have left the IW community via redesignation since 2004.  It is, 
therefore, a good deduction that almost all of the 603 personnel that left the IW 
community are separated or retired from active Naval service. 
 
Figure 12.   Description of Data Matching 
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Of the October 2008 IW community data, 355 personnel do not match the 
older DMDC data set that ended in September 2007.  Of those 355, 146 are 
accounted for due to the following reasons: 
 Incomplete data (7) 
 PEBD after October 1, 2007 (15) 
 Active Duty Commissioning Date (ADCD) after October 1, 2007 
(40) 
 Reservists (nonactive component) (29) 
 IW officers in training or officers so new, they are unlikely to be 
included in the DMDC data set (55) 
This leaves 209 personnel currently in the IW community who are in  
the active component, and are not “newer” personnel, as described above.  The 
reason these personnel are not in the original DMDC data set is unknown.  It is 
possible that this large data set from DMDC includes errors.  This excluded data 
also over-represents personnel of Hispanic ethnicity.  Other than this over-
representation of Hispanics, the excluded data are otherwise representative of 
the data used in this thesis. 
2. Procedure 
Once the data set was created, there were 1,145 lines of data (603 + 542) 
with 64 columns of information.  Of the 64 columns of information, most were 
decoded using Microsoft Excel software and the DMDC Active Duty Personnel 
Cohort File Record Format (Version 2).  After decoding, many columns were 
excluded due to blank or useless information.  For example, there were six 
columns of data for a Desert Storm study, and other nonapplicable data columns 
for enlisted personnel information.  After this initial sorting, information that was 
not available for both those that left the service and those that are still in service 
was excluded. 
For example, three different columns included information on race or 
ethnicity.  Two of these columns gave race and ethnicity data in a format that 
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was added to the database in April 2006.  These two columns did not contain 
accurate information on those personnel who left the Navy before April 2006.  If 
personnel left the Navy before then, their data for these columns simply stated as 
unknown.  The third column gave race and ethnicity under an older format, but 
included data for almost all 1,145 lines of data. 
After careful scrutiny, the following columns or predictor variables were 
identified as containing possibly useful information: 
 Pay Grade 
 Gender 
 Family Status 
 Education 
 Source of Commission 
 Race or Ethnicity 
 Job by Naval Officer Billet Classification (NOBC) Codes 
 Personnel Operational Tempo 
 *Prior enlisted 
*This prior enlisted predictor variable was created. 
Columns containing Active Duty Service Dates (ADSD) and ADCDs were 
compared to each other to find out whether or not officers were prior enlisted.  
PEBDs and ADSDs often fluctuate depending upon source of entry into the 
military or commissioning source.  Because of this fluctuation, a prior enlisted 
officer was identified as someone who had completed more than 48 months of 
AD service according to their ADSD, before receiving a commission according to 
their ADCD.  This is similar to the Defense Finance and Accounting Services 
(DFAS) definition of a prior enlisted non-warrant officer for pay purposes. 
These data were then grouped and downloaded to JMP 8 software for 
statistical analysis.  Whether or not a person stayed in or left the IW community is 
used as the dependent variable.  The columns of data described above are used 
as predictor variables to try to identify areas of concern for IW retention.  Since 
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these data columns provide categorical data, chi-square tests were used for 
initial and interaction analysis.  Then, a logistic regression model was built, using 
stepwise regression, in an attempt to model IW retention. 
Additionally, the analysis also looks at months of service in an IW 
designator.  The initial months of service data included the first and last month of 
service in the IW community for the original 1,272 IWOs, broken down by 
designator.  Confounding these data was the fact that many officers hold an IW 
training designator (1640 or 1645) initially, and then switch to a regular IW 
designator like 1610.  It was noted that many of these months of IW service 
ended in the 46th month, while many others began in the 46th month.  It was 
assumed that this represented the training transition from an IW in training to a 
qualified IWO.  To look at months of service in a retention format, the training 
data were excluded.  Additionally, those personnel that got out at 119 and 120 
months were often confounded with those who did not get out.  For this reason, 
the last two months of service data were also excluded.  These data provided a 
longitudinal look at when personnel in the IW community leave the community, 
departing before 118 months (9 years and 10 months) of IW service. 
3. Confounding Variables 
It is important to note that these data provide the most current information 
available.  For example, the rank, family status, or NOBC job held by an 
individual in the data set is the most current available.  It does not represent past 
history.  If someone left the IW community in October 2001, then these data will 
represent his or her last known information.  If, however, someone is still in the 
IW community, then these data will represent his or her last known data as of 
September 2007, when the original DMDC data file was created. 
It is also because of this that making assumptions while looking at NOBCs 
and Personnel Operational Tempo can introduce confounding variables.  
Retention may (or may not) be related to a person’s job or job tempo during a 
certain time.  Ideally, NOBCs and Personnel Operational Tempo could be viewed 
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multiple times over the course of one’s career.  Finding these data, however, 
requires the use of other data columns that may have high variability, such as 
months of service or months of service in one of the IW designators.  Because of 
these possible confounding variables, personnel operational tempo is not 
included in the results, and job by NOBC is discussed only sparingly. 
However, the personnel operational tempo descriptive statistics can be 
found in Appendix B.  The descriptive statistics show that operational personnel 
who are deployed or separated from their family, are more likely to stay in the IW 
community than those who are nonoperational.  This is highly sensitive, however, 
to a number of confounding variables such as time in service, personnel tempo 
over an entire career, and where personnel are stationed at the time of 
retirement or end of obligation. 
Initially, months of service was to be used as a predictor variable; 
however, after careful scrutiny, it was decided that this variable was very 
unreliable.  Additionally, several unusual DMDC data entries had the ability to 
cause confounding results.  These abnormalities are described in Chapter IV  
as applicable. 
4. Predictor Variables 
Of the nine predictor variables available, eight were used.  Each of the 
variables are described below according to the available data. 
Pay Grade is identified, in order from low to high, as O-1 or Ensign (ENS), 
O-2 or Lieutenant Junior Grade (LTJG), O-3 or LT, O-4 or LCDR, O-5 or CDR, 
and O-6 or Captain (CAPT).  There are one or two Rear Admirals in the data 
set(s); however, these were not included in the analysis. 
Gender is defined as male or female.  Family Status includes four 
subcategories:  Joint Marriage, Married, Single, and Single with Family.  Joint 
marriage is defined as a married man and woman, who are both on AD in the 
military.  Married is defined as a married man or woman, only one of whom is on 
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AD in the military.  Single is defined as nonmarried, including divorced or 
widowed, without dependent family.  Single with family is defined as non-married, 
including divorced or widowed, with dependent family, including children or 
parents.  Dependent family is defined as family (usually children or parents) who 
are recognized by the military as needing the member’s support. 
Education was identified as High School (HS) Diploma, Associate’s 
Degree, Baccalaureate Degree, Master’s Degree or equivalent, or Doctorate 
Degree.  This means that these personnel have received their diploma or degree 
in fulfillment of that level of education. 
For the analysis purposes, the major sources of commission are grouped 
into unknown, Naval Academy, ROTC scholarship, ROTC nonscholarship, ROTC 
combined (both scholarship and nonscholarship), OCS/AOCS/OTS, direct 
appointment (nonprofessional), and other.  “Other” includes those categorized 
under other in the original data, along with two personnel commissioned by other 
service academies, and four personnel commissioned by direct appointment 
(professional).  Naval Academy, ROTC Scholarship, and ROTC nonscholarship 
include those personnel commissioned by those sources.  Direct appointments 
(nonprofessional) are those personnel commissioned directly by the Navy in a 
nonprofessional capacity, usually for a specific duty or job.  These personnel are 
often given the option to continue or separate from service once their duty or job 
is complete. 
Race and ethnicity are grouped as unknown, Caucasian, African-
American, Hispanic, Indian, Asian and Pacific Islander, or Other.  Job by NOBC 
was grouped using the NOBC manual.  This list will identify the groups used, 
followed by their distinct NOBC codes.  These groups consist of Naval Science 
(2100-2199), Personnel (3000-3999), Electronic Engineering (General)  
(5900-5999), Staff and Fleet Command (9000-9099), Shore Operations  
(9400-9499), Communications (9500-9599), Intelligence (9600-9699), Automated 
Data Processing (ADP) (9700-9799), Information Warfare (9800-9899), and 
Other.  “Other” included all other NOBC jobs not included in the above 
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categories.  “Other” made up approximately 13% of the total Job by NOBC data 
available.  Prior enlisted is defined as someone who has completed more than 48 
months of AD service prior to receiving a commission as an officer. 
D. IDENTIFYING CIVILIAN EQUIVALENT PAY 
Finding out the retention needs of the IW community is a large part of this 
thesis.  However, the implementation of an IW CSRB may be a solution to 
increase retention.  This section will discuss the methodology used to find a 
civilian equivalent pay for IWOs.  The difference between this pay and the current 
pay of IWOs (if any) may be useful in the implementation of an IW CSRB. 
1. Procedure 
As discussed in Chapter II, Section C, subsection 7, there is an easily 
accessible Web site that converts MOCs to SOCs or military jobs to civilian 
equivalent jobs.  This Web site translator can be located on the World Wide Web 
at http://www.acinet.org/moc/Default.aspx.  To use this Web site, it is helpful (but 
not necessary) to have a military NOBC code(s).  To ensure fairness in this pay 
equivalent process, the top 15 IW jobs were selected for comparison and are 
listed in Table 15.  The left column shows the NOBC code, followed by the MOC 
or military job title.  The third column is the number of IWs in the data set that 
worked in that job.  The right-hand column shows the percentage of IWs that held 
that particular NOBC code.  The total number of IW personnel with NOBCs in the 













9815 Operations Officer, Naval Security Group 204 17.9% 
9851 Direct Support Officer, Naval Security Group (Surface) 181 15.9% 
9850 Direct Support Coordinator, Naval Security Group  57 5.0% 
9860 Special Operations Officer, Naval Security Group  47 4.1% 
9735 Computer Systems Analyst  43 3.8% 
9421 Commanding Officer, Shore Activity  39 3.4% 
9853 Direct Support Officer, Naval Security Group (Subsurface)  36 3.2% 
9817 Operations Watch Officer, Naval Security Group  34 3.0% 
9065 Staff Operations and Plans Officer  29 2.5% 
9436 Executive Officer, Shore Activity  27 2.4% 
9852 Direct Support Officer, Naval Security Group (Air)  27 2.4% 
9087 Staff Plans Officer  25 2.2% 
9517 Communications Security Officer  22 1.9% 
9640 Operational Intelligence Officer (General)  22 1.9% 
9825 Information Processing and Reporting Officer, Naval Security Group  22 1.9% 
3290 Training Officer 15 1.3% 
TOTAL  830 72.6% 
 
Table 15.   IW Jobs by NOBC Used to Find Civilian Equivalent Pay 
As shown in Table 15, the top 15 jobs represent approximately 73% of the 
total number of IW jobs.  These jobs were matched to their civilian equivalent 
jobs using the aforementioned Website.  Then, using the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics May 2008 National Occupational Employment and Wage Estimates, 
the annual wages were found for the IW civilian equivalent jobs.  While mean 
annual wages are shown in Chapter IV, it is assumed (based on Chapters I and 
II) that a CSRB will be given to personnel who are higher in rank and with more 
experience than the average IWO.  For this reason, the 75th percentiles of wages 
for each job are used to find an equivalent civilian pay.  We then compute a 
weighted average of these 75th percentile values, with weights determined by 
each job’s proportional representations listed in Table 15.  The resulting amount 
is an estimate of the civilian equivalent pay for an IWO. 
This civilian equivalent pay is then compared to the pay that an IWO 
currently makes.  The Secretary of Defense offers a current military 
compensation calculator that identifies how much annual base pay, Basic 
Allowance for Sustenance (BAS), and Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH) 
military personnel receive.  This calculator can be viewed on the World Wide 
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Web at http://www.defenselink.mil/militarypay/pay/calc/index.html.  While base 
pay and BAS are the same for each officer in a certain pay grade, BAH is 
dependent upon location.  This study used the national Inside the Continental 
United States (INCONUS) average for BAH.  The annual amount of base pay, 
BAS, and BAH was then used to compare military pay versus civilian  
equivalent pay. 
2. Concerns and Assumptions 
There are at least three possible concerns to this method of computing an 
IW civilian equivalent pay.  First, the NOBC codes from the data set used are 
from the last ten years of IW community billets.  A list of current billets is 
available, but does not have the needed NOBC codes.  For complete accuracy in 
this process, the use of current NOBC codes is recommended.  An initial check 
of the current IW billet list shows that the billets used for this comparison are still 
current billets in the IW community, with the exception of one type of billet.  The 
DMDC data set included 22 NOBC billets identified as Classic OWL Special 
Operations Officer.  There were only two similar billets found in the current billet 
list.  Therefore, this NOBC was excluded and the next highest NOBC billet was 
added to the list in Table 15. 
Second, this approach may be more accurate if a CSRB pay grade is 
identified first.  Then analysis could search for the most common NOBCs within 
that specific pay grade.  The argument against this is that many officers perform 
jobs at junior ranks before becoming senior IWOs.  Identifying only jobs at a 
certain rank may exclude jobs that these officers are very experienced in doing. 
Thirdly, military benefits and civilian benefits are often very different.  It is 
often argued that military benefits and retirement offer much more than civilian 
equivalent jobs.  However, the military also has frequent deployments, 
relocations, and long working hours, as noted in Chapter II.  For the purposes of 
a monetary CSRB, it is assumed that the better military benefits are offset 
completely by deployments, frequent relocations, working hours, and other 
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negative retention factors.  Because of this assumption, it is assumed that 
military pay and civilian equivalent pay are equally weighted by IWOs.  This 




In this chapter, the results of the DMDC IW retention study are included as 
part of the FNA.  Additionally, the results of an analysis on IW-equivalent civilian 
pay for CSRB purposes are included as the final section of this chapter.  FNA 
conclusions and FSA recommendations will be provided in Chapter V. 
The data analyzed in Sections B and C represent a historical population of 
IWOs.  We can treat this population as a hypothetical sample of all historical and 
future IWOs.  As a sample, p-values are used to assess the significance of these 
data.  Throughout this chapter, p-values are considered significant if they are 
below .05.  Additionally, significant p-values are denoted with an asterisk.  All 
tables, charts, and analysis use Retention Status as the Y or Dependent variable. 
B. IW RETENTION DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
This section is organized by type of predictor variables.  Each subsection 
has tables showing descriptive statistics along with categorical differences in IW 
retention.  Descriptive statistic tables show the actual numbers of personnel 
within each category.  The Predictor variable is in the left column, followed by 
retention status.  “In” means these personnel stayed in the IW community, while 
“Out” means these personnel left the IW community.  The total number of 
personnel under that category is in the total row/column, while percentages of the 
total retention status are to the right.  Education, Race/Ethnicity, and Source of 
Commission have rows of unknown located in the predictor variable description.  
Since unknown data provides no contribution to this thesis, these unknown rows 
of data are excluded from the comparison tests for those predictor variables. 
After the descriptive table, some subsections have a chi-square 




shown only if the chi-square p-value is less than .05.  This graph has categorical 
labels along the x-axis.  The bar width of these categories is relative to its 
population size. 
1. Pay Grade 
This subsection provides historical information on the relationship between 
IW retention and pay grade.  Table 16 shows that as expected, ENSs and LTJGs 
stay in more than officers at higher pay grades.  More LTs get out than stay in, 
and LCDRs get out at the highest rate (63.4%), followed closely by CAPTs 
(63.0%) and CDRs (62.1%).  Table 17 shows these differences. 
PREDICTOR VARIABLE  RETENTION STATUS      PERCENTAGES 
RANK  IN  OUT  TOTAL    IN  OUT 
ENS  83 22 105   15.3%  3.6%
LTJG  88 59 147   16.2%  9.8%
LT  176 190 366   32.5%  31.5%
LCDR  112 194 306   20.7%  32.2%
CDR  53 87 140   9.8%  14.4%
CAPT  30 51 81   5.5%  8.5%
TOTAL  542 603 1,145   100.0%  100.0%
 
Table 16.   Pay Grade Description 
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Table 17.   Pay Grade Categorical Differences 
As shown in Table 17, there are significant differences in retention among 
pay grades at the .0001 level.  While significant differences look to be between 
the two lowest grades (O-1 and O-2) and the higher ranks, this difference is 
expected.  Most personnel in these lower ranks have not been in service long 
enough to be eligible to leave the IW community.  Table 17 also shows the 
beginning of an expected decrease in retention as personnel become more 
senior.  Retention, however, reaches its minimum at O-4.  While it is true that 
LCDRs have the lowest retention, retention in pay grades O-5 and O-6 are not 
much different. 
The data show that the overall retention rates for the last decade are 48% 
for O-3, 36.6% for O-4, 37.9% for O-5, and 37% for O-6.  This supports the 
theory that O-4 and O-5 may be an area of concern for the IW community, 
dependent upon the desired retention rates for those pay grades. 
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2. Gender 
This subsection provides historical information on the relationship between 
IW retention and gender.  Table 18 shows that IW females are historically more 
likely than males to leave the IW community; however, this difference is not 
statistically significant. 
PREDICTOR VARIABLE  RETENTION STATUS      PERCENTAGES 
GENDER  IN OUT TOTAL   IN  OUT
MALE  469 506 975   86.5%  83.9%
FEMALE  73 97 170   13.5%  16.1%
TOTAL  542 603 1,145   100.0%  100.0%
 
Table 18.   Gender Description 
3. Family Status 
This subsection provides historical information on the relationship between 
IW retention and family status.  Table 19 shows that over 70% of the IW 
community is married.  This is similar to the proportion of married males in the 
military shown in Chapter II, Table 8.  The table also shows that single personnel 
with family are historically more likely to leave the IW community than those who 
are single, married, or in a joint marriage; however, this is not of statistical 
significance with a p-value of .128. 
PREDICTOR VARIABLE  RETENTION STATUS      PERCENTAGES 
FAMILY STATUS  IN OUT TOTAL   IN  OUT
JOINT MARRIAGE  21 16 37   3.9%  2.7%
MARRIED  382 441 823   70.5%  73.1%
SGL W/ FAMILY  19 33 52   3.5%  5.5%
SINGLE   120 113 233   22.1%  18.7%
TOTAL  542 603 1,145   100.0%  100.0%
 
Table 19.   Family Status Description 
4. Education 
This subsection provides historical information on the relationship between 
IW retention and education.  Before discussing education as a predictor variable, 
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it is important to note a possible confounding variable found during data analysis.  
In the DMDC data set described in Tables 20 and 21, all 102 of the IWOs with a 
Doctorate also have OCS/AOCS/OTC, other, or unknown listed as their 
commissioning source.  Additionally, 101 of these 102 officers are in pay grades 
O-3 or below.  This is possible since OCS/AOCS/Officer Training Command 
(OTC), other, and unknown Source of Commission (SoC) make up 70% of all IW 
commissioning sources in this data set, as shown in Table 23.  However, this still 
implies that none of the remaining 30% of IW officers from the Naval Academy, 
ROTC, or Direct Appointment have a Doctorate.  This also implies that only one 
IW officer in pay grades O-4 and above has a Doctorate.  The author found this 
to be highly suspicious.  It is very possible that DMDC has made some errors in 
the area of Doctorate education. 
PREDICTOR VARIABLE  RETENTION STATUS      PERCENTAGES 
EDUCATION  IN OUT TOTAL   IN  OUT
UNKNOWN  98 54 152   18.1%  9.0%
HS DIPLOMA  64 50 114   11.8%  8.3%
ASSOCIATES  19 21 40   3.5%  3.5%
BACHELORS  203 347 550   37.5%  57.5%
MASTERS  82 105 187   15.1%  17.4%
DOCTORATE  76 26 102   14.0%  4.3%
TOTAL  542 603 1,145   100.0%  100.0%
 
Table 20.   Education Description 
As shown in Table 20, having a Doctorate or HS Diploma has a positive 
association with retention.  Conversely, having a Bachelor’s or Master’s degree 
has a negative association with retention.  It is worth noting that many prior 
enlisted LDO officers have an education level of HS Diploma or an Associate’s 
degree.  This may help explain why the retention at these lower educational 
levels is higher than those at Bachelor’s or Master’s level.  Table 21 shows these 
educational differences.  Those with an unknown education are excluded from 
the analysis shown in Table 21. 
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Table 21.   Education Categorical Differences 
As shown in Table 21, there are significant differences in retention among 
the educational subcategories and retention status to the .0001 level.  A 
Doctorate or HS Diploma has the most positive effect on retention.  Bachelor’s 
degrees, followed by Master’s degrees, have the lowest effect on retention.  If the 
LDO-related HS Diplomas and Associates degrees are excluded, the data show 
a positive relationship between higher education and retention. 
5. Source of Commission 
This subsection provides historical information on the relationship between 
IW retention and an IW officer’s source of commission.  Table 22 shows that 
personnel commissioned through OCS/AOCS/OTC make up approximately 50% 
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of the total.  Other than those with unknown commissioning sources, it looks as 
though OCS, AOCS, and OTC also have the most positive effect on retention.  
Both Tables 22 and 23 show SoC retention patterns similar to what Bernard 
(2002) found in Chapter II, Table 5.  The description also shows that personnel 
commissioned through direct appointment have lower retention rates.  This is 
most likely due to their often-temporary status. 
PREDICTOR VARIABLE 
RETENTION 
STATUS      PERCENTAGES 
SOURCE OF COMMISSION  IN OUT TOTAL   IN  OUT
UNKNOWN  51 14 65   9.4%  2.3%
NAVAL ACADEMY  54 70 124   10.0%  11.6%
ROTC SCHOLARSHIP  60 85 145   11.1%  14.1%
ROTC NONSCHOLAR  13 22 35   2.4%  3.6%
OCS/AOCS/OTS  284 279 563   52.4%  46.3%
DIRECT APPT Non‐Professional (Non‐Prof) 16 50 66   3.0%  8.3%
OTHER  64 83 147   11.8%  13.8%
TOTAL  542 603 1,145   100.0%  100.0%
 
Table 22.   Source of Commission Description 
Table 23 shows the categorical differences in retention between sources 
of commission.  The unknown SoC shown in Table 22 are excluded from the 
analysis shown in Table 23. 
78 
 
Table 23.   SoC Categorical Differences 
As shown in Table 23, there is a significant difference in retention among 
the categorical sources of commission at a .0009 level.  This is mostly due to the 
differences between Direct Appointment (Non-Prof) and the other subcategories.  
However, there is also a difference between those commissioned through ROTC 




6. Race or Ethnicity 
This subsection provides historical information on the relationship between 
IW retention and race or ethnicity.  As shown in Table 24, over 70% of the IW 
community is Caucasian.  It appears being Hispanic (with 69% leaving the 
community) or Asian/Pacific Islander (56%) has the most negative associations 
with retention. 
PREDICTOR VARIABLE  RETENTION STATUS      PERCENTAGES 
RACE OR ETHNICITY  IN OUT TOTAL   IN  OUT
UNKNOWN  65 15 80   12.0%  2.5%
CAUCASIAN  378 457 835   69.7%  75.8%
AFRICAN‐AMERICAN  48 54 102   8.9%  9.0%
HISPANIC  19 43 62   3.5%  7.1%
AMERICAN INDIAN/ALASKAN NATIVE  10 6 16   1.8%  1.0%
ASIAN/PACIFIC ISLANDER  18 23 41   3.3%  3.8%
OTHER  4 5 9   0.7%  0.8%
TOTAL  542 603 1,145   100.0%  100.0%
 
Table 24.   Race or Ethnicity Description 
Table 24 shows that Hispanics have the lowest retention.  However, in 
Chapter III, Section C, subsection 1, the author noted an over-representation of 
personnel of Hispanic descent in the data set that were excluded from this data 
set.  All of these excluded personnel are still in the IW community.  
Conservatively, those excluded personnel of Hispanic descent still in the IW 
community are over-represented by approximately 15.  If that number were 
added into this data set, then the differences in Table 24 might not exist. 
7. Jobs by NOBC 
This subsection provides historical information on the relationship between 
IW retention and jobs by NOBC.  As shown in Table 25, over half of all jobs in the 
data set are within the NOBC IW Group.  However, other support or 




confounding variable is whether the jobs have an effect on retention, or whether 
these personnel are sent to these jobs before leaving the IW community.  There 
is no way of knowing this from the data. 
PREDICTOR VARIABLE  RETENTION STATUS      PERCENTAGES 
JOB BY NOBC  IN OUT TOTAL   IN  OUT
NAVAL SCIENCE (2100‐2199)  3 8 11   0.6%  1.3%
PERSONNEL (3000‐3999)  11 31 42   2.0%  5.1%
ELECTRONIC ENG (GEN) (5900‐5999)  5 18 23   0.9%  3.0%
STAFF & FLT CMD GROUP (9000‐9099)  38 49 87   7.0%  8.1%
SHORE OPS (OIC/XO/CO) (9400‐9499)  31 45 76   5.7%  7.5%
COMMS GROUP (9500‐9599)  22 23 45   4.1%  3.8%
INTEL GROUP (9600‐9699)  31 28 59   5.7%  4.6%
ADP GROUP (9700‐9799)  37 35 72   6.8%  5.8%
IW GROUP (9800‐9899)  291 291 582   53.7%  48.3%
UNKNOWN  60 51 111   11.1%  8.5%
OTHER  13 24 37   2.4%  4.0%
TOTAL  542 603 1,145   100.0%  100.0%
 
Table 25.   Jobs by NOBC Description 
Table 26 shows the categorical differences in retention between Jobs by 
NOBC.  Among subcategories of Job by NOBC, Electronic Engineering (General) 
and Personnel have the lowest retention.  Tracking retention within these groups 




Table 26.   Jobs by NOBC Categorical Differences 
8. Prior Enlisted 
This subsection provides historical information on the relationship between 
IW retention and prior enlisted officers.  In Table 27, attrition rates for prior 
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enlisted officers look about the same rate as those for non-prior enlisted officers.  
A chi-square analysis confirms that there is no significant difference between 
prior enlisted and non-prior enlisted retention in this data set. 
PREDICTOR VARIABLE  RETENTION STATUS      PERCENTAGES 
PRIOR ENLISTED  IN  OUT TOTAL   IN  OUT
UNKNOWN  4  13 17   0.7%  2.2%
PRIOR ENLISTED  247  263 510   45.6%  43.6%
NOT PRIOR ENLISTED  291  327 618   53.7%  54.2%
TOTAL  542  603 1,145   100.0%  100.0%
 
Table 27.   Prior Enlisted Description 
C. IW RETENTION INTERACTIONS 
Unlike Section B of this chapter, there are no descriptive statistics for 
predictor variable interactions.  For each identified interaction, however, there is 
a column plot that shows the significant interactions.  For the interaction analysis, 
ROTC-S and ROTC Non-Scholarship are combined into one category  
labeled ROTC. 
To find interactions, a logistic regression model was created with predictor 
variables.  Initially, all predictor variables were used in this model, and a number 
of interactions were found with extensive searching.  However, because of the 
overall poor fit of the model, there were concerns due to possible co-linearity 
within the data and type-one error. 
Based on previous retention research in Chapter II, four predictor 
variables were selected for an interaction evaluation.  These were Gender,  
Pay Grade, SoC, and Prior Enlisted.  Figure 13 shows the top-level interactions 
among these four variables using a partition regression tree (Breiman, et al., 
1993).  As with the chi-square analysis, the red color represents the number of 
IWOs who remain in the IW community, while the blue color represents those 
officers who left.  The regression tree finds the most significant interactions 
among the identified variables, as they relate to retention. 
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Figure 13.   Partition Regression Tree 
Further chi-square analysis of the factors shown in Figure 13 show two 
significant interactions with a p-value of less than .05.  These two interactions are 
shown in the next two subsections. 
1. Pay Grade by SoC 
As explained in Section B of this chapter, retention at the O-4 pay grade 
may be less than what is expected.  This interaction helps show which SoCs 
have lower or higher retention across the pay grades.  Figure 14 shows retention 
rates across Pay Grades within both ROTC and OCS/AOCS/OTS SoCs. 
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Figure 14.   Difference in Retention Rates by Pay Grade for OCS and  
ROTC SoCs 
Figure 14 shows higher retention within OCS/AOCS/OTS SoC at pay 
grades O-3 and below and the lower retention at higher pay grades.  Conversely, 
those personnel with a ROTC SoC show lower retention than OCS/AOCS/OTS 
at O-3 and below and higher retention at O-5 and O-6.  It appears personnel with 
a ROTC SoC stay in at higher rates, as those with an OCS/AOCS/OTC SoC 
leave the IW community.  This is likely due to the high number of prior enlisted 
officers that enter the IW community through the OCS, AOCS, and OTS 
programs.  This data set shows that 51% of IWOs commissioned from OCS are 
prior enlisted. 
Unlike both the OCS/AOCS/OTC and ROTC SoCs, the Naval Academy 
showed no major differences in retention across pay grades.  Retention for the 
Naval Academy SoCs stayed between 38% and 56% across all pay grades. 
2. Prior Enlisted by SoC 
This section shows the retention of prior or non-prior enlisted officers 
within each SoC.  Figure 15 shows that prior enlisted officers with a commission 
from the Naval Academy and ROTC are significantly more likely to leave the IW 
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community than non-prior enlisted officers from those SoCs are.  Conversely, 
prior enlisted officers commissioned from OCS/AOCS/OTC are much more likely 
to remain in the IW community than non-prior enlisted officers from that SoC are. 
 
Figure 15.   Difference in Retention Rates of SoCs by Prior Enlisted Status 
D. MODELING IW RETENTION 
This section describes an effort to model IW retention based on the factors 
used in Sections B and C.  Such a model could be used to predict how important 
these factors are to the retention status of IW personnel.  Unfortunately, the 
factors used in Sections B and C do not accurately model the retention of IW 
personnel.  It is likely that the data set includes excess noise that makes 
retention trends difficult to identify. 
The initial model of the basic factors used in Section B (minus Jobs by 
NOBC) shows a p-value of .0007*, yet an R² value of only .0456.  Further 
analysis finds that a model of the initial values (minus Jobs by NOBC) and the 
interactions shown in Section C, provide another low p-value and a modest 























Figure 16.   Retention Model with Major Interactions 
Still, an R² value of 12% hardly inspires confidence in the model.  
Unfortunately, it was not possible to create a better model, regardless of the 
primary factors used.  Future, successful modeling efforts may be possible if 
more data on those personnel that leave the IW community were available.  
Tracking and maintaining quality information on personnel who leave the 
community could assist future IW retention research. 
E. LONGITUDINAL MONTHS OF IW SERVICE 
This section gives a longitudinal view of when IW officers leave the IW 
community up to 118 months or 9 years, 10 months of service within the IW 
community.  It is important to note that this measurement set does not represent 
career LOS; rather, it is the length that officers serve after accepting the IW 
designators 1610 or 6440.  Within the DMDC data set, officers in the IW 
community with the aforementioned IW designators were matched with the first 
and last month they served under the IW designators 1610 and 6440.  These 
longitudinal data are shown in Figure 17 with the X-axis as the number of 
personnel leaving and the Y-axis as the months after entering the IW community.  
As shown, IW officers leave the community most frequently between 60 and 90 
months (5-7.5 years) and 100 and 118 months (8.3-9.8 years) of IW service.  
That is, they enter the IW community, normally serve between 60 and 90 months 
or 100 and 118 months, and then leave the IW community.  Data past 118 
months of IW service was not available. 
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Figure 17.   LOS After IW Designation 
Additionally, there is a difference in the number of months served in the 
IW community between prior enlisted officers and non-prior enlisted officers.  
This was found by analyzing only the data of officers who left the IW community 
between FY97 and FY07.  There were not enough personnel at the grades of O-
1 and O-2 who got out of the IW community to analyze.  Figures 18 through 20 
show the difference in months of IW service between prior enlisted and  
non-prior enlisted officers of grades O-3 through O-5.  The x-axis represents 
months of IW service while the y-axis represents the number of IWOs that 
separated. 
As Figures 18 and 19 show, the number of O-3 and O-4 IWOs who leave 
the IW community before serving 120 months (10 years) within the community is 
much greater among prior enlisted officers (as shown by the N statistic).  This 
difference decreases significantly in the pay grade of O-5.  The percentages for 
all pay grades are shown in Table 28. 
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Figure 18.   O-3 Length of IW Service Before Leaving 
 
Figure 19.   O-4 Length of IW Service Before Leaving 
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Figure 20.   O-5 Length of IW Service Before Leaving 





Table 28.   IWOs Leaving Prior to 10 YOS in the IW Community 
Table 28 shows a very high percentage of prior enlisted personnel leaving 
the community in the pay grade of O-4 before serving 10 years in an IW 
designator.  This may be of concern to the IW community. 
F. IW CIVILIAN EQUIVALENT PAY 
Section F shows the results of an initial analysis of the civilian equivalent 
pay for an IWO.  This section converts the top 15 IW NOBC jobs into a single 
average for an IW civilian equivalent pay.  That amount is then compared to 
current military pay to find a CSRB amount.  The difference in this pay may be 
useful when implementing a CSRB retention solution. 
1. IW Officer Civilian Equivalent Pay 
Table 29 shows the military job, NOBC, and the civilian equivalent job that 
matches.  As shown in Table 29, 9 of the 15 NOBC jobs are classified as 
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General and Operations Manager, and two are classified as Management 
Analyst.  It should be noted that the salary of a General and Operations Manager 
is weighted to account for approximately 80% of the IW civilian equivalent pay.  
As noted earlier, weight is dependent upon the percentage of IW officers that 
work in that field. 
NOBC MOC SOC(s) Weight 
9815 Operations Officer, Naval 
Security Group General and Operations Manager 
24.8% 
9851 Direct Support Officer, Naval 
Security Group (Surface) General and Operations Manager 
22.0% 
9850 Direct Support Coordinator, 
Naval Security Group General and Operations Manager 
7.1% 
9860 Special Operations Officer, 
Naval Security Group General and Operations Manager 
5.8% 




9421 Commanding Officer, Shore 
Activity General and Operations Manager 
4.8% 
9853 Direct Support Officer, Naval 
Security Group (Subsurface) General and Operations Manager 
4.5% 
9817 Operations Watch Officer, Naval 
Security Group General and Operations Manager 
4.3% 
9065 Staff Operations and Plans 
Officer Management Analyst 
3.7% 
9436 Executive Officer, Shore Activity General and Operations Manager 3.4% 
9852 Direct Support Officer, Naval 
Security Group (Air) General and Operations Manager 
3.4% 
9117 Staff Plans Officer Network Systems and Data 
Communications Analyst 
3.2% 
9087 Communications Security Officer Management Analyst 2.9% 
9640 Operational Intelligence Officer 
(General) None Available 
0% 
9825 Information Processing and 
Reporting Officer, Naval Security 
Group 
Computer and Information Systems 
Manager 
2.9% 
3290 Training Officer Training and Development Manager 1.8% 
 
Table 29.   Conversion of Top 15 IW Jobs by NOBC 
NOBC job 9640 showed no available civilian equivalent job, and is 
therefore excluded.  Its original 2.9% weight was divided by the remaining 14 




classified as Computer Systems Analyst showed two possible civilian equivalent 
jobs.  Both jobs are used and the weight for the Computer Systems Analyst is 
split evenly between them. 
Table 30 shows the civilian equivalent pay broken down by the seven IW 
civilian equivalent jobs.  Wages shown are national estimates.  The column third 
from the right includes the relative standard error (RSE) given by the Bureau of 
















General and Operations 
Manager $51.91 $107,970 $137,020 0.2% 80.1% 
$108,753
Computer Systems Analyst $37.90 $78,830 $95,810 0.4% 2.7% $2,587
Database Administrator $35.05 $72,900 $91,850 0.8% 2.7% $2,480
Management Analyst $39.87 $82,920 $99,700 0.5% 6.6% $6,580
Network Systems and Data 
Communications Analyst $35.50 $71,100 $90,740 0.4% 3.2% 
$2,904
Computer and Information 
Systems Manager $57.07 $118,710 $141,890 0.4% 2.9% 
$4,115
Training and Development 
Manager $45.11 $93,830 $115,570 0.6% 1.8% 
$2,080
Civilian Equivalent Wage      $129,499
 
Table 30.   IW Civilian Equivalent Pay Wages 
The Bureau of Labor Statistics calculates annual wages by multiplying 
hourly wages by 2,080 hours, which represents year-round, full-time work. Each 
civilian equivalent mean annual wage is adjusted by its NOBC job weight to 
arrive at a civilian equivalent compensation total for an IWO.  As shown at the 
bottom right of Table 30, the civilian equivalent wage for an IWO, according to 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics 75th Percentile wage, is $129,499. 
2. Difference between IW Civilian Equivalent and Military Pay 
The official Secretary of Defense military compensation calculator was 
used to gather pay information on pay grades O-3E, O-4, and O-5.  The 
information provided is shown in Table 31.  All inputs used the U.S. INCONUS 
average for BAH, with standard federal tax deductions and a state tax rate of 5%.  
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Since approximately 70% of the IW community is married, the pay for all ranks 
was calculated to have at least one dependent.  The difference in pay between 
one dependent and multiple dependents is minimal.  This should better 
approximate the national average BAH rates for IWOs with dependents. 
Rank YOS Base Pay BAS BAH Tax Break Total Difference in Pay (Annual)
LT/O-3E 16 $71,672 $2,676 $21,720 $8,323 $104,392 –$25,107
LT/O-3E 18 $73,760 $2,676 $21,720 $8,621 $106,778 –$22,721
LCDR/O-4 18 & Up $80,680 $2,676 $23,148 $10,222 $116,726 –$12,773
CDR/O-5 20 $92,369 $2,676 $24,972 $11,849 $131,867 +$2,368
CDR/O-5 22 $95,144 $2,676 $24,972 $11,849 $134,642 +5,143
 
Table 31.   Difference Between IW Civilian Equivalent and Military Pay 
Additionally, each rank had an input for YOS as shown in the second 
column in Table 31.  The ranks and YOS used were based upon the previous 
assumption that an IW CSRB would go to higher ranks with more experience, 
possibly eligible for retirement.  Numbers are rounded to the nearest  
whole dollar. 
As shown in the right-hand column of Table 31, the difference in annual 
pay between an IW civilian equivalent and senior pay grades O-3E and O-4 is 
substantial.  Pay grade O-5, however, seems to be paid an amount similar to the 
civilian market’s 75th-percentile wage. 
93 
V. FSA DISCUSSION 
A. OVERVIEW 
This chapter summarizes the FNA and provides functional solutions for 
retention issues identified in the FNA.  The FNA identified retention issues and 
possible capability gaps, summarized in Section B.  The FSA provides realistic 
solutions for these issues, shown in Section C. 
B. FNA SUMMARY 
This section summarizes the results of the FNA.  In Chapter III, Section B, 
the FAA showed a possible capability gap in the number of IWOs in the grade of 
O-4 and O-5.  The FNA looked at historical IW data to empirically show this and 
other capability gaps within IW retention.  These results are split into two 
subsections.  The first subsection (Significant results) includes statements of fact 
and results that were statistically significant below a .05 p-value.  The second 
subsection (Areas for improvement) shows overall areas of low retention that the 
IW community may want to improve. 
1. Significant Results 
 Retention over the last decade at pay grade O-3 is 48.0%. 
 Retention over the last decade at pay grade O-4 is 36.6%. 
 Retention over the last decade at pay grade O-5 is 37.9%. 
 Retention over the last decade at pay grade O-6 is 37.0%. 
 The IW O-4 pay grade has the lowest retention rate. 
 Officers commissioned via OCS/AOCS/OTS show a decrease in 
retention, as rank increases.  Conversely, officers commissioned 
via ROTC show an increase in retention, as rank increases.  This is 
likely due to the number of prior enlisted IWOs commissioned via 
OCS/AOCS/OTS (51%). 
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 Prior enlisted officers with a commission from the Naval Academy 
and ROTC are significantly more likely to leave the IW community 
than are non-prior enlisted officers from those SoCs. 
 Prior enlisted officers commissioned from OCS/AOCS/OTC are 
significantly more likely to remain in the IW community than  
are non-prior enlisted officers from that SoC. 
 Within the first 9.8 YOS, IWOs are most likely to leave the IW 
community between 5-7.5 YOS and 8.3-9.8 YOS. 
 Sixty-two percent of those who left the IW community in the pay 
grade of O-4, prior to 10 YOS in an IW designator, were  
prior enlisted. 
2. Areas for Improvement 
There are some easily identifiable gaps in retention, especially at the pay 
grade of O-4.  Other retention issues are more complex.  While this list is not  
all-inclusive, it does identify areas where the IW community may want to improve 
retention.  These are the areas of lower retention when compared to other IWOs 
within each predictor variable(s). 
 All officers at the grade of O-4 (assuming O-4 retention should be 
higher than 36.6%). 
 All officers at the grade of O-5 (assuming O-5 retention should be 
higher than 37.9%). 
 Prior enlisted officers commissioned through ROTC and the  
Naval Academy. 
 Non-prior enlisted officers commissioned via OCS/AOCS/OTS. 
C. FUNCTIONAL SOLUTION ANALYSIS 
Both materiel and non-materiel approaches to improving retention were 
covered in Chapter II.  In the case of retention, materiel solutions most likely 
involve a monetary retention bonus.  Non-materiel approaches may include 
nonmonetary policy changes, detailing priority changes, sabbaticals, etc.  It is 
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important to remember that a solution for one retention capability gap may not be 
a viable solution for another.  Additionally, a materiel solution cannot discriminate 
by gender, race, or prior enlisted status.  This section will provide materiel and/or 
non-materiel solutions for each possible IW retention capability gap.  These 
suggested solutions should be strategically responsive, feasible, and realizable 
(Joint Chiefs of Staff, J-8, 2006). 
Section D will highlight areas of note for the IW community specifically 
related to a CSRB solution.  Before implementing any retention solutions, the IW 
community should first think about minimum billet levels and the efficiency and 
effectiveness of using civilian employees in place of military personnel.  
Additionally, these solutions should be reanalyzed in terms of short-term and 
long-term IW community goals.  Some solutions may be effective now, but may 
not be effective in the long term.  In addition, these are only suggested solutions.  
To find out the most effective solutions, an effective survey, exit poll, or interview 
of IWOs similar to the one described in the next chapter would be helpful. 
As noted in Chapter II, the best way to increase retention is to offer many 
flexible retention solutions.  The more retention opportunities and choices an 
officer has within the Navy, the more likely he or she is to remain in service.  FNA 
issues and FSA solutions are listed below. 
1. Improve Retention of IWOs at the Grade of O-4 
The implementation of flexible work arrangements, geographical stability, 
and improved work place policies may help retain more LCDRs.  Additionally, 
these midgrade officers may want to see more leadership billets, as was 
mentioned in Chapter II.  A monetary CSRB solution for O-4s (with less than 25 
YOS, as required by law) may be the best solution here for the short term.  
Additionally, other areas of a CSRB are discussed in Section D of this chapter.  




18 YOS or higher) is $12,000-$13,000 annually.  If the CSRB is offered to less 
experienced O-4s, Table 31 should be recalculated and the amount of the CSRB 
should change. 
2. Improve Retention of IWOs at the Grade of O-5 
Monetary bonuses may not be the best solution to retain IWOs in the 
grade of O-5.  Personnel at the grade of O-5 already earn approximately the 
same as the 75th-percentile civilian equivalent. 
Geographical stability or flexible work arrangements may be effective 
solutions.  However, considering the feedback from the IW survey mentioned in 
Chapter II, the best solution might be to provide these officers with more  
IW-related leadership opportunities, should they remain in service. 
3. Improve Retention of Prior Enlisted Officers Commissioned via 
ROTC and the Naval Academy 
The reason for poor retention of these officers is unknown.  Further 
research is needed to understand the lower retention of prior enlisted officers 
from these SoCs. 
4. Improve Retention of Non-Prior Enlisted Officers Commissioned 
via OCS/OACS/OTS 
Again, it is unknown why there is low retention within this category.  
Further research in this area is needed. 
D. CSRB CONSIDERATIONS 
As discussed in Chapter II, a CSRB may be a valid solution for the IW 
community’s midgrade shortages.  First, a specific LOS eligible for a CSRB 
should be defined.  While the need for O-4s between 12 and 24 YOS is easily 
identifiable, there are complexities involved due to prior enlisted service, FOS, 
lateral transfers, and department head tours.  It is recommended that the IW 
community look into a bonus program dependent upon YOS and pay grade.  
Additionally, a program that encourages personnel to accept orders to areas of 
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IW need should be included into the program.  The IW community may also use 
this opportunity to ensure that personnel eligible for this CSRB are qualified in a 
certain area, and have received certain training, certificates, or degrees.  This 
kind of CSRB eligibility would require the community to first identify and develop 
these critical training programs or certificates. 
It is also suggested that personnel only be eligible for the IW bonus if they 
are serving in an area of need, or performing IW critical skill-related activities 
more than 75% of the time, with the exception of those in an IA/GSA billet.  
Additionally, research should be conducted on the differences between the 
effectiveness of a bonus auction and a traditional bonus.  Once these issues are 
assessed, the IW community should show the cost effectiveness of such a 
CSRB, as compared to the cost of unmanned billets.  This is similar to the 
process described in Chapter II. 
The most important thing the IW community can do is to ensure it receives 
input from those who need to be retained.  This can be done via a survey, exit 
poll, or interviews.  Such a survey was developed and given to IWOs at NPS.  
Chapter VI discusses this survey and the results. 
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VI. MEASURE OF SOLUTION EFFECTIVENESS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
To measure the solution effectiveness of both monetary and nonmonetary 
programs identified in the FSA, a retention survey for IWOs was created, fielded, 
and analyzed at NPS.  This survey provides the IW community with a fully 
developed tool that can provide quality input on the retention behavior and 
opinions of IWOs.  The survey was developed in such a manner to provide the 
following information about the participants: 
 Overall job satisfaction 
 Job satisfaction based on location 
 Areas for community retention improvement 
 Importance of various retention factors towards individual retention 
decisions 
 Individual retention intentions 
 Opinions about the civilian equivalent job market. 
 Opinions concerning an IW CSRB 
 The take-rate behavior for an IW CSRB 
 Trade-offs between a CSRB and nonmonetary programs 
 Other suggestions for IW leadership 
 Other suggestions for improving this type of survey 
B. SURVEY REPORT OVERVIEW 
In support of the objectives, a Web-based survey was given to NPS IWOs 
in June 2009.  The survey consisted of 41 questions given to each of 34 
students.  Section C describes the survey methodology, including how the 
instrument was designed and fielded.  The survey results are shown in Section 
D.  Of the initial 41 questions, 17, shown in Section D, subsection 2, were 
demographic in nature.  The remaining 24 questions are shown in Section D, 
subsection 3.  A discussion of survey results can be found in Section E, followed 
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by future survey recommendations.  The actual survey instrument used is 
included in Appendix C.  When viewing the survey instrument in Appendix C, it is 
important to remember that some participants skipped some questions, 
dependent upon earlier responses. 
C. SURVEY METHODOLOGY 
1. Target Population 
The population for this survey was NPS IWOs enrolled in a degree 
program.  According to IW community records, the total population was 38.  Two 
personnel were excluded due to having transferred out of the community.  This 
left 36 eligible participants. 
2. Instrument Review and Pretesting 
Because the population of IW students at NPS was so small, the target 
population was excluded from reviewing and pretesting the instrument.  Instead, 
instrument review and pretesting was done via six students from the Human 
Resource (HR) and Aviation communities.  Five of the six students had previous 
knowledge in survey research methods.  These students were asked to treat this 
survey like one that their own community would give them.  This provided 
valuable feedback to ensure a smooth fielding process.  Total response time to 
take this survey averaged 20 minutes during the fielding process. 
3. Fielding Procedures and Response Rates 
Upon completion of pretesting and Institutional Review Board (IRB) 
approval, the survey was fielded.  Respondents were contacted two to three 
times during the process.  The initial contact was a nonpersonalized, anonymous 
e-mail sent from the author notifying students of the survey they would receive 
the following day.  This e-mail was sent at 1100 on Monday, June 1, 2009.  At 
1200 on Tuesday, June 2, 2009, a personalized e-mail containing an embedded 
hyperlink to the survey was sent to all participants.  Thirty, or 83%, of the 
participants completed the survey within one week of this e-mail. 
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The following week, on Tuesday, June 9, 2009, a single follow-up 
personalized e-mail was sent to six respondents that had not yet completed the 
survey.  This e-mail served as a reminder that these participants had not yet 
completed or opted out of the survey.  Both the second and third e-mails were 
sent from within SurveyMonkey.  Samples of all e-mails sent are included in  
Appendix D.  Four additional participants completed the survey within the second 
week after the follow-up e-mail.  The final response rate for the survey was 34 of 
36 eligible participants, or 94%. 
D. RESULTS 
1. Analysis Approach 
The survey data were exported from SurveyMonkey to an Excel file 
containing e-mail addresses of respondents and responses to each question.  
While the analysis was conducted at the individual level, certain data were 
aggregated to ensure participant anonymity in published results.  Individually 
identifiable data in open-ended responses was generalized to ensure  
participant anonymity. 
2. Respondent Demographics 
All respondents were U.S. Naval IWOs attending NPS.  Figures 21-25 
show various demographic data for participants.  While race should be included 
in future surveys of this sort with larger populations, it was not included in this 
survey.  Figure 21 shows participant pay grades.  This shows an over-
representation of more senior IWOs compared to their prevalence in the 
community.  Participant data show that 51.5% of participants are warfare 
qualified.  This seems to accurately represent the number of warfare-qualified 
officers in the IW community, and resembles IW warfare qualification 
assumptions made in Chapter II, subsection G. 
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Figure 21.   Participant Pay Grades 
Figure 22 shows that the 74% of participants have been in the IW 
community for less than eight years. 
 
Figure 22.   Participant LOS in the IW Community 
Figure 23 shows a possible over-representation of participants with OCS 
as their SoC.  While this matches the historical data analyzed in Chapter IV, data 
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from FY03 to present in Chapter II, Table 11 showed that the number of OCS 
graduates assessed has decreased.  Figure 24 shows the age of participants.  
As with high levels of experience shown by rank in Figure 21, average participant 
age is older than it would have been in a random sample of IWOs. 
 
Figure 23.   Participant SoC 
 
Figure 24.   Participant Age 
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Males accounted for 94.1% of the participants, and 5.9% were female.  
This is an over-representation of males in the survey population.  Because of  
this over-representation, gender interaction analysis is excluded from the  
survey results. 
About seventy-three percent of participants were married.  This closely 
resembles the entire population of married IWOs at approximately 70%.  Of 
those participants that were married, only 8% were not co-located with their 
spouse, and none of those married were in a joint military marriage.  Other 
demographic questions showed that 56% of participants had children.  Of those 
with children, 95% had children that lived within their household, while 26% of 
had children that lived in another location.  Twenty-one percent of participants 
had children both in their household and in other households. 
Twenty percent of participants have experience on IA/GSA tours.  Of 
these participants, all were deployed fewer than 10 months.  Approximately 41% 
of respondents were prior enlisted.  This closely approximates the percentage of 
all IW prior enlisted officers (44%).  Among those participants whom had prior 
enlisted service, the range of this service spanned across 2-14 years, as shown 
in Figure 25.  As shown, 64% of prior enlisted participants had between 7 and 14 




Figure 25.   Years of Prior Enlisted Service 
3. Detailed Survey Results 
Histograms of responses generally show the set of responses on the  
X-axis, and the count associated with each response on the Y-axis. 
To find means for questions that used a four- or five-point Likert scale 
shown in both columns below, the following coding was used: 
Five-Point Likert Scale Four-Point Likert Scale 
Very Satisfied = 5 Very Important = 4 
Satisfied = 4 Important = 3 
Neutral = 3 Some Importance = 2 
Dissatisfied = 2 No Importance = 1 
Very Dissatisfied = 1  
 
The means are based only upon results of those who answered a 
question.  Those who answered Not Applicable (N/A), or skipped a question, are 
not included in the calculation for that question.  Means are not given for yes or  
no questions. 
It is important to note that within the last year, community leaders have 
spoken to the participants about IW retention issues.  While this does not change 
the results, it may have biased the opinion of IW retention issues on several 
open-ended questions.  In addition, this survey is not a reflection of all IWOs, but 
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rather, those officers stationed at NPS.  As such, it is highly recommended that 
the IW community administer this survey to IWOs Navy-wide.  This will ensure 
the accurate identification of IWO opinion and CSRB take-rate behavior. 
Questions 1–24 are shown below.  The text of each question is stated to 
the right of the question number in bold font, followed by a description of  
the results. 
Q1) Overall, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with your job as an  
IW officer? 
 
Mean = 3.5 
Q2) In your opinion, does the IW community have any retention issues? 
 
Question 1 shows that participants are generally satisfied with their job as 
an IWO; however, Question 2 shows that they think the community has retention 
issues.  Question 3 shows what participants thought were the most important 
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factors that negatively affect retention in the IW community.  As shown below, 
civilian career opportunities, IW leadership, and pay were the top three, closely 
followed by time spent away from family and lack of command opportunities. 
Q3) In your opinion, what are three major factors that affect IW 
COMMUNITY retention?  Please select the THREE most important factors 
that you think negatively affect IW COMMUNITY retention. 
These response choices were randomized for each participant and are 
shown in Table 32.  This question also offered a selection of “Other”:  Ten 
participants selected this option and gave specific feedback, shown in its entirety 
in Appendix E.  Below is a very generalized overview of this feedback: 
 6 of 10 comment on the lack of Navy and community direction and 
structure. 
 2 of 10 comment on the issue of retaining LDO O-4s. 
 1 comments on the quality of lateral transfers. 
 1 comments on the lack of a good IA/GSA plan. 
 1 comments on the lack of an updated pay system. 
 1 comments on the lack of education opportunities. 
 1 comments on the lack of quality/updated shipboard equipment. 
 1 comments on the lack of job satisfaction. 
Answer Count % 
Career opportunities in the civilian job market 10 14
IW leadership 10 14
Not enough pay 9 13
Time spend away from family 8 11
Lack of command opportunities (i.e., CO or XO) 7 10
IA or GSA 6 08
Lack of education/training opportunities 5 07
IW culture 4 06
Navy leadership 3 04
Frequent relocations 3 04
Lack of having a mentor 2 02
Long work hours 2 02
Spouse employment 2 02
 
Table 32.   Factors that Negatively Affect IW Community Retention 
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Q4) Please rate the importance of the following factors, when you make 
your decision to continue or discontinue your Navy service. 
These levels, or factors, were randomized for each participant.  Each 
factor’s mean is given on a scale, where 4 is Very Important and 1 is of No 
Importance.  Histograms for each factor are available in Appendix F.  Table 33 
shows the most important factors selected when participants are making the 
decision to continue or discontinue Naval service. 
On the four-point Likert scale, only five factors had a mean that ranked 
above 3.0 or Important or higher.  Among the factors in this question, the one 
with the largest reported impact on retention is IW leadership, followed closely by 
advancement, education and training opportunities, pay, and career opportunities 
in the civilian job market.  Of the factors used, coworkers, spouse employment, 
the influence of a mentor, and IA/GSA tours rank among the lowest that affect 
retention.  At between 2.23 and 2.39, these items were viewed as having “Some 
importance” (2.0), but not enough on average to be “Important” (3.0). 
Question 4 also allowed participants to list other factors they felt were 
important.  Five participants chose to do so.  Their full responses can be viewed 
at the end of Appendix F.  Below is a very generalized overview of their 
responses, followed by the given importance. 
 Community Direction–Very Important. 
 Training in cryptology as a technical expert/manager–Very 
Important. 
 Training for technical abilities in computer network operations–Very 
Important. 
 Job Satisfaction–Very Important. 
 Meaningful Job–Very Important. 
 Community Transition–Unspecified Importance. 




Answer Mean (Likert Scale of 1-4) 
IW leadership 3.29 
IW advancement to the next pay grade 3.24 
Education/training opportunities 3.24 
Pay 3.15 
Career opportunities in the civilian job market 3.03 
Time spend away from family 2.97 
IW culture 2.85 
Navy leadership 2.85 
Lack of command opportunities (i.e., CO or XO) 2.70 
Relocations 2.67 
Work hours 2.56 
Navy culture 2.51 
IA or GSA 2.39 
The influence of a mentor 2.25 
Spouse employment 2.23 
Coworkers 2.23 
 
Table 33.   Personal Retention Factors by Level of Participant Importance 
Q5) Do you think you can make more money in a civilian equivalent job? 
 
As shown above, all respondents thought they either could earn more 
money in a civilian equivalent job, or were unsure.  Those participants that 
answered yes to Question 5 were directed to Question 6.  All others were 
directed to Question 7. 
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Q6)  How much MORE money do you think you can make in a 
civilian equivalent job compared to what you make now? 
 
As shown, more than 50% of participants thought they could earn between 
$10,000 and $20,000 more per year in a civilian equivalent job.  To find an 
overall mean, each participant’s choice was given the median for that category 
(with more than 40K assigned a value of 45K).  Overall, the participants thought 
they could earn, on average, about $25,000 more per year in a civilian  
equivalent job. 
Q7) Do you think a Critical Skills Retention Bonus (CSRB) would be 
helpful in retaining more IW officers? 
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As shown above, this question shows that 88% of participants thought a 
CSRB would be helpful in retaining IWOs.  Those participants who answered yes 
or no for Question 7 were directed to Question 8.  The one participant who was 
not sure was directed to Question 9. 
Q8) Why do you think a Critical Skills Retention Bonus (CSRB) will or will 
not be helpful?  Please provide concise reason(s): 
This open-ended question was answered by 33 of 34 respondents.  Many 
participants gave multiple comments, both negative and positive.  Their specific 
inputs can be found in Appendix G.  Below is a very generalized overview of  
this feedback: 
Positive CSRB Comments 
 12 comment on closing the pay gap between military and  
civilian pay. 
 6 comment on keeping prior enlisted retirees. 
 5 comment on making up for difficult family lives. 
 4 comment on having better pay equality between the IW 
community and other designators. 
 4 comment on keeping quality officers at specific decision points. 
 2 comment on increasing pay to keep experienced officers. 
 2 comment that increased money gives increased commitments. 
 2 comment that a CSRB would force the community to better 
identify and communicate critical skills. 
Negative CSRB Comments 
 2 comment that the issue is with IW leadership and culture, not pay. 
 2 comment that personnel who desire to stay will stay with or 
without the bonus, while those who desire to leave will leave. 
 2 comment that pay will not affect prior enlisted officers. 
 1 comments that community direction, training, and path for 
advancement is more important. 
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Q9) Are you seriously considering leaving Naval service in the next  
5 years? 
Answer Count % 
Yes, I am seriously considering RETIRING from service 
in the next 5 years 
11 32
Yes, I am seriously considering RESIGNING in the next 
5 years 
9 26
No, I am not seriously considering resigning or retiring in 
the next 5 years 
14 41
The chart above shows 20 of 34 participants (58%) stated they were 
seriously considering retiring or resigning in the next five years.  Those who were 
not skipped to Question 14.  Those who were seriously considering resigning 
answered Questions 10 and 11.  Those who were seriously considering retiring 
answered Questions 12 and 13. 
Q10) Why are you considering resigning in the next 5 years?  Please 
provide concise reason(s): 
Open-ended statements were left by 9 of 11 participants to explain their 
possible future resignations.  Specific statements are available in Appendix H.  
Below is a very generalized overview of this feedback: 
 8 comment on family hardships or relocations. 
 5 comment on a better civilian/DOD job or pay. 
 2 comment on leadership quality. 
 1 comments on spouse employment. 
 1 comments on advancement opportunities. 
 1 comments on educational opportunities. 
 1 comments on equality between designators. 




Q11) Please indicate how much money would improve your quality of life, 
such that you would no longer seriously think about leaving the Navy for 
the next 5 years. 
This question allowed one answer—either no amount of money, or a fill-in-
the-blank amount of money.  Participants answered as follows: 
Answer Count % 
No amount of money will improve my quality of life enough to influence 







Only 50% of those who are considering resigning are willing to stay for 
additional money.  The mean (N = 5) for those that gave a monetary amount was 
$89,000 over five years, or $17,800 per year. 
Q12) Why are you considering retiring in the next 5 years?  Please provide 
concise reason(s): 
Eleven participants left open-ended statements to explain their possible 
future retirement.  Specific statements are available in Appendix I.  Below is a 
very generalized overview of this feedback: 
 7 comment on family hardships or relocations. 
 4 comment on a better civilian/DOD job or pay. 
 3 comment on lack of community direction. 
 2 comment on lack of command/leadership opportunities. 
 1 comments on spouse employment. 
 1 comments on advancement opportunities. 




For both Questions 11 and 12, the top two reason participants would leave 
the community are family hardships or relocations, and pay or a better 
civilian/DOD job.  Aside from these similarities, there are differences between the 
two groups.  The resignation group focused on quality of leadership, career 
paths, and educational opportunities.  The retirement group focused on lack of 
community direction and command/leadership opportunities. 
Q13) Please indicate how much money would improve your quality of life, 
such that you would no longer seriously think about leaving the Navy for 
the next 5 years. 
This question allowed one answer—either no amount of money, or a fill in 
the blank amount of money.  Participants answered as follows: 
Answer Count % 
No amount of money will improve my quality of life enough to influence 









The mean (N = 9) for those that gave a monetary amount was $78,330 
over five years, or $15,660 per year.  It is also interesting to note that 82% of the 








Q14) What is the MINIMUM amount of money that you would accept, in 
return for TWO ADDITIONAL years of obligated service? 
Participants answered this question as follows: 
 
For the purposes of showing complete histogram labels, the responses for 
Question 14 were shortened.  The complete question wording can be found in 
Appendix C. 
As shown, 47% of participants desired between $10,000 and $20,000 per 
year to incur an obligated service of two additional years.  To find an overall 
monetary mean, each participant’s choice was given the median for that category 
(with more than 30K assigned a value of 35K).  Overall, the participants who 
selected a monetary option desired a bonus of $17,400 per year on average to 




Q15) What is the MINIMUM amount of money that you would accept, in 
return for FOUR ADDITIONAL years of obligated service? 
Participants answered this question as follows: 
 
For the purposes of showing complete histogram labels, the responses for 
Question 15 were shortened.  The complete question wording can be found in 
Appendix C. 
As shown, 42% of participants desired between $20,000 and $30,000 per 
year to incur an obligated service of four additional years.  To find an overall 
monetary mean, each participant’s choice was given the median for that category 
(with more than 30K assigned a value of 35K).  Overall, the participants who 
selected a monetary option desired a bonus of $22,750 per year to incur an 




participants that desired a bonus of more than $30,000 per year to incur four 
more years of service.  More than $30,000 is over the maximum amount allowed 
by law. 
Q16) Assume that a 4 year CSRB of the amount you indicated in the last 
question is available to you.  For example, if you selected $10,001-$15,000 
for a 4-year commitment in the last question, this would be a total of 
$40,000-$60,000 CSRB paid to you over four years.  Please indicate the 
percentage of your total 4 year CSRB that you would be willing to exchange 
for a guarantee of each item listed below (rate each item separately). 
This question allowed participants to trade their 4-year CSRB for various 
nonmonetary programs.  Participants were allowed to choose a percentage 
(between 0% and 100%) of their four-year CSRB that they would be willing to 
give back for various nonmonetary incentives (assuming they are eligible).  
Overall mean answers are shown in Table 34.  Individual incentive responses are 
available in Appendix J. 
Answer Mean  
Homeport/Duty location of your choice AND two tours of 
geographic stability 
23.7%
XO or CO billet of your choice 23.3%
Educational opportunity 15.0%
Homeport/Duty location of your choice 12.5%
Billet type of your choice 11.2%
Geographical stability of two tours 10.7%
Department Head billet of your choice 8.0%
Compressed work week 7.9%
One-year sabbatical 5.8%
Flexible work hours 5.6%
 
Table 34.   Mean Percentage of CSRB that Participants Would Give Back for 
Nonmonetary Options 
Table 34 shows the overall mean percentage that participants were willing 
to give back for each option.  Mean percentages were calculated using the 
median percentage for each selected answer.  For example, a participant who 
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selected 11%-20% would be assigned a median answer of 15%.  Means were 
not assigned for 0% or 100%.  Participants who selected those answers were 
assigned 0% or 100%, as applicable. 
As shown in Table 34, participants responded positively to the idea of 
choosing a duty location and the detailer(s) assigning the participant two tours of 
duty in that location.  Next was the ability to choose an XO/CO billet of choice 
(assuming eligibility and availability), followed by educational opportunities.  The 
IW community may be able to use these kinds of questions not only to answer 
the effectiveness of certain programs, but also to be able assign an IWO-specific 
numerical value to these programs.  This may be useful in deciding whether a 
program is worthwhile, or more cost effective than a CSRB. 
Another part of this question gave participants the ability to create their 
own options and disclose what percentage of their CSRB they would be willing to 
give for that option.  Four participants used one or two of these options.  Specific 
statements are available at the end of Appendix J.  Below is a very generalized 
overview of these responses, followed by their CSRB percentage value. 
 Nondeployable shore duty working within my area of expertise–give 
100% back. 
 Homeport/Duty location of choice AND two tours of geographic 
stability, along with no negative promotion consequences–give 
61%-70% back. 
 Two years to work on Ph.D.–give 41%-50% back. 
 One hundred percent Language training at Defense Language 
Institute (DLI), followed by one year in-country training, followed by 
3-year duty related to security issues in this area–give 91%-99% 
back. 
 IA/GSA billet of choice–give 11%-20% back. 
 Choice of billet for two tours–give 11%-20% back. 
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Q17) Have you served as an IW officer in ANY of these locations: 
 Washington, D.C. & greater area 
 Norfolk, VA & greater area 
 San Diego, CA & greater area 
 Hawaii 
 Fort Gordon, GA 
 
Twenty-seven participants had served in one or more of these locations.  
These participants answered Questions 18 and 19.  Those participants that had 
not served in these locations skipped to Question 20. 
Q18) If you have served as an IW officer in the duty locations below, 
please indicate your level of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the 
AREA/LOCATION as a whole.  If you have not lived in any of these 
locations, please select N/A. 
Reported means are given using a scale from 1 (Very Dissatisfied) to 5 
(Very Satisfied).  In these graphs, percentages are not shown due to the small 
counts (shown along the Y-axis).  Participant answers are broken down by 






 Washington, D.C. (Location) 
 
Mean = 3.38 
 Norfolk, VA (Location) 
 
Mean = 2.5 
 San Diego, CA (Location) 
 




 Hawaii (Location) 
 
Mean = 3.63 
 Fort Gordon, GA (Location) 
 
Mean = 3.8 
The overall means for Question 18 are shown in Table 35. 
Q19) If you have served as an IW officer in any of the duty locations 
below, please indicate your level of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the 
COMMAND you worked for.  If you have not served as an IW officer in these 
locations, please select N/A. 
Reported means are given using a scale from 1 (Very Dissatisfied) to 5 
(Very Satisfied) similar to Question 18.  Like the last set of graphs, percentages 
are not shown due to the small N or counts shown along the Y-axis.  Participant 
answers are broken down by location as follows: 
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 Washington, D.C. (Command) 
 
Mean = 3.38 
 Norfolk, VA (Command) 
 
Mean = 3.16 
 San Diego, CA (Command) 
 
Mean = 3.57 
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 Hawaii (Command) 
 
Mean = 3.27 
 Fort Gordon, GA (Command) 
 
Mean = 4.00 
 
Location Location Mean (Likert Scale of 1-5) 
Command Mean 
(Likert Scale of 1-5) 
Washington, D.C. & greater area 3.38 3.38
Norfolk, VA & greater area 2.5 3.16
San Diego, CA & greater area 4.57 3.57
Hawaii 3.63 3.27
Fort Gordon, GA 3.8 4.0
Table 35.   Mean Likert Scores of IW General Locations and Commands 
As shown in Table 35, the Norfolk, VA and greater area score the lowest 
in satisfaction of both commands and location.  While the count or N for these 
questions is very low, this type of question may prove useful to the IW community 
in future surveys. 
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Q20) What region do you consider home (i.e., where you are from, or 
where you consider home, other than your current residence)? 
Those participants who selected a region answered Question 21.  Those 
participants who did not select a region skipped to Question 22. 
Answer Count Percent
Northeastern (ME, NH, VT, MA, RI, CT) 2 6%
Middle Atlantic (NY, NJ, PA, WV, VA, MD, DC, DE) 5 15%
North Central (OH, IN, IL, MI, WI, MN, IA, MO, ND, SD, NE, KS) 4 12%
South (NC, SC, GA, FL, KY, TN, AL, MS, AR, LA, OK, TX) 8 24%
West (MT, ID, WY, CO, NM, AZ, UT, NV, WA, OR, CA) 9 24%
Alaska (AK) 0 0%
Hawaii (HI) 0 0%
I don’t really have one 6 18%
Other U.S. territory or country outside the U.S. (please specify below) 0 0%
Q21) How significant is being stationed close to this location to you? 
Reported means are given using a scale from 1 (No Significance) to 5 
(Very Significant). 
 
Mean = 3.29 
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Q22) Overall, please rate your level of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with 
the time you have to spend with your immediate family while being a part of 
the IW community. 
 
Mean = 3.36 
Question 22 shows that the participants were on average between Neutral 
and Satisfied with the time they have had to spend with their family.  While this 
may seem contrary to some of the open-ended comments, consider that no one 
answered Very Satisfied, and 42% answered either neutral or below. 
Q23)  Do you think that a comparable civilian equivalent job would allow 
you to spend more time with your family? 
 
Question 23 shows some of the attractiveness of civilian employment as it 
relates to family life.  This is reinforced by many open-ended comments 
throughout this survey. 
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Q24) Do you have any other monetary or nonmonetary solutions that may 
help the IW community improve retention? 
This was one of two open-ended questions toward the end of the survey.  
Nineteen participants gave quality responses.  Specific statements are available 
in Appendix I.  Reading individual responses is highly encouraged by the author.  
However, a generalized overview of this feedback is shown below: 
Additional Monetary Solutions 
 1 comments that CSRB is attractive, especially to pay for children 
going to college. 
Additional Nonmonetary Solutions 
 10 comment on improving IW training, specifically: 
o Give specific IW area of expertise training (5) 
o Improve training process in general (4) 
o Educate community via distance learning (1). 
 4 comment on improving community direction. 
 3 comment on improving quality of life, especially as it relates to 
relocation and family. 
 2 comment on the establishment of an advancement/career path. 
 2 comment on improving IW leadership. 
 2 comment on improving overall job satisfaction. 
 1 comments on improving IW culture. 
 1 comments on increasing educational opportunities. 
 1 comments on improving the overall treatment of personnel. 






Q24) Is there anything else that you would like see added or discussed in 
this survey? 
This is the second open-ended question to end the survey.  Eight 
participants answered as shown below: 
 Such a survey should not be limited to students here at NPS.  This 
group is a subset of the community that is obligated with a 3-year 
tour following NPS graduation.  As such, it cannot accurately 
represent the community as a whole. 
 Better and more systematic IW related training throughout  
the career. 
 Recommendations on career paths, i.e., operational assignments 
verses national assignments…Tactical collection vs. National 
collection…computer related fields vs. signal processing vs. traffic 
analysis? 
 Recommendations to improve our qualifications…not just as junior 
officers, but also throughout our career. 
 You might as well bring up the discussion of community information 
flow through venues such as Facebook, Information Warriors, and the 
NPC Community Mgr/Detailer page.  There should be an authoritative 
running dialogue on where our community is going, not just rumors. 
 A BONUS for specific jobs–like AIP for enlisted Sailors. 
 Yes.  There should be an investigation of attitudes toward 
community mergers. 
 It is kind of funny that the questions touched on pretty much 
everything except job satisfaction as a criterion for staying in. 
 Expansion on leadership opportunities (to include command at 
sea).  Alternation of promotion flows (merit vice time based). 
Merger and consolidation with 1630 and/or 1600 communities. 
Current posture where community (under NETWAR) is postured 
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under a “babysitter” URL who (prior to being placed in charge) 
understands neither the mission or techniques to accomplish. 
E. DISCUSSION OF SURVEY RESULTS 
1. Discussion 
While this survey had a high response rate, it represents only a small 
portion (3.5%) of the community.  The respondent population has more men, with 
slightly more experience than the overall IW community.  Additionally, all 
participants were attending graduate school.  Other than these concerns, the 
participants were otherwise representative of their peers.  However, the overall 
opinions of the IW community may differ substantially since these participants 
were not a random sample from the IW community. 
Overall, personnel are between neutral and satisfied with the IW 
community.  Eighty-two percent of the population believes there are IW retention 
issues.  The top negative community factors are civilian career opportunities, 
pay, IW leadership, family quality of life, and community direction.  When it 
comes to individual decision making, personnel think IW leadership, job 
advancement, education and training opportunities, pay, and civilian career 
opportunities are the most significant. 
Fifty-eight percent of the personnel stated they were considering 
retirement or resignation in the next five years.  Reasons for leaving the IW 
community centered on family quality of life, civilian career opportunities, pay, IW 
leadership, and community direction.  Eighty-eight percent of the respondents 
thought a CSRB would be helpful.  Additionally, these personnel thought highly of 
several nonmonetary programs.  These included a guarantee of homeport 
location of choice AND two tours in that location, XO/CO billet of choice, 
educational opportunities, and homeport/duty location of choice. 
Personnel believe they can earn an average of about $25,000 more 
annually in a civilian equivalent job; however, they are willing to stay for less than 
that amount per year.  Overall, those who were resigning desired $17,800 per 
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year to stay, while those who were retiring desired $15,660 per year to stay.  
Personnel desired an average of $17,400 per year for two years of obligated 
service.  While this option had a lower take rate, personnel desired $22,750 per 
year for four years obligated service. 
Based on these mean survey results, it is suggested that a CSRB 
between $15,000 and $20,000 per year would be an effective amount for a  
2-year obligation.  However, this does not represent the take-rate behavior of 
officers of a certain rank; rather, it shows the take-rate behavior of all survey 
participants.  If a specific rank and experience is identified, then the take-rate 
behavior of officers within that category should be used to identify the best CSRB 
solution.  In addition, if the CSRB obligation changes, the take-rate behavior may 
also change, and a different CSRB amount should be computed. 
2. Recommendations 
This survey should be sent to personnel whom the IW community would 
like to retain.  There are, however, several areas in which the survey could be 
improved.  First, there should be a demographic question added concerning race 
and ethnicity.  Secondly, there should be a question that identifies overall YOS.  
Thirdly, factors within each question should be analyzed carefully, and updated 
as necessary.  Lastly, nonmonetary factors or programs should be adjusted to 
reflect actual and realistic programs that the IW community would be willing  
to consider. 
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This chapter provides overall conclusions.  Sections B, C, D, and E 
summarize the CBA findings and solutions.  Section F gives thesis conclusions 
and recommendations to the IW community.  Section G provides 
recommendations for future research. 
B. FAA REVISITED 
The area analysis of CSRBs, retention, and the IW community  
showed that: 
 The Navy supports CSRBs when they are cost-effective. 
 There are many types of monetary and nonmonetary retention 
issues and solutions. 
 Flexibility in retention choices will retain more personnel. 
 Forty-four percent of the IW community is prior enlisted.  This 
number is high, considering that annually between 25% and 35% of 
newly-accessed acquired? Naval officers are prior enlisted. 
 While prior enlisted retention to O-4 should be high, there are many 
reasons why retention past the grade of O-4 may be lower. 
 While IW O-5 manning is currently low, future manning at O-4 is 
also a concern. 
C. FNA REVISITED 
The IW retention needs analysis identified historical IW retention issues 
and the difference in pay between a Navy IW and civilian equivalent job.  The 
needs analysis found that: 
 Historical O-4 retention is the lowest of all IW pay grades at 36.6%, 
mainly due to the number of prior enlisted officers leaving the 
community at this time. 
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 Historical O-5 retention is also low at 37.9%. 
 There are several other retention areas involving prior enlisted 
status, rank, and SoC that should be reviewed and improved as 
needed. 
 An IW O-4 at 18 or more YOS earns on average about $12,700 
less annually than his or her civilian counterpart’s 75th-percentile 
wage. 
 An IW O-5 with 20 or more YOS earns slightly more than his or her 
civilian counterpart’s 75th-percentile wage. 
D. FSA REVISITED 
There are many types of retention solutions.  While a CSRB for IWOs in 
certain pay grades and YOS may increase retention in the short term, other 
retention solutions may also be beneficial.  These include, but are not limited  
to, geographical stability, flexible work arrangements, and leadership or  
educational opportunities. 
E. SOLUTION EFFECTIVENESS REVISITED 
While a Navy-wide IW survey is recommended, NPS participants  
showed that: 
 Overall, the top negative IW community retention factors (in order 
of importance) are viewed by participants as:  civilian career 
opportunities, pay, IW leadership, family quality of life, and 
community direction. 
 Overall, the top negative personal retention factors (in order of 
importance) are IW leadership, job advancement, education and 
training opportunities, pay, and career opportunities. 
 Of those who were considering leaving the community, the top 
reasons (in order of importance) were family quality of life, civilian 
career opportunities, pay, IW leadership, and community direction. 
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 Overall, personnel believe they can earn $25,100 more annually in 
a civilian job, and 88% think a CSRB will be helpful. 
 Overall, personnel will remain in the community for less than that 
amount per year. 
F. OVERALL CONCLUSIONS 
In conclusion, the data show there is a need for improvement in IW 
retention.  The highest priority should be to ensure future retention at the pay 
grade of O-4.  Secondary priorities concern retention at the pay grade of O-5 and 
the differences in retention between prior enlisted status, rank, and SoC. 
Recommended solutions include the implementation of both monetary and 
nonmonetary programs.  While nonmonetary programs are most likely the best 
solution for the long term, a monetary CSRB may provide a short-term solution.  
All solutions should have a clear goal of improving IWO moral, while providing 
more reasons for these officers to remain a part of the IW community. 
It is the author’s conclusion that the manning issues at the grade of O-5 
are a direct result of too many prior enlisted officers who are not willing to stay in 
past retirement eligibility at the O-4 pay grade.  This may be due, in part, to a 
perceived lack of community direction, leadership, and leadership opportunities. 
Before implementing any solution, the IW community should first find out 
the IWO take-rate behavior for all identified solutions.  This is most easily done 
via a survey of those officers identified above.  If the CSRB take-rate behavior is 
acceptable, cost effective, and meets the needs of the IW community, then the 
implementation of an annual CSRB is suggested. 
Ideally, a strategically-placed CSRB at the grade of O-4 will ensure higher 
retention and increase the pool of officers eligible for O-5.  Once these officers 
advance to the grade of O-5, it is expected that many will remain in that rank for 
at least three years to maximize retirement benefits.  This should also help 
increase retention at the O-5 pay grade. 
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This CSRB should be dependent upon IW community needs and 
perceived fairness.  Based upon this research, the author recommends a two-
year CSRB for those in the O-4 pay grade between 20 and 22 YOS.  The CSRB 
amount should be dependent upon survey results, along with the differences in 
pay between these IWOs and the civilian sector. 
Survey data show that nonmonetary retention solutions should include a 
plan to identify, communicate, and implement an IW community direction, 
focusing on specific IW areas of expertise, training programs, and improving IW 
leadership and leadership opportunities.  This, combined with a strategic CSRB, 
should help increase retention in all pay grades. 
G. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The issue of military retention is very complex.  However, the complexity 
of prior enlisted officer retention is often overlooked.  These officers provide 
valuable experience and improved retention in pay grades O-3 and below.  
However, retention of these officers past the grade of O-4 can be a challenge.  
While this thesis focused on recommendations for the IW community, other 
communities may face similar retention problems. 
This thesis noted an increase in the number of newly-acquired prior 
enlisted officers Navy-wide since FY06.  If we continue to decrease the number 
of officers Navy-wide, while keeping the number of officers in our prior enlisted 
programs the same, these trends are likely to continue, especially in  
RL communities. 
Additionally, the retention survey created for the IW community may 
provide a helpful tool to identify retention issues in other communities.  Such 
surveys can provide invaluable feedback to community leaders. 
It is also recommended that Navy RL communities pay attention to the 
retirement eligibility of prior enlisted officers.  This may change the manner in 
which they are often viewed.  When faced with poor family quality of life, higher 
civilian pay, poor leadership, etc., these officers may choose to retire before 
reaching pay grades O-4 or O-5 as an officer.  A non-prior enlisted officer at the 
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same pay grade (O-3 or O-4) is not normally eligible for retirement, and may be 
more likely to stay in the service than a prior enlisted officer.  Future research in 
this area would be useful to both the Navy and many RL communities. 
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APPENDIX B.  IW PERSONNEL TEMPO DESCRIPTION 
*PERSONNEL OPERATIONAL TEMPO  IN** OUT*** TOTAL   IN** OUT***
ASHORE  400  504  904    73.8%  83.6% 
AFLOAT  142  88  230    26.2%  14.6% 
UNKNOWN  0  11  11    0.0%  1.8% 
TOTAL  542  603  1,145    100.0%  100.0% 
             
OPERATIONAL  144  90  234    26.6%  14.9% 
NONOPERATIONAL  398  502  900    73.4%  83.3% 
UNKNOWN  0  11  11    0.0%  1.8% 
TOTAL  542  603  1,145    100.0%  100.0% 
             
DEPLOYED   31  13  44    25.0%  21.3% 
SEPARATED  93  37  130    75.0%  60.7% 
UNKNOWN  0  11  11    0.0%  18.0% 
TOTAL  124  61  185    100.0%  100.0% 
             
FAMILY  422  480  902    77.9%  79.6% 
NO FAMILY  120  112  232    22.1%  18.6% 
UNKNOWN  0  11  11    0.0%  1.8% 
TOTAL  542  603  1,145    100.0%  100.0% 
               
FAMILY & DEPLOYED OR SEPARATED  75  27  102    17.8%  5.6% 
FAMILY & NOT DEPLOYED OR SEPARATED  347  453  800    82.2%  94.4% 
TOTAL  422  480  902    100.0%  100.0% 
*This table represents the last known personnel operational tempo before they 
left the IW community or when the data ended in September 2007.  In other 
words, this shows that when personnel left the community, they tended to be 
more in a nonoperational status.  Those personnel who stayed in the community 
tended to be more in an operational status as of September 2007. 
**In refers to those personnel who remained in the IW community. 
***Out refers to those personnel who left the IW community. 
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APPENDIX C.  IW RETENTION SURVEY INSTRUMENT 
Below is the IW retention survey instrument as seen by the participants.  It 
is important to note that SurveyMonkey provides a skip logic option for survey 
questions.  For example, on page 1, if the participant answered no, they moved 
to the second page.  However, if the participant answered yes, they moved to the 
first set of questions on page 3.  Page numbers are shown at the bottom right.  
Another example includes the question about resigning or retiring on page 10.  If 
participants selected they were seriously considering resigning in the next five 
years, they only answered the follow-up questions pertaining to resigning.  If they 
selected they were considering retiring, they only answered the follow-up 
questions pertaining to retiring.  If they answered that they were not considering 
retiring or resigning, they skipped those questions pertaining to resigning and 
retiring and moved on to the next applicable question. 
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APPENDIX D.  IW RETENTION SURVEY CONTACT E-MAILS 
A. INITIAL CONTACT 
Dear NPS Information Warfare (IW) Officers, 
You have been selected to participate in a study to determine the effectiveness 
of an IW Critical Skill Retention Bonus (CSRB).  The results of this study will be 
used to inform your community leaders how you feel about both monetary and 
nonmonetary retention factors.  This study is sponsored by your IW community 
manager, CDR Heritage, BUPERS-315. 
Tomorrow, you will receive an e-mail with a subject line entitled "IW Retention 
Survey" from myself, LTJG Rob Linn.  I understand that your personal time is 
important to you.  The survey has been kept short - it should only take about 
twenty minutes to complete. 
This will be your opportunity to speak frankly to your community leaders about 
retention issues.  Note that all information you provide will be kept confidential 
and will be released only as summaries with no identifying information.  Once 
you have taken the survey, your name will be removed from the survey mailing 
list and upon completion of the survey, all records of your participation in the 
survey will be destroyed. 
If you experience any difficulties with the survey or have any questions or 
comments about the study, please contact myself or Dr. Ron Fricker of the NPS 
Operations Research department. 





Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 
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Subject: IW Retention Survey 
Body: Dear [CustomValue] [FirstName] [LastName],  
 
As mentioned in an E-mail to you yesterday, this is a request for you 
to complete an IW Retention Survey.  It should take approximately 20 
minutes. 
 
Here is a link to the survey: 
http://www.surveymonkey.com/s.aspx  
 
This link is uniquely tied to this survey and your e-mail address. 
Please do not forward this message. 
 





Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 
 








Subject: IW Retention Survey 
Body: Dear [CustomValue] [FirstName] [LastName], 
 
Last week I sent you an E-mail link to a survey that asked you about an IW 
CSRB and retention issues within the IW community.  To the best of my 
knowledge, that questionnaire has not been completed.
 
Many of your IW peers have already provided us with valuable feedback, both 
good and bad.  I expect the results to be very useful to IW community leaders.  
 
You are again being contacted because the opinion of every IW NPS Student is 
important, and only by obtaining the opinion of every student can we ensure that 
the results of the survey are accurate.  In case the original E-mail containing the 
link was inadvertently discarded, please follow the link below and complete the 
survey. 
 
Here is a link to the survey: 
 
http://www.surveymonkey.com/s.aspx  
Although we track who has responded to the survey using your e-mail address, 
please be assured that all responses are completely confidential.  Once your 
survey is completed, your name will be removed from our list and you will not be 
contacted in connection with your answers. 
 
This survey is completely voluntary, but hightly encouraged.  If you would prefer 
not to participate, please let us know by contacting LTJG Linn of the Operations 
Research Department at ralinn@nps.edu. 
 
Again, thanks for your participation! 
Sincerely, 
Rob Linn  
LTJG USN 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 
Please note:  If you are NOT an NPS IW Officer, please click here: 
http://www.surveymonkey.com/optout.aspx  
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APPENDIX E.  IW RETENTION SURVEY QUESTION 3 OPTIONS 
Q3) In your opinion, what are three major factors that affect IW 
COMMUNITY retention?  Please select the THREE most important factors 
that you think negatively affect IW COMMUNITY retention.  (These levels 
were randomized for each participant) 
This question also offered a selection of other:  Ten participants selected 
this option and gave the following feedback: 
 Lack of community information and direction. 
 Senior officers that lateral transfer don't seem to be properly vetted.  
Many come over thinking it's going to be a cakewalk compared to 
their previous jobs as a SWO, leading to disillusionment amongst 
Junior Officers. 
 Too much focus on navy admin and not enough focus on 
operational jobs 
 No clear guidance from Naval Network Warfare Command (NNWC) 
as to where the IW community is heading - at least when we were 
cryptologists we knew what to expect.  Now we don't know what we 
are exactly - someone in big navy needs to make up a clear focus 
for IW officers 
 Naval personnel mismanagement- lack of tenable plan for IA/GSAs, 
out-dated pay system with bonuses to other communities who work 
less, lack of continued educational opportunities, overall the Navy 
would rather have jacks of all trades that only know Navy-specific 
admin and button-pushing rather than cultivating leaders  
and experts. 
 Lack of direction from leadership.  It seems every year the direction 
for the IW changes completely.  I understand the need for change 
to keep up with the times but I believe that a set of fundamentals 
should stay the same.  Also, the jobs that are competitive always 
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change.  For example, the last year being PCS afloat has been the 
best thing to do, but in the past doing DIRSUP was enough. 
 It sounds to me like the biggest problem is with LDO O-4s hitting 20 
years and retiring. 
 Our community lacks focus and seems to be in a state of constant 
reinvention.  Our equipment and capabilities are decades behind 
state of the art.  I speak specifically about our ship-board 
equipment.  The lack of investment in this area severely limits what 
IW JO's can offer to a ship CO in way of real intelligence.  The 
CCOP program attempts to address this but often runs afoul of the 
Navy installation process.  We should focus on a small set of Core 
IO capabilities, invest in the equipment and training to become 
experts in these.  The Navy model of "jack-of-all-trades" works well 
for non-technical professions, but IW is so tech heavy that it calls 
for specialization.  I don't say these things lightly and know the 
problems with the procurement process, budgetary constraints, etc.  
I think that there is so much off the shelf technology that can be 
leveraged in our field and we are missing the boat.  In many cases 
it would be far better to partner with industry experts (Microsoft, 
Google, and Motorola) and get the real experts cleared to work on 
new technologies for us instead of going back to the same well of 
insider companies who always seem to promise us low cost 
maintainable systems and simply deliver lemons time and again. 
 Lack of job satisfaction.  Most of the people I know enjoy their 
tactical jobs, but find many of the management jobs in the national 
side unfulfilling. 
 In my opinion, a big portion of our community comes from the 
enlisted CT community or lateral accession from other officer 
communities.  Retaining senior IW officers is our biggest challenge 
since many reach 20 years of service around the 03-O4 level and 
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retire.  At this time, they are ripe for picking from a handful of 
contractors/gov't jobs and the option to stay Navy is less appealing. 
 Lacks a structured career paths to ensure proper development of 
well rounded leaders...  While mentorship does help it would be 
better to know what the community expects of its officers. 
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APPENDIX F.  IW RETENTION SURVEY QUESTION 4 
HISTOGRAMS AND OPTIONS 
 Career opportunities in the civilian job market 
 
Mean = 3.03 
 Pay 
 
Mean = 3.15 
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 Time spent away from family 
 
Mean = 2.97 
 IW leadership 
 
Mean = 3.29 
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 IW culture 
 
Mean = 2.85 
 Navy leadership 
 
Mean = 2.85 
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 Navy culture 
 
Mean = 2.51 
 The influence of a mentor 
 




Mean = 2.67 
 Spouse employment 
 
Mean = 2.23 
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 Work Hours 
 
Mean = 2.56 
 IW Advancement to the next pay grade  
 
Mean = 3.24 
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 IW Command Opportunities (i.e., CO or XO) 
 
Mean = 2.70 
 Education and Training opportunities 
 
Mean = 3.24 
 Co-workers 
 
Mean = 2.23 
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 IA or GSA 
 
Mean = 2.39 
 Other 
This question also allowed participants to list other factors they felt were 
important.  Five participants chose to do so: 
o Now that we are Information Warfare, many simply do not 
understand the community's role.  We have assumed many new 
responsibilities without any additional formal training.  Leadership 
has not defined our new roles & responsibilities.  Evidence of this is 
that most other communities still refer to us as Cryptologists.  This 
issue is Very Important. 
o The single most important factor is becoming a technical 
expert/manager in Cryptology, which is the minimum to really 
understanding the pillars of IO and the technical side of intelligence 
collection. 
o Potential for smooth transition into the IW community with 
opportunities for advancement and command. 
o Again, the job satisfaction element will be the most important for 
me.  If I keep enjoying my job and getting deployment opportunities, 
I will keep doing it. 
o The ability to develop, retain, and use technical abilities, specifically 
those related to computer network operations (Very Important).  
The perception that my service is meaningful and worthwhile  
(Very Important). 
195 
APPENDIX G.  IW RETENTION SURVEY QUESTION 8 OPINIONS 
Q8) Why do you think a Critical Skills Retention Bonus (CSRB) will or will 
not be helpful? Please provide concise reason(s): 
This open-ended question was answered by 33 of 34 respondents.  Their 
specific inputs are as follows: 
 Because officers often calculate what they make per hour and 
realize that it isn't much since they work such incredibly long hours.  
If service commitment means giving up your family and your 
finances, then they are likely to leave the service. 
 I think it would help retain some people that would otherwise retire.  
I am pretty sure I'm staying in, but this would play very much in my 
decision as well. 
 Some people would probably stick around for a little more money, 
particularly with the bad economy.  It would force the community to 
define what the critical skills are in order to justify the bonus.  Lack 
of community definition/direction is a major retention issue. 
 I believe that most IW officers will continue to serve if given 
opportunities for real training (not to be confused with formal 
education) and by being shown that there is a path for 
advancement.  I have not heard a lot of fellow IW officers complain 
about the money we are paid and have not heard of any that have 
separated because the pay was no high enough. 
 I think that because our community has a lot of prior enlisted 
officers, who by timing in their careers, have an easy means to 
retire after 20 years as an O4/LCDR.  If there were a reasonable 
bonus amount, the Navy might be able to retain those personnel for 
another 10 years or so—I know it would probably influence  
my decision. 
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 You get what you pay for. If the Navy is not willing to reward and 
develop its IW professionals, it makes it very difficult to stay in a 
lower-paying job with all the attendant relocations and 
mismanagement that come with staying Navy.  There should be 
more equity in pay for critical skills and job performance. 
 Pro:  It will help to retain officers with critical skills, this is necessary in 
order for senior officers to truly mentor junior officers.  But, there are so 
many senior officers who have less time as IW than junior officers 
(lateral transfers), should they receive the bonus as well?  Con:  How 
do you measure which officers have the critical skills to qualify for the 
bonus?  Some officers career path makes them excellent staff officers, 
but not necessarily technical experts/managers.  Will our Designator be 
the only qualification?  Graduation for NPA?  A tour in each major area? 
Any masters or a Technical masters?  How do you apply this fairly 
across such a diverse career field? 
 The bonus helps close the gap between what one makes as an 
officer and what one would make as a civilian. 
 I look at other communities and see that they are rewarding the 
officers that chose to stay in the fleet and continue progression of 
their crucial jobs.  I look at aviators, submariners and SWOs as 
core competencies in the fleet but then again I am being asked, as 
IWO, to go out there and spend the same time away from the family 
and the same work hours, but getting paid less because everyone 
else gets CSRBs.  Also of note, Most IWOs have the opportunity to 
work for other agencies or contractors and make a substantial 
amount of money.  Yes it’s true that we serve for the patriotism, but 
it would be much easier to be away from home knowing that the 
grass, the civilian world, is not greener on the other side or that the 
contractor sitting next to me is not getting paid almost twice the 
money for the same job and less hours. 
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 Due to equality with Intel Officer brethren 
 Financial enrichment is not the main reason why people join the 
Navy; therefore more money will not change their mind if they want 
to leave. 
 The IW Community is very heavy with prior enlisted which is good 
and bad.  Good in that our depth of experience and technical 
knowledge is unmatched, bad in that just as our junior officers get 
to a rank that allows them to seriously affect change in the 
community they retire.  A CSRB could persuade those IW officers 
to stay in the additional three or four years to bridge the gap in 
experience and technical knowledge.  It could also keep the 
younger generation of IW officers from jumping ship to the civilian 
sector for a few years. 
 At specific decision making points—The 4/5 year mark, a CSRB 
would entice younger JO's who already have all the prerequisite 
clearances and knowledge to be affective in the EW world to decide 
against getting a Gov Civilian or contractor position.  This would 
keep prerequisite knowledge available for needed Department 
Heads.  One thing to keep in mind is there are many very 
knowledgeable prior enlisted that make up the majority of the IW 
ranks. Many are getting out at 20 years as LT/LCDR's when we 
could use their vast knowledge in the CDR/CAPT ranks.  Maybe if 
you entice them at the 20 year mark to stay another 5-10 years we 
could solve our leadership issues of not knowing where our 
community is going or what we should be concentrating on.  We 
went from SIGINT to everything IO.  There is no way an IWO can 
be proficient in everything IO. 
 Many officers leave due to a perception they can make more 
money in the civilian world.  Whether or not this is true, a CSRB 
would make the decision to leave harder.  Furthermore, it has the 
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added affect that the officer feels appreciated and wanted by the 
Navy.  This is especially true for the IW community as we are one 
of the only officer communities without a CSRB. 
 As with all pay to play bonuses, money for a commitment extends 
commitments. 
 It seems like there are some great opportunities as JOs.  Retention 
at the O-3 level is not an issue.  The problem area seems to be the 
O-4/O-5 level.  Some type of O-4/O-5 retention bonus would help 
keep your O-4/O-5 billets filled with your top performers and give 
you a competitive pool for senior leadership opportunities.  This is 
how I would classify the windows for an effective retention bonus: 
o O-1,O-2,O-3 on initial commitment—No real retention 
issues. 
o O-3, 6-8 years:  Potential to get out—Could be enticed to 
stay in by the fact that a retention bonus is available in a 
couple of years.  Offering a bonus during this period could 
be too early resulting in an incurred bonus commitment 
being fulfilled prior to the critical retention window. 
o O-4/O-5 at 9-16 years:  Offer some sort of retention bonus to 
keep O-4s/O-5s through this period. 
o O-5/O-6 at 16-20 years:  Retirement at 20+ years will be 
enough to keep folks through this period. 
o O-6/O-7 at 20+ years:  No real retention issues. 
 To address the issue of O-4 LDOs retiring at 20 years, the bonus 
would have to be available to them at the 19-24 year range. 
 CSRB will be only way to retain young officers with highly skilled in 
computer science/CNO field or any type of experience in this field.  




comp science background (especially with military background) will 
be demanded for jobs from contractors/other government agencies 
with higher salaries. 
 Well, first you are asking if a CSRB will retain more officers and that 
may not be the right question.  The data from other officer 
communities indicates that CSRB payments do improve retention.  
However, are you retaining the people you want to retain or just the 
people who are only looking for more money to do the same job, or 
who really do not care one way or the other?  Honestly, the CSRB 
will only reduce feelings of unfairness among IWs who see SWOs, 
submariners, pilots, and intelligence officers receiving bonuses.  
The feelings of unfairness grow from seeing substandard officers in 
those communities receive bonuses simply because of designator 
and not performance while IW officers, who do much the same 
work (on staffs for example) do not receive such bonuses.  The 
retention issues past O4 seem to be for those IWs who are prior 
enlisted.  This indicates not an issue with pay but an issue with IW 
culture and leadership—the Mustangs are “voting with their feet” 
because they realize this community’s culture is dysfunctional (but 
not in the same way as SWOs) and more importantly because 
community leadership seems confused and lacking in vision.  
Those prior enlisted who have served 10 years commissioned 
service seem to be leaving in droves and it is unlikely that money is 
the issue given their already higher pay rates. 
 The skill sets developed by Information Warfare Officers today are 
in high demand in the civilian job market.  This is true both in the 
government related contracting world and in the non-government 
world as the skill sets, especially those related to development and 
protection of networks, communications, etc. 
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 Money talks.  (Although there should be strict qualification 
requirements to make sure we retain the RIGHT people...not 
everyone is a good candidate for retention.) 
 Our community has many officers that decide to serve for 
ideological reasons, but once exposed to the National Cryptologic 
environment, they realize they can continue to serve our country in 
much the same way without needing to experience the same rigors 
of military life through work as a GS or contractor.  They are likely 
to experience external pressure from their families to work in a 
more stable situation, without the need to relocate or deploy, and to 
be able to make more money as a civilian.  I think a CSRB will help 
to retain many people who would like to remain on active duty, but 
who cannot justify the additional hardships endured while being 
paid less than they might otherwise. 
 It depends on who its targeted to. Mid Career O3's with less than 
10 years are certainly at a decision point and could be tipped by a 
financial reward. Also, our community has a problem keeping O4's 
(most punch at the 20 year mark).  If correctly targeted and 
marketed, it could certainly help with retention in either of  
these cases. 
 Combined with the current economy, it would probably tip the 
balance for some people on the fence.  Honestly, though, we have 
so many officers with prior enlisted service that I don't think 
retention is a big problem, with the exception of those who retire  
as O-4s. 
 It will keep educated officers, with master's degrees in Electrical 
Engineering and Computer science, from seeking civilian 
employment in lucrative fields upon completion of their 
commitments. 
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 IW is a different kind of community than SWO of Nukes.  People 
that want to do the job will probably stay with or without the bonus.  
People that really want to leave will leave. 
 CSBR would not benefit those of us who come from prior service 
and already aim for retirement from the Navy.  Keeping IWs in past 
20 is the challenge, and why I think some form of CSRB would be 
beneficial to retain the experience and skill set our community 
needs.  Since our merger with NNWC, the unmentioned 
"disorganization" at the top could use people with 20+ years of 
experience to sort out our role and responsibilities.  Up to O3, our 
community has many advantages over other designators in that we 
typically don’t have back to back sea tours and the IW culture is 
much more positive, hence CSRB is not beneficial to keep people 
after their initial obligation. 
 CSRB attached to a time remaining in service requirement would 
provide guaranteed personnel levels for the community.  Also, its 
currently hard for the military to compete with the civilian workforce 
when there is a legitimate 30-40K difference in salary.  Military 
benefits are on the out, and therefore do not have the same 
leverage in retaining people that they once did.  Bonus isn't going to 
change the minds of those who are intent on getting out, but it 
would positively influence those on the fence to continue service. 
 It seems that the IW community has a high percentage of prior 
enlisted officers.  That means there are a lot of junior officers with a 
lot of experience that don't stay in past O4.  Because most of our 
jobs are done by civilians, it is very easy to get out of the Navy and 
keep doing the same job for the same money without having  
to deploy. 
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 The Navy will always benefit from keeping those that have the most 
experience in a field. In our community, experience will always be a 
priceless commodity. 
 I believe that we have a shortage of LCDRs, and while we can't 
change the turmoil the community is experiencing (changes in 
technology, organization, etc.), we can give them a financial 
incentive to stay which might fill that hole. 
 Compensation for high skill value would assist in balancing issues 
with deployment and transient status.  Additionally, it offsets outside 
job offers which have recently been over Navy pay and allowances 
by ~30K.  It would not offset issues with people unhappy with  
work environment. 
 Most people are motivated by financial incentives, to a certain 
degree.  Our community, if trained properly, has technical abilities 
that are highly sought after in both the public and private sectors.  
Our community faces demanding OPTEMPOs through direct 
support, IA/GSA, and PCS deployments. 
 It will help to offset the obvious difference in pay between the 
military and civilian sectors.  The place where this is needed most 
is in the senior O-3 through O-5 pay grades.  It is at this point that 
our middle to upper managers are getting out in favor of civilian 
jobs.  It would not be hard to entice these people to remain in the 
Navy for they, most often, have around 20 years in.  Convincing 
them to stay in would not be difficult; they are already used to  
the lifestyle. 
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APPENDIX H.  IW RETENTION SURVEY QUESTION 10 OPINIONS 
Q10) Why are you considering resigning in the next 5 years?  Please 
provide concise reason(s): 
Nine participants left nine open-ended statements to explain their possible 
future resignations as shown below: 
 Relocation 
 My reasons have less to do with dissatisfaction with the job and 
more to do with the fact that when I joined, I only intended to serve 
a few years before entering the private job force.  It is still my hope 
to do so, though I am not 100% committed to leaving the Navy.  
However, soon I will be getting to the point in my life where I do not 
want to move around the world at the whim of the Navy, and would 
like to settle down in a location on my own terms. 
 My wife’s career is much more contingent on location stability; the 
Navy makes it extremely difficult for us to be able to stay co-
located, let alone try to start a family.  Navy senior leadership's 
personnel mismanagement. Of the ~10 O-5 level officers I have 
worked for, there is only one that I consider a good leader and 
someone that I would like to work for again.  The callous disregard 
for personnel in the Navy is disheartening.  Senior Naval leadership 
comments seem to show they are more interested in their own 
careers and appearing to support “diversity” rather than making a 
competent force capable of defending our nation in a dangerous 
world.  Lack of continued educational opportunities.  Once I finish 
my M.S. at NPS, it is highly unlikely that I will be able to continue on 
to a Ph.D. in the Navy, or gain the required job skills commonplace 
in the equivalent civilian field. 
 Better pay and less time away from family. 
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 Time away from family, pay, equality in bonus, job advancement 
opportunity. 
 After a pay back tour I will have over 10 years involved with the 
SIGINT community.  I could easily get GS position with NSA, NRO, 
DOD, with my experience and clearance.  It would also be easy to 
obtain a contractor position at many different locations.  I could over 
double my pay because my spouse could actually maintain a good 
job with upward mobility instead of moving every 2 years and 
basically starting over. 
 I want to pursue another line of work. 
 Quality of life.  Being at sea is hard on the family.  Haven’t made a 
decision yet though. 
 The lack of a defined career path for computer network operations.  
The probability of becoming a mid-level “paper-pusher” as I gain 
rank.  The perception that my time, efforts, and sacrifices are often 
wasted due to poor decisions from higher leadership.  The desire 
for stability as my kids approach high school age. 
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APPENDIX I.  IW RETENTION SURVEY QUESTION 12 OPINIONS 
Q12) Why are you considering retiring in the next 5 years?  Please provide 
concise reason(s): 
Eleven participants left open-ended statements to explain their possible 
future retirement.  Specific statements are shown below:  
 The financial and family strain/stress has taken its toll on my 
relationships at home.  I may have to leave the service to get a job 
with more regular hours to keep the peace. 
 I have done my time and no longer wish to be separated from my 
family for any length of time.  The job is not satisfying enough to 
warrant continued sacrifice by myself and my family. 
 I’m tired of moving and I would like to stay in one place for at least 
3 years.  When looking at prior advancement stats to the next rank, 
it would be a gamble for me to stay in past 5 more years.  I would 
need reassurance of where my community was headed, so that I 
could better plan the next 10 years of my service.  Right now, I 
don't see any point to stay past my current rank. 
 I do not like the direction the community is heading.  There are so 
many mid- grade and senior officers who do not truly understand 
the technical requirements of our community.  Furthermore, there 
are no senior officers clearly stating what those skill requirements 
should be.  There are clear indications that officers measure 
success not by their technical prowess, but by whether they simply 
tow the party line, which changes direction often and without 
academic rigor and/or intelligent debate.  Furthermore, I find it 
insulting that Navy officers, outside our designator, are trying to fill 
the void and state minimum skill requirements, which they do not 
understand, vice simply writing requirements, which they would like 
for us to fill. 
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 Civilian career opportunities along with more stability due to the fact 
that one must move so often in the military.  Deploying is ok after 
20 years only if I could homestead more often.  This will allow me to 
provide some stability to the family. 
 In order to spend more time with my children. 
 I don’t feel that my work is as rewarding as something in the private 
sector where I would actually produce something. 
 I have a wife that has been unable to work in one job for more than 
a couple of years due to constant relocation, and children that will 
be in high school, so it will primarily be related to easing the burden 
that military service has placed on my family. 
 I wish there was an option for just “considering” retirement versus 
“seriously considering”. I am eligible to retire within 5 years and the 
civilian market has much to offer. 
 With so few command opportunities and the uncertainty in our 
community, I will likely move to the private sector. 
 Major negatives for remaining in include transient status, and lack 
of IW community focus towards becoming a URL community with 
leadership opportunities. 
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APPENDIX J.  IW RETENTION SURVEY QUESTION 16 
HISTOGRAMS AND OPTIONS 
Twenty-nine participants answered these questions and their responses 
are shown below.  For the purposes of showing complete histogram labels, the 
responses for Question 16 were shortened.  The complete question wording can 
be found in Appendix C. 
 Homeport/Duty location of your choice (the detailer will 
choose your tour of duty, but you can choose your location). 
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 Billet type of your choice (you get to choose what type of duty 
you go to, i.e., sea, shore, or overseas duty, while the detailer 
chooses the location and command). 
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 One year Sabbatical (sabbatical is defined as an unpaid year to 




 Geographical Stability of 2 tours (geographical stability allows 
personnel to serve two consecutive tours or 6 years in the 
same location, while the detailer chooses the command). 
 
 Educational opportunity (detailer sends you to a master's or 
doctoral program for up to 2 years to earn your next degree). 
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 Compressed workweek (4 ten hour days, with 3 consecutive 
days off). 
 
 Flexible work hours (at least half of your working hours are 
flexible over 2 eight-hour shifts, i.e.: 0700-1500 or 0900-1700). 
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 Homeport/Duty location of your choice AND 2 tours of 
geographic stability (you choose location and the detailer 
sends you there for 2 tours or 6 years) 
 
 Department Head billet of your choice (assuming both it is 
available, and you are eligible) 
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 XO or CO billet of your choice (assuming both it is available, 
and you are eligible) 
 
 Options 
This part of the question gave the participant the ability to create 
their own option and disclose what percentage of their CSRB they would 
be willing to give for that option.  Four participants used one or two of 
these options as follows: 
o I would give it all back for:  The ability to actually perform 
within my area of expertise and permanent assignment to 
perform such duties at a shore facility without requiring 
deployment, even if this meant no promotion opportunities. 
o I would give 61%-70% back for Homeport/Duty location of 
your choice AND 2 tours of geographic stability (you choose 
location and the detailer sends you there for 2 tours or 6 




not hold it against the individual for taking the option to stay 
in one area - allow the individual a fair opportunity to 
promote) 
o I would give 41%-50% back for up to 2 yrs to work on PhD. 
o I would give 91%-99% back for 100% Language training at 
DLI followed by min 1 yr in country training, followed by 3 yr 
duty related to this areas security issues.  This will really 
make me feel the Navy and the IW community takes a 
common-sense approach toward training and preparing its 
officers for SUCCESS. 
o I would give 11%-20% back for IA/GSA billet of choice. 
o I would give 11%-20% back for choice of billet for two tours. 
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APPENDIX K.  IW RETENTION SURVEY QUESTION 24 OPINIONS 
Q24) Do you have any other monetary or nonmonetary solutions that may 
help the IW community improve retention? 
This was one of two open-ended questions toward the end of the survey.  
Nineteen participants responded as shown below: 
 Actual education vice MILITARY education (taught by ones who 
WANT and HAVE THE ABILITY to teach - not just checking a box 
for promotion purposes), educate the community via Distance 
Learning on SIGINT math from NPS, or other comparable 
educational system (as part of IW qualification process). 
 The community assumed responsibility for many new duties when 
we merged with NETWARCOM, however, we have not defined or 
trained for any of them.  We simply changed our name and have 
confused everyone, including ourselves, as to our purpose.  The 
initial training I received when I joined the community was the worst 
I have experienced during my career.  Note that this was before the 
merger when we actually knew what our job was supposed to be.  I 
see no evidence that we have improved and we still rely almost 
entirely on OJT. 
 There are two areas that I feel would greatly improve retention in 
the IW community: 
o Training: Many IW officers are sent to billets without the 
proper training or experience.  There is almost zero 
formalized training (outside of graduate school) and the 
performance of IW officers is greatly affected.  The wide 
range of missions now covered by IW requires more (not 
less) training and on the job training is not reliable. 
o Advancement / career path:  There is no established career 
path and many IW officers float from one billet to the next 
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without any real plan.  No mentoring and a lack of focus from 
one detailer to the next makes it difficult to plan a successful 
career.  The fact that many of the senior billets at NNWC are 
occupied by non-IW officers( or new lateral transfer O-5 /  
O-6) does not hold a lot of promise for the career path of 
current IW officers. 
 Given the responsibilities one faces at this stage of a career, i.e. 
many have children entering college at this time, a significant bonus 
would be an attractive retention tool. 
 I think the first and foremost issue that needs to be resolved is to 
solidify where the IW community is heading.  Too many rumors of 
IW officers being forced converted to Intel and vice versa, and the 
confusion as to where we're headed within the cyber community.  If 
you want better officers then you need to allow us to focus more in 
a specific area instead of being a mile wide and an inch deep with 
knowledge.  There needs to be more focus on taking care of the 
officers in the O4 and below ranks.  The mentoring program is  
a joke. 
 Its all about the work environment, leadership, and quality of life 
issues (in addition to pay). 
 Job satisfaction is key!!!  Our community has become responsible 
for such a large area of responsibility, all based on technical 
proficiency and management of those technical fields to fulfill the 
needs of the Navy.  The ever changing, and therefore the lack of 
clear direction, is evident.  The grand plans which filter down from 
Norfolk never work and are often dismissed by officers, as well as 
senior enlisted.  How can we ever lead the community into the 
future when we can't even agree on the direction?  We need a 
senior officer who can commit his/her time to improving our  
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community based on intelligent debate and academic rigor (Our 
Admirals are so multitasked with their assignments; they do not 
have time to focus on us). 
 I would like to see a depth of skill added to our immense breath of 
experience.  The traditional SIGINT functions 1610s have 
performed are just as important as ever, but the value of career 
diversity seems to trump the value of being a SIGINT expert.  This 
problem is exacerbated by adding roles in the Cyber realm to our 
list of requisite skills.  Why not encourage our 1610s to specialize in 
a particular area for multiple tours before shipping them off to get 
that next check in the box? 
 Matching your TSP contributions.  The ROTH TSP was a good start 
at moving the TSP forward.  The next logical step would be to 
match the contributions. 
 Nonmonetary: There was talk long ago about allowing officers to be 
technical specialists (outside of the LDO community) or have areas 
of focus.  For example, allowing an IW officer to focus on CNO 
professionally and be offered jobs that continue to enhance that 
specialty.  Moving from one type of job to the next requires 
excessive time just to build corporate knowledge about the nature 
of the job; time which could be spent improving the process if that 
knowledge was already founded through past tour experiences  
and training. 
 Nonmonetary:  Community identity...I think more information, 
strategic goals and operational plans, needs to be pushed out to 
the IW officers.  While this may not be a problem at the magnet 
sites where large concentrations of IW officers reside, those of us 
on ships or working at other agencies are kept in the dark about the 
day to day events of our HQ...if the means to push information is 
already there, it needs more marketing and visibility.  Sometimes 
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our personnel are treated as SWO’s while PCS afloat, which is 
good for the ship CO’s, but not for IW skill sets. 
 It's all the people you work with: big Navy, IW, or civilian sector 
there is always politics and BS, but the retention solution is to be 
good to people.  I’d much rather have additional educational 
opportunities than haggle for cash.  Money isn’t everything, 
although I do get the feeling IWs are the lowest paid officers in the 
Navy, since everyone with a pin gets a bonus, Submariners make 
more than half my pay in bonuses, and even the Intel guys got an 
extra chunk of change.  It is what it is though, and I didn’t join the 
service for money. 
 The disestablishment of the IW community should be seriously 
considered.  Our only special skill is signals intelligence (SIGINT) 
and it is not unreasonable to take a portion of our community and 
lateral transfer them to intelligence (1610) to perform this function.  
Our information operations “specialties” are exactly the opposite. 
There is no schoolhouse to train IW officers for PSYOP, MILDEC, 
EW, OPSEC, or CNO and we do not have appropriate levels of 
qualification in these fields.  Additionally, by pillar: 
PSYOP—The Army’s 4th POG performs all PSYOP planning and 
product generation.  There is no Navy equivalent to this unit and we 
do not send officers through the 4-month PSYOP officer course 
because the Navy is not POM-specified (Program Objective 
Memorandum) to maintain a PSYOP capability. 
MILDEC—The Army has the only school for MILDEC and the Navy 
is reluctant to send personnel through this training.  We do not train 
and certify tactical units (ships and aircraft squadrons), the primary 
implementers of military deception techniques.  Additionally, Navy 
MILDEC equipment is lacking for electromagnetic and  
acoustic deception. 
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EW—The ECMO community is separate from the IW community. 
The installation of an O5 lateral transfer ECMO as CO of Whidbey 
Island speaks to our lack of knowledge in this field.  And while we 
have “supported” the Army with EW on the ground by providing 
personnel, they are actually going in with minimal training.  Such a 
task could have been performed by URL officers given the  
same training. 
OPSEC—This should be practices and certified by all units – we 
bring no special skills or training to the table for the implementation 
of OPSEC.  OPSEC planners should report directly to commanders 
and not be part of the N39 staff. 
CNO—While there are dedicated Navy commands to implement 
different portions of CNO, there is no special training we bring to 
the table.  Officers from other communities with appropriate short-
term training would perform just as well.  If you also factor in those 
officers who had computer science backgrounds regardless of 
designator and those who are interested in computers as a hobby, 
you would find a much more qualified and effective workforce. 
If you add on concepts like “influence operations,” our potential 
contributions seem unique.  However, in point of fact, there are no 
advanced degree programs available at NPS in regional studies – 
only technical majors.  We allowed the three billets that were 
created to expire, and there are no additional spots on the horizon.  
Additionally, IW officers are highly discouraged from applying to 
Olmstead scholarships and a vast majority of PEP tours are not 
available to IW officers because we are restricted line.  Throw in the 
lack of language training billets for our community and it shows that 
we are extremely weak in an area where we are supposed to  
be experts. 
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Then if you factor in the FAO community stand-up, there is really no 
place for our “influence operations” “special skills” that we actually 
do not posses. 
 Job satisfaction is key.  People need to feel like they have the tools 
and the ability to make a tangible difference. 
 Many of us are technically oriented, so providing more billets that 
actually use our skills would help improve job satisfaction.  Also 
putting people into billets based on the skills they actually have, 
vice family or geo-locational desires or needs.  Doing a better job of 
screening senior officers for leadership billets would also help.  
Again, due to the community attracting officers with a technical 
bias, many are lacking in leadership and people skills.  Those types 
of people should not be in jobs that include developing JOs, or 
Sailors in general. 
 People do this job for different reasons.  As long as my skills are 
used in a meaningful way, I plan on staying with or without a bonus. 
I am more worried about getting stuck in a remedial job in order to 
get a check-in-the-box than having a high itempo.  I have yet to 
meet someone in the IW community that minds deploying - but I 
have met plenty who get back stateside (when they expect to have 
more time with their families) and get stuck in a 12 hour day doing 
remedial taskers.  No one enjoys a constant crisis mode (must-
have-these-stats-by-close-of-business-or-world-will-end) when they 
are back from deploying.  If I got stuck in a job like that, I'd consider 
leaving no matter what money was offered.  Also, an Information 
Warfare pin would be nice since it is a warfare like surface or 
subsurface. 
 Advanced education in combination with follow-on billet/homeport 
of choice. 
221 
 Leadership billets.  There are very few opportunities for command, 
and some of our largest commands are commanded by non-IW 
officers (NIOC Norfolk, NNWC). 
 Lack of community focus has been a major source of consternation 
in the IW work environment.  IW “community plans” have focused 
on trivial issues such as warfare pins and retaining antiquated core 
competencies instead of how to embrace the full IW scope, 
alter/improve educational opportunities, and (most importantly) 
move into warfighter posture. 
Junior officers question where we are going and the competency of 
our leadership because previous “vision” documents have not been 
about refocusing to meet tomorrows challenges but about how to 
hold on to what we have.  Further, our continued deference to 
URLs as ultimate NETWAR leadership demonstrates that our 
leaders are unwilling to step forward, acting as the “reluctant bride” 
instead of the “white knight.” 
 I am highly motivated by training, and the opportunities for technical 
leadership.  Better-defined career paths would help reduce the 
uncertainty in the detailing process. 
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